FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT

 

The above-captioned matter was heard as a contested case on April 14, and May 21, 2009, at which times the complainant and the respondents appeared, stipulated to certain facts and presented testimony, exhibits and argument on the complaint.  For purposes of hearing, the above-captioned matter was consolidated with Docket #FIC 2008-560; Robin Elliott v. John Sieminski, Warden, State of Connecticut, Department of Correction, Corrigan-Radgowski Correctional Institution; and State of Connecticut, Department of Correction; and Docket # FIC 2008-627; Robin Elliott v. Warden, State of Connecticut, Department of Correction, Corrigan-Radgowski Correctional Institution; and State of Connecticut, Department of Correction.

 

A Report of Hearing Officer was issued on June 4, 2009 in the above captioned matter.  The Commission considered such report at its special meeting of July 1, 2009.   At such time, the respondents requested that the Commission reopen the hearing so that evidence could be entered into the record in support of their claimed exemptions to the disclosure of the records at issue, claiming that their failure to do so at the prior hearings was a result of being unaware of the Commission’s “new procedure” requiring them to do so.  Notwithstanding its rejection of the claim that putting on evidence in support of one’s claims is a “new procedure,” the Commission remanded the above-captioned matter to the hearing officer.  A hearing on remand was conducted on July 13, 2009, at which time the complainant and the respondents appeared, presented testimony, and argument on the complaint. 

 

The complainant, who is incarcerated, appeared via teleconference, pursuant to the January 2004 memorandum of understanding between the Commission and the Department of Correction.  See Docket No. CV 03-0826293, Anthony Sinchak v. FOIC et al, Superior Court, J.D. of Hartford at Hartford, Corrected Order dated January 27, 2004 (Sheldon, J.).

 

After consideration of the entire record, the following facts are found and conclusions of law are reached:

1.      The respondents are public agencies within the meaning of §1-200(1), G.S.

 

2.      It is found that by letter dated July 17, 2008, the complainant made a request to the respondents pursuant to the Freedom of Information (“FOI”) Act that included the following:

 

a.       “Please provide me with the ‘table of contents’ that govern the administrative directives.”

 

b.      “Please provide me with the administrative directive, which sets the guidelines for the packing, and inventory of inmate property (it may be Adm. Dir. 6.10).”

 

c.       “Please provide me with the identity of all staff members who were involved with the packing, storing and/or transportation of my property to the A/P on July 9, 2008.”

 

d.      “Please provide me with the post orders, or guidelines for supervisors overseeing the packing or inventory of inmate property.”

 

e.       “Please provide the names of all supervisors responsible for overseeing the packing of my property on July 9, 2008.”

 

f.       “Please provide me with a complete list of the names of all staff members who were present in F-Unit (Fox-trot) during the code call at approximately 1:30 p.m. to 2 p.m. on July 9, 2008.”

 

g.      “Please provide me with copies of all reports, summaries, use of force, chemical agents disciplinary reports, or any document, pertaining to that day made by any staff members.”

 

h.      “Please provide me with any written documents or phone summaries, memo or any communications, as pertains to me, concerning the events in questions [sic] on July 9, 2008, namely the assault on the correctional officer.”

 

i.       “Please provide me with the names of the correctional officer who was assaulted on July 9, 2008.”

 

The complainant indicated in his request that he was indigent.

 

3.      It is found that by letter dated July 23, 2008, the respondents acknowledged receipt of the complainant’s request and informed him that “in the event that [he] did not have sufficient funds in [his] account to pay for the copy fees associated with production of documents, the copies will be provided and an obligation to pay shall be established in [his] account.” 

 

4.      It is found that by letter dated July 29, 2008, the respondents attempted to provide the complainant with the records that were responsive to his request but assessed a fee for the copies and informed him again that “in the event that [he] did not have sufficient funds in [his] account to pay for the copy fees associated with production of documents, the copies will be provided and an obligation to pay shall be established in [his] account.”

 

5.      It is found that the complainant did not take the records at that time.

 

6.      By letter dated July 30, 2008 and filed on August 1, 2008, the complainant appealed to this Commission, alleging that the respondents violated the FOI Act by attempting to provide him with records but on the condition that he sign a fund withdrawal form that would allow the respondents to debit his account when funds became available to pay the fee for the copies of records provided.  The complainant also requested that this Commission impose a civil penalty against the respondents. 

