FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT

 

 

In the Matter of a Request
for Advisory Opinion


 

 

     Advisory Opinion   #44

Corporation Counsel, City of Ansonia,

Applicant

    

 

 

 

On January 14, 1981, the Commission considered and agreed to respond to the request for an advisory opinion filed by the Corporation Counsel, City of Ansonia.

 

In his letter of request, the applicant states that the Board of Aldermen of the City of Ansonia adopted a resolution permitting members of that board to attend certain executive sessions of other city agencies.  Specifically, the resolution provides that

 

the committees of the Board of Alderman [sic] are herein given the right to attend the executive sessions of any and all commissions or agencies of the City of Ansonia wherein such agency is discussing matters upon which the Board of Alderman [sic] committees have direct responsibility provided that said committee of said Board of Alderman [sic] and said agency or board comply with the substantive procedural requirements as set forth by the Freedom of Information Act.

 

The board of Aldermen is the legislative body of the City of Ansonia. Conn. Gen. Stats. §§ 1-1(m) and 7-193(a).  See also Charter of the City of Ansonia, § 85 et seq.

 

In essence, the applicant seeks the Commission's opinion as to whether this resolution of the board of aldermen is con­sistent with the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act, particularly Conn. Gen. Stats.  §1‑21g.

 

Conn. Gen. Stats. § 1‑21 permits a public agency to convene in executive session for one or more of the limited purposes set forth in Conn. Gen. Stats. § 1‑18a(e).  The latter section defines executive session, in part, as "a meeting of a public agency at which the public is excluded ...."   In addition, Conn. Gen. Stats. § 1‑21g expressly provides that

 

[a]t an executive session of a public agency, attendance shall be limited to members of said body and persons invited by said body to present testimony or opinion pertinent to matters before said body provided that such persons' attendance shall be limited to the period for which their presence is necessary to present such testimony or opinion and, provided further, that the minutes of such executive session shall disclose all persons who are in attendance.

 

The statute is clear and unambiguous, and therefore is not subject to statutory construction.  Housten v. Warden, 169 Conn. 247, 251 (1975); Evening Sentinel v. National Organization for Women, 168 Conn. 26 (1975).  It explicitly limits attendance at an executive session to agency members and those persons invited by the agency to present testimony or opinion relating to the subject of such session.  Further attendance by such invited persons, and by others, is prohibited.

 

Consequently, it is the Commission's opinion that to the extent that the resolution of the board of aldermen gives aldermen the right to attend the executive sessions of other municipal agencies without the latter's invitation, it is inconsistent with Conn. Gen. Stats. § 1‑21g.  Furthermore, it is the Commission's opinion that to the extent that that resolution gives aldermen the right to continue in attendance at the executive sessions of other municipal agencies, beyond the necessary period for which they were invited to present pertinent testimony or opinion, it is likewise inconsistent with Conn. Gen. Stats. § 1‑21g.

 

Since the resolution at issue appears to conflict with a section of the Freedom of Information Act, another question is necessarily raised. The question is whether the provisions of the board of aldermen resolution, where inconsistent with Conn. Gen. Stats. § 1‑21g, would supersede the mandate of the state statute.

 

The answer to this question is well‑settled under Connecticut law.  "Local charter powers must yield to the superior power of the state when the two enter a field of statewide concern." Journal Publishing Co. v. Enfield, 31 Conn. Sup. 392, 401 (Super. Ct. 974).  See also Larke v. Morrissey, 155 Conn. 163, 174 (1967) and Wallingford v. Board of Education, 152 Conn. 568, 574 (1965).  Therefore, it is the Commission's opinion that the provisions of Conn. Gen. Stats. § 1-21g would control over any inconsistent provisions of the subject board of aldermen resolution.

 

 

                                                                                            By Order of the Freedom of
                                                                                            Information Commission

                                                                                           

                                                                                            ________________________
                                                                                            Judith A. Lahey, Chairman of
                                                                                            of the Freedom of Information
                                                                                            Commission

Date  ___________________

 

                                                                                             Ordered_________________

Wendy Rae Briggs,
Clerk of the Commission