FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION

OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT

 

In the Matter of a Complaint by FINAL DECISION

 

Dean J. Golembeski, Brent Laymon and The Associated Press,

 

Complainants

 

against Docket #FIC 86-104

 

Attorney General Joseph I. Lieberman,

 

Respondent September 23, 1986

 

The above captioned matter was heard as a contested case on May 2, 1986. By agreement the hearing was continued to May 13, 1986, at which time the complainants and the respondent appeared, stipulated to certain facts and presented testimony, exhibits and argument on the complaint.

 

After consideration of the entire record the following facts are found:

 

1. The respondent is a public agency within the meaning of 1-18a(a), G.S.

 

2. By letter dated March 21, 1986 the complainant Golembeski made a written request of the respondent for a copy of a report that had been prepared for his office and for the State Department of Transportation by management Technology and Data Systems, Inc. (hereinafter "MTDS") on a computer analysis of Connecticut's road paving program.

 

3. By letter dated March 24, 1986 the respondent denied complainant Golembeski access to the requested report claiming the report was exempt pursuant to 1-19(a), 1-19(b)(3)(B), 1-19(b)(3)(C), 1-19(b)(4), 1-19(b)(5), 1-19(b)(10) and 35-42(c), G.S.

 

4. By letter of complaint filed with the Commission on April 17, 1986 the complainant Golembeski appealed the denial of his request.

 

Docket #FIC 86-104 Page 2

 

5. It is found that the report that is the subject of the instant request stems from a contractual agreement between the respondent, the State Department of Transportation and MTDS to develop a bid monitoring system.

 

6. It is also found that the report in question outlines the methodology employed by MTDS to analyze, by way of a specialized software system, Connecticut's road paving program with specific reference to the detection of bidrigging.

 

7. It is found that the substance of the report requested in paragraph 2, above, constitutes a trade secret within the meaning of 1-19(b)(5), G.S.

 

8. It is therefore concluded that the request, as it relates to the substance of the report, is exempt from disclosure pursuant to 1-19(b)(5), G.S.

 

9. It is further found, however, that the respondent has failed to prove that the general conclusions reached in the report in question are exempt from disclosure within the meaning of 1-19(a), 1-19(b)(3)(B), 1-19(b)(3)(C), 1-19(b)(4), 1-19(b)(5), 1-19(b)(10) and 35-42(c), G.S.

 

The following order by the Commission is hereby recommended on the basis of the record concerning the above captioned complaint:

 

1. The respondent shall forthwith provide the complainants with a copy of the conclusions reached in the report more fully described in paragraph 2 of the findings of fact, above.

 

2. In complying with paragraph 1 of this order, the respondent may delete or otherwise mask those portions of the conclusion which are exempt from disclosure pursuant to 1-19(b)(5), G.S.

 

Approved by order of the Freedom of Information Commission at its special meeting of September 23, 1986.

 

Karen J. Haggett

Clerk of the Commission