 

7.      It is found that, by letter dated September 1, 2008 and filed on September 11, 2008, the complainant amended his appeal to limit his complaint to allege that the respondents had violated the FOI Act by redacting non-exempt portions of the responsive records that were provided and by failing to provide any records in response to his request described in paragraphs 2c, 2d, and 2e, above.

 

8.      This appeal is, therefore, limited solely to the allegations made in the complainant’s amended appeal, as described in paragraph 7, above.

 

9.      Section 1-200(5), G. S., provides:

 

“Public records or files” means any recorded data or information relating to the conduct of the public's business prepared, owned, used, received or retained by a public agency, or to which a public agency is entitled to receive a copy by law or contract under section 1-218, whether such data or information be handwritten, typed, tape-recorded, printed, photostated, photographed or recorded by any other method. 

 

10.  Section 1-210(a), G. S., provides in relevant part:

Except as otherwise provided by any federal law or state statute, all records maintained or kept on file by any public agency, whether or not such records are required by any law or by any rule or regulation, shall be public records and every person shall have the right to (1) inspect such records promptly during regular office or business hours, (2) copy such records in accordance with subsection (g) of section 1-212, or (3) receive a copy of such records in accordance with section 1-212. 

 

11.  Section 1-212(a), G. S., provides in relevant part that “[a]ny person applying in writing shall receive, promptly upon request, a plain or certified copy of any public record.”

 

12.   It is found that the requested records, to the extent that they exist, are public records within the meaning of §§1-200(5), 1-210(a), and 1-212(a), G.S.

 

13.   Notwithstanding the complainant’s allegation described in paragraph 6, above, it is found that the respondents provided the complainant with, and he accepted, an un-readacted copy of the records described in paragraphs 2a and 2b, above.

 

14.   It is found that the records responsive to the complainant’s request described in paragraph 2c through 2i, above, are included in the 159-page incident report package related to the July 9, 2008 incident (hereinafter “the incident”), a copy of which was provided to the complainant in redacted form.

 

15.   At the hearings on this matter, the respondents contended that the redactions were made, and are appropriate, pursuant to §1-210(b)(2) and (18), G.S.   

 

16.   It is found that, at the request of the hearing officer, the respondents submitted an un-redacted copy of the record for in camera inspection which has been identified as in camera record #s 2008-507-001 through 2008-507-159.

 

17.   It is found that the in camera record is an incident report captioned “Incident Summary Report” and includes various supplemental forms and reports such as use of force reports, injury reports, medical incident reports, workers’ compensation forms, emergency procedures logs, inmate property inventory forms, supervisor video recording review forms, contraband/physical evidence tag and chain of custody forms, and inmate location history printouts.

 

18.   It is found that there are no other records responsive to the complainant’s request including his request described in paragraphs 2c, 2d, and 2e, above.

 

19.   It is found that, on the in camera index, the respondents contended specifically that: all code colors, all inmate names, inmate numbers, locations, and social security numbers, excluding those of the complainant, are exempt from disclosure pursuant to §1-210(b)(18), G.S.; all medical information of staff and inmates, not including the complainant’s, are exempt from disclosure pursuant to §§1-210(b)(2) and (18), G.S.; the emergency logs are exempt from disclosure pursuant to §1-210(b)(18)(G), G.S.; and the workers compensation documents are exempt from disclosure pursuant to §§1-210(b)(2), G.S., and the federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (hereinafter “HIPAA”).

 

20.   With respect to the in camera records that the respondents contend are exempt from disclosure pursuant to §1-210(b)(2), G.S., that section provides that disclosure is not required of “[p]ersonnel or medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute an invasion of personal privacy ….”

 

21.   The Supreme Court set forth the test for the exemption contained in §1-210(b)(2), G.S., in Perkins v. Freedom of Information Commission, 228 Conn. 158, 175 (1993).  The claimant must first establish that the files in question are personnel, medical or similar files.  Second, the claimant must show that disclosure of the records would constitute an invasion of personal privacy.  In determining whether disclosure would constitute an invasion of personal privacy, the claimant must establish both of two elements: first, that the information sought does not pertain to legitimate matters of public concern, and second, that the disclosure of such information is highly offensive to a reasonable person.  The Commission takes administrative notice of the multitude of court rulings, commission final decisions¹, and instances of advice given by the Commission staff members², which have relied upon the Perkins test, since its release in 1993.

