FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
In the Matter of a Complaint by FINAL DECISION
Angelo J. DeLeon and Fairfield Police Union, I.B.P.O., Local 530,
against Docket #FIC 90-282
Fairfield Board of Police Commissioners,
Respondent July 24, 1991
The above-captioned matter was heard as a contested case on November 11 and December 14, 1990, at which time the complainants and the respondent appeared, stipulated to certain facts and presented testimony, exhibits and argument on the complaint. Docket #FIC 90-286 was consolidated for hearing with the above-captioned matter.
After consideration of the entire record, the following facts are found and conclusions of law are reached:
1. The respondent is a public agency within the meaning of 1-18a(a), G.S.
2. By letter of complaint filed with this Commission on July 31, 1990, the complainants alleged that in violation of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) the respondent:
(a) held meetings on June 13 and July 11, 1990 (hereinafter "June meeting" and "July meeting"), at which grievances and/or transfers of personnel were discussed and voted upon although the individuals discussed were not notified and the agendas for the meetings did not list either grievances or transfers as items to be discussed;
(b) at the June meeting had discussions concerning grievances and/or transfers which were not reflected in the minutes for either meeting, and did not provide the minutes for the June meeting to the complainant until July 2, 1990; and
(c) routinely interviews prospective police candidates in executive session and did so during the week of July 23, 1990.
3. It is found that the respondent held the June meeting.
Docket #FIC 90-282 Page 2
4. It is found that the complainant DeLeon attended the respondent's June meeting.
5. It is found that the complainants failed to comply with the appeal provisions set forth in 1-21i(b), G.S., with respect to their allegations concerning the respondent's June meeting.
6. It is concluded that this Commission is without subject matter jurisdiction to hear or decide the appeal as to the June meeting and the complaint is dismissed as to those allegations.
7. The respondent contends that it maintains two sets of minutes for every regular meeting held--an "approved" and "unapproved" set of minutes.
8. At the hearing on this matter the respondent testified that the "approved" set of minutes get approved at the regularly scheduled meeting following the meeting for which the minutes were prepared and thereafter are placed in a bound volume where all of the minutes for its meetings are kept. The "unapproved" set of minutes are available to the public within the statutory time period.
9. It is found that the minutes of the June meeting were mailed to the complainant DeLeon, and not received by him until July 2, 1990.
10. It is found, however, that the complainants failed to demonstrate that the minutes of the June meeting were not available within seven days of the date of the meeting in accordance with 1-21(a), G.S.
11. It is found that the respondent held a July meeting.
12. The respondent concedes that at its July meeting it discussed and voted upon a motion regarding matron duty although that topic was not listed on the agenda for the July meeting.
13. It is concluded that the agenda for the July meeting did not adequately state the business to be transacted at the meeting as required by 1-21(a), G.S.
14. Section 1-21(a), G.S., provides that by a two-thirds vote a public agency may amend its agenda for a regular meeting in order to consider and act upon business not included in its originally filed agenda.
Docket #FIC 90-282 Page 3
15. It is concluded that the respondent failed to properly amend its agenda by first obtaining an affirmative vote of two-thirds of all board members present and voting as required by 1-21(a), G.S.
16. It is found that no discussion or action on the grievance concerning matron duty occurred at the July meeting.
17. The respondent concedes that it interviews prospective employees in executive session.
18. It is concluded that 1-18a(e)(1), 1-21 and 1-21g, G.S., permit an agency to convene an executive session for a proper purpose which may include interviewing job applicants.
The following order by the Commission is hereby recommended on the basis of the record concerning the above-captioned complaint:
1. Henceforth the respondent shall act in strict compliance with the agenda and open meeting provisions clearly set forth in 1-21, G.S.
Approved by Order of the Freedom of Information Commission at its regular meeting of July 24, 1991.
Debra L. Rembowski
Acting Clerk of the Commission
Docket #FIC 90-282 Page 4
PURSUANT TO SECTION 4-180(c), G.S. THE FOLLOWING ARE THE NAMES OF EACH PARTY AND THE MOST RECENT MAILING ADDRESS, PROVIDED TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION, OF THE PARTIES OR THEIR AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE.
THE PARTIES TO THIS CONTESTED CASE ARE:
Angelo J. DeLeon and Fairfield Police Union, I.B.P.O., Local 530
c/o Robert J. Murray, Jr., Esq.
65 Seaside Avenue
Guilford, CT 06437
Fairfield Board of Police Commissioners
c/o Donal C. Collimore, Esq.
1238 Post Road
Fairfield, CT 06430
Debra L. Rembowski
Acting Clerk of the Commission