 

22.   With respect to in camera record #s 2008-507-001, 2, and 6, which the respondents contend are medical files exempt from disclosure pursuant to §1-210(b)(2), G.S., it is found that the respondents failed to prove that the principal purpose of such records is to furnish information for making medical decisions regarding the staff or inmates.  After a careful review, it is found that, while those in camera records contain information related to injuries sustained by individuals involved in the incident, such information was not provided to a health care professional to assist in medical diagnosis or treatment.  Rather, the information was provided to complete the respondent department’s “Incident Summary Report” which is used to document specified events that occur within the prisons.  See Connecticut Alcohol & Drug Abuse Commission v. Freedom of Information Commission, 233 Conn. 28, 41 (1995), and Docket No. CV 08 4018164 S, State of Connecticut, Department of Public Safety v. FOIC, et al, Superior Court, J.D. of New Britain, Memorandum of Decision dated March 3, 2009 (Judge Schuman) [a ‘medical’ file of an individual has as one of its principal purposes the furnishing of information for making medical decisions regarding that individual].

 

23.   With respect to in camera record #s 2008-507-013, 014, and 103, it is found that they are captioned “Medical Incident Report”; contain information related to the injuries, assessment, and treatment of individuals involved in the incident; are signed by a medical professional; and are maintained in each individual’s medical file.  

 

24.   It is found that in camera record #s 2008-507-013, 014, and 103 are medical files within the meaning of §1-210(b)(2), G.S.

 

25.   It is found that the information contained in in camera record #s 2008-507-013, 014, and 103 does not pertain to legitimate matters of public concern, and the disclosure of such records is highly offensive to a reasonable person.

 

26.   It is concluded therefore that: disclosure of in camera record #s 2008-507-013, 014, and 103 would constitute an invasion of personal privacy within the meaning of Perkins, supra; that such records are exempt from mandatory disclosure; and that the respondents did not violate the FOI Act by redacting such records.

 

27.   With respect to in camera record #s 2008-507-104 through 108, and 110 through 112, which records the respondents contend are medical files exempt from disclosure pursuant to §1-210(b)(2), G.S., it is found that such records are individual forms captioned “Health Evaluation For Restrictive Housing Unit (RHU) Placement.”

 

28.   At the July 13, 2009 hearing, the respondents contended that such records are medical files exempt from disclosure pursuant to §1-210(b)(2), G.S., because the forms are used by medical professionals to assess whether an inmate would be harmed by being placed in restrictive housing.  By way of example, the respondents contended that if an inmate had been previously diagnosed with a heart condition and he required placement in the infirmary, that information would be a “contra-indication” for placement of that inmate in restrictive housing.  The respondents further contended that the form is used by medical treatment personnel to assess the physical and mental health of an inmate and to make treatment decisions.  The respondents contend that such treatment can include housing decisions such as placement in the infirmary, in mental health housing, on specialized watch, or in restrictive housing wherein medical interventions could be accomplished.  Finally, the respondents contended that the forms are placed with the inmate’s medical records and are considered part of the inmate’s treatment file. 

 

29.   It is found that while there are various types of housing decisions that are made by a treating physician that fall within the definition of “treatment,” there are housing decisions that are purely custodial.  

 

30.   It is found that the “Health Evaluation For Restrictive Housing Unit (RHU) Placement” forms, that are at issue in this matter, were not used to assess an inmate for purposes of diagnosis or treatment but rather were used to certify an inmate’s fitness for, or if he would be harmed by, placement in restrictive housing, which decision, in this instance, was purely custodial.

 

31.   After a careful review, it is found that the principal purpose of in camera record #s 2008-507-104 through 108, and 110 through 112, was not to furnish information for making medical decisions regarding the inmate but to make custodial decisions regarding the inmate.  It is found that while the in camera records contain some medically related information, that information was not provided to a health care professional to assist in medical diagnosis or treatment.  Rather, the information was provided by a health care professional to certify that inmate’s fitness for placement in a restrictive housing unit described as administrative detention.    See Connecticut Alcohol & Drug Abuse Commission v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, and State of Connecticut, Department of Public Safety v. FOIC, et al, supra.

 

32.   It is also found that any record may be placed in a file described as a medical or treatment file, however, that is not a decisive factor in assessing whether that record is a “medical” or “similar” file within the meaning of §1-210(b)(2), G.S.

 

33.   It is concluded, therefore, that in camera record #s 2008-507-104 through 108, and 110 through 112, are not “medical” or “similar” files within the meaning of §1-210(b)(2), G.S., and are not exempt from disclosure under that provision.

 

34.   It is found that in camera record #s 2008-507-146 through 159 are workers compensation forms, which the respondents contend are medical files exempt from disclosure pursuant to §1-210(b)(2), G.S.

 

35.   It is found that in camera record #s 2008-507-146 through 159 are maintained in a DOC staff member’s medical file.

 

36.   At the July 13, 2009 hearing, the respondents contended that the primary use of the information provided on a worker’s compensation form is to convey to the employer exactly what the medical condition is that would either prevent the staff member from engaging in certain activities, require light duty work assignments, or prevent the staff member from working at all.  They contended that the information is provided and used to ensure that staff members do not further injure themselves.  

 

37.   It is found, consistent with the respondents’ contentions in this regard, that in camera record #s 2008-507-146 through 159, were not used to assist in medical diagnosis or treatment.

 

38.   It is also found that the act of reducing an employee’s work load, or reassigning that employee to lighter duties, is not “treatment” as that term is commonly understood.

 

39.   It is found that the principal purpose of in camera record #s 2008-507-146 through 159 is not to furnish information for making medical decisions regarding staff members.   After a careful review, it is found that those in camera records contain information regarding job related injuries sustained by staff members and that such information was not provided to a health care professional to assist in medical diagnosis or treatment.  Rather, the information was provided to make claims for payment of medical care and/or, as the respondents contended, to convey to the employer the staff member’s medical condition so that work assignments could be adjusted accordingly.  See Connecticut Alcohol & Drug Abuse Commission v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, and State of Connecticut, Department of Public Safety v. FOIC, et al, supra.

 

40.   As already found in paragraph 32, above, any record may be placed in a file described as a medical or treatment file, however, that is not a decisive factor in assessing whether that record is a medical or similar file within the meaning of §1-210(b)(2), G.S.

 

41.   It is concluded, therefore, that in camera record #s 2008-507-146 through 159 are not “medical” or “similar” files within the meaning of §1-210(b)(2), G.S., and are not exempt from disclosure under that provision.

 

42.   With respect to the records that the respondents contend are exempt from disclosure pursuant to §1-210(b)(18), G.S., that provision provides in relevant part that disclosure is not required of:

 

[r]ecords, the disclosure of which the Commissioner of Correction . . . has reasonable grounds to believe may result in a safety risk, including the risk of harm to any person or the risk of an escape from, or a disorder in, a correctional institution or facility under the supervision of the Department of Correction or Whiting Forensic Division facilities. Such records shall include, but are not limited to:

 

(A)  Security manuals, including emergency plans contained or referred to in such security manuals. . .

 

(G) . . . [l]ogs or other documents that contain information on the movement or assignment of inmates or staff at correctional institutions or facilities . . . .

 

43.   In Docket #CV064012025S, State of Connecticut, Department of Correction v. Freedom of Information Commission and Richard Quint, et al, Superior Court, J.D. of New Britain, Memorandum of Decision dated July 3, 2007 (Judge Levine), the court held that “the statutory phrases ‘reasonable grounds to believe’ and ‘may result’ establish a standard which has an inherently subjective component…” and that “…the test can … be established only by opinion evidence.” (page 6).

 

44.   The respondents contend, in this regard, that in camera record #s 2008-507-001, 2, 6, 104 through 108, 110 through 112, and 146 through 159, specifically, are exempt from disclosure pursuant to §1-210(b)(18), G.S.

 

45.   At the July 13, 2009 hearing, the respondents contended that, in their opinion, if it were known, specifically within the inmate population, that an inmate or staff member suffered from a physical or mental ailment, a safety and security risk would be present.  The respondents provided the following examples:

 

a.       If it were known that a staff member suffered from a severe back injury, inmates would consider that staff member as a potential target for assault because he or she would be more easily overpowered than a staff member that did not have such an injury.  The threat of such assault puts that staff member’s safety at risk by first being assaulted and second by having his/her back targeted during the assault.  The security of the prison would also be at risk because the response to assaults often requires other staff members to leave their assigned areas and leave other inmates unattended who may engage in some other nefarious activity, such as escape or another assault.

 

b.      If it were known that an inmate suffered from an medical condition that required taking a sedative thus making the inmate sluggish and somewhat slow to react, that inmate would be at risk of another inmate entering his cell and either stealing from him or assaulting him.  The risk of such a theft or assault not only puts the inmate’s safety at risk but also compromises the security of the prison.

 

46.   It is found, based upon the respondents’ examples, that if the respondents could withhold information regarding an inmate’s or staff member’s physical or mental health, the respondents might avoid the safety and security risk that could be created, in this regard.

 

47.   After a careful review of the in-camera records, it is found that the Commissioner of Correction has reasonable grounds to believe that disclosure of the portions of the in camera records, including in camera record #s 2008-507-001, 2, 6, 104 through 108, 110 through 112, and 146 through 159, that disclose injuries, medical or mental conditions, or the treatment thereof, may result in a safety risk, within the meaning of §1-210(b)(18), G.S., and consequently, it is concluded that those portions of such records are exempt from disclosure and that the respondents did not violate the FOI Act by redacting those portions.

 

48.   With respect to the inmate names and numbers, which the respondents also contend are exempt from disclosure pursuant to §1-210(b)(18), G.S., the respondents contended, at the July 13, 2009 hearing, that, in the context of the in camera records at issue in this case, the disclosure of inmate names and/or numbers, specifically within the inmate population, would create a safety and security risk.  The respondents provided the following example:

 

a.       If an inmate’s name and/or number were disclosed on an inmate’s property manifest revealing that he was in possession of certain valuables in his cell, that inmate would be a target for theft or extortion.  In the case of a theft, the inmate may be assaulted or a brawl would occur between the two.  In the case of extortion, if the inmate refused to cooperate, whatever threats were used, including threats of assault or harm to his family, may be carried out.  The threat of such assaults or brawls not only puts the inmates, or their family members, at risk of harm, but also puts the security of the prison at risk because the response to assaults and brawls often requires other staff members to leave their assigned areas leaving other inmates unattended who may engage in some other nefarious activity, such as escape or another assault.

 

49.   After a careful review of the in-camera records, it is found that the Commissioner of Correction has reasonable grounds to believe that disclosure of the inmate names and/or numbers found in in camera record #s 2008-507-113 through 120, 127, 128, 130, 135 and 136 may result in a safety risk, within the meaning of §1-210(b)(18), G.S., and consequently it is concluded that such names and/or numbers are exempt from disclosure and that the respondents did not violate the FOI Act by redacting them.

 

50.   At the July 13, 2009 hearing, the respondents contended that in camera record #s 2008-507-113 through 120, are exempt from disclosure, in their entirety, pursuant to §1-210(b)(18), G.S., contending that, in their opinion, disclosure of an inmate’s possessions, specifically within the inmate population, would create a safety and security risk.  The respondents’ example has already been described in paragraph 48a, above. 

 

51.   It is found that in camera record #s 2008-507-113 through 120 are inmate inventory property forms detailing items maintained by individual inmates within their cells.

 

52.   It is found, however, that by redacting the inmate’s name and/or number, the risk described in the example provided in paragraph 48a, above, would not exist.    

 

53.   It is found, therefore, that the Commissioner of Correction has no reasonable grounds to believe that disclosure of in camera record #s 2008-507-113 through 120, with inmate names and/or numbers redacted, may result in a safety risk, within the meaning of §1-210(b)(18), G.S., and consequently, the forms in their entirety are not exempt from disclosure pursuant to that provision.

 

54.   With respect to the records the respondents claim disclose “code colors” and information related thereto, the respondents claimed on the in camera index that such information is exempt from disclosure pursuant to §1-210(b)(18), G.S.

 

55.   At the July 13, 2009 hearing, the respondents contended that “code colors” constitute emergency procedures and contended that whenever there is an “institutional emergency” the codes dictate how staff is to respond to that emergency. The respondents also contended at the July 13, 2009 hearing, that, in their opinion, disclosure of the “code colors,” specifically within the inmate population, would create a safety and security risk because an individual with knowledge of what the codes meant could respond in a manner counter-productive to the response of staff.  The respondents contended that, notwithstanding any claim by an individual that they already know the codes and the standardized response to that code, formally disclosing the information could jeopardize the response of staff and compromise their ability to handle the emergency.  The respondents provided the following example:

 

a.       If the code colors were known, an individual could deliberately initiate a specific disturbance, forcing staff to respond in a specific manner in that area of the prison and leave other areas unattended, for the purpose of creating a diversion for some other nefarious activity in another area of the prison.  The response to the latter activity would be limited because staff would be diverted to handle the initial disturbance.  Thus, the safety and security of inmates and staff, in both areas, would be at risk. 

 

56.   It is found that the in camera records disclose one code color and do not disclose, in any detail, the standard response to that code color or any other code color. 

 

57.  It is also found, based on the testimony of the respondents, that the response to a code color is not always the same, that what an individual, including an inmate, may think they know about a code, and the standard response to it, is not necessarily accurate and that the codes are changed periodically.

 

58.   It is found that, in the present case, the complainant was present when the code was called, heard the code that was called and witnessed much of the staff’s response to the incident, and therefore, the in camera records disclose no more than what the complainant is aware of already.

 

59.   Based upon what is claimed on the in camera index and what is contained in the in camera records, it appears that the respondents do not want to disclose even the code color itself. 

 

60.   It is further found that the one code color mentioned, in the context of the in camera records at issue in this case, does not constitute an emergency plan, or even part thereof, within the meaning of §1-210(b)(18)(A), G.S.

 

61.   It is found, therefore, that the respondents failed to prove that the Commissioner of Correction has reasonable grounds to believe that the disclosure of the code color, in the context of the in camera records at issue in this case, may result in a safety risk within the meaning of §1-210(b)(18), G.S., and consequently, it is concluded that the code color, referenced in the context of the in camera records at issue in this case, is not exempt from disclosure pursuant to that provision.

 

62.   The respondents claimed on the in camera index that the in camera records contain information regarding the “location or re-location of inmates” and that such records are exempt from disclosure pursuant to §1-210(b)(18)(G), G.S.

 

63.   The respondents also contend that in camera record #s 2008-507-137, 138 and 144 are exempt from disclosure pursuant to §1-210(b)(18)(G), G.S., because such records are emergency logs of the location of security personnel.

 

64.   It is found that information regarding the location or re-location of inmates appears throughout in camera record #s 2008-507-001 through 2008-507-159; and further that in camera record #s 2008-507-137, 138 and 144 are emergency logs revealing the location of security personnel.

 

65.   It is found, therefore, that the records described in paragraph 64, above, constitute “logs or other documents that contain information on the movement or assignment of inmates or staff at correctional institutions or facilities” within the meaning of §1-210(b)(18)(G), G.S.

 

66.   It is found, therefore, that the information regarding the location and relocation of inmates and staff, contained throughout in camera record #s 2008-507-001 through 2008-507-159, and the emergency logs contained in in camera record #s 2008-507-137, 138 and 144, are permissibly exempt from disclosure pursuant to §1-210(b)(18)(G), G.S., and consequently, it is concluded that such records are exempt from disclosure and that the respondents did not violate the FOI Act by redacting them.

 

67.   At the July 13, 2009 hearing, the respondents contended that disclosure of the names, and/or identification numbers, of assault victims, specifically within the inmate population, would create a safety and security risk because those victims would be targeted for further assaults and/or harassment.  The respondents provided the following examples:

 

a.       In the case of a staff member who is an assault victim, that staff member is now apprehensive and unsure of his ability to maintain control of the inmates he is assigned to supervise.  An inmate with knowledge of the assault would prey upon that apprehension and threaten to assault that staff member again and/or continue to remind the staff member of the incident.  Both are attempts to intimidate that staff member and to undermine his authority and shake his confidence.  Without the confidence to exert his authority, that staff member may not fully perform his duties.  Such duties would include conducting a thorough cell or body search for contraband.  Contraband, including homemade weapons, would not be appropriately confiscated.  The potential for unauthorized weapons to enter, or remain, in the prison setting creates a safety and security risk - even if that risk resulted from a staff member not doing his job. 

 

b.      In the case of an inmate who is an assault victim, specifically sexual assault, that inmate would be viewed as an easy target to be assaulted again in the same manner.  The threat of such an assault puts that inmate’s safety at risk and compromises the security of the prison.  Even if the inmate were only threatened with such another assault, that inmate may engage in a fight in an effort to discourage attempts to assault him again and to rehabilitate his reputation within prison society.  The threat of such a fight puts inmates’ safety at risk and also compromise the security of the prison. 

 

68.   It is found that the in camera records contain the names of victims of assault.

 

69.   After a careful review of the in-camera records, it is found that the Commissioner of Correction has reasonable grounds to believe that disclosure of the names of victims of assault, wherever found in the in camera records, may result in a safety risk, within the meaning of §1-210(b)(18), G.S., and consequently, those names are permissibly exempt from disclosure. 

 

70.   After the July 13, 2009 hearing, the respondents submitted a new in camera index on which they claimed that personal information of staff contained in in camera record #s 2008-507-146 through 2008-507-159 was exempt from disclosure pursuant to §1-210(b)(18), G.S..

 

71.   It is found that the respondents failed to present any evidence at the hearing on this matter with respect to the applicability of §1-210(b)(18), G.S., to the personal information of staff contained in in camera record #s 2008-507-146 through 2008-507-159.

 

72.   Notwithstanding the finding in paragraph 71, above, it is found that in camera record #s 2008-507-151 and 153 are “personnel” or “similar” files within the meaning §1-210(b)(2), G.S.

 

73.  It is found that the records contain the names of family members and information concerning tax filing status. 

 

74.  It is found that the information described in paragraph 73, above, is not a matter of legitimate public concern and that the disclosure of such information would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, within the meaning of Perkins, supra.

 

75.   It is concluded therefore that answers reflected in lines 14, 15, and 21 through 23 of in camera record #2008-507-151 and lines 14, 15, 21 and 22 of in camera record #2008-507-153, are permissibly exempt from disclosure pursuant to §1-210(b)(2), G.S. and that respondents did not violate the FOI Act by redacting those lines.

 

76.   The respondents originally contended only that the workers’ compensation forms, identified as in camera record #s 2008-507-146 through 2008-507-159, were exempt, in their entirety, from disclosure pursuant to HIPAA.

 

77.   At the July 13, 2009 hearing, the respondents expanded their claim of exemption with respect to HIPAA to include all medical information, including the medical incident reports which have been identified as in camera record #s 2008-507-013, 014 and 103.  In support of their contention, the respondents cited 45 C.F.R 164.512(k)5, which provides in relevant part as follows:

 

§164.512. Uses and disclosures for which an authorization or opportunity to agree or object is not required…

A covered entity may use or disclose protected health information without the written authorization of the individual, as described in §164.508, or the opportunity for the individual to agree or object as described in §164.510, in the situations covered by this section, subject to the applicable requirements of this section. When the covered entity is required by this section to inform the individual of, or when the individual may agree to, a use or disclosure permitted by this section, the covered entity's information and the individual's agreement may be given orally.

 

…(k) Standard: Uses and disclosures for specialized government functions

 

(5) Correctional institutions and other law enforcement custodial situations.

(i) Permitted disclosures. A covered entity may disclose to a correctional institution or a law enforcement official having lawful custody of an inmate or other individual protected health information about such inmate or individual, if the correctional institution or such law enforcement official represents that such protected health information is necessary for:

(A) The provision of health care to such individuals;

(B) The health and safety of such individual or other inmates;

(C) The health and safety of the officers or employees of or others at the correctional institution;

(D) The health and safety of such individuals and officers or other persons responsible for the transporting of inmates or their transfer from one institution, facility, or setting to another;

(E) Law enforcement on the premises of the correctional institution; and

(F) The administration and maintenance of the safety, security, and good order of the correctional institution.

(ii) Permitted uses. A covered entity that is a correctional institution may use protected health information of individuals who are inmates for any purpose for which such protected health information may be disclosed.

(iii) No application after release. For the purposes of this provision, an individual is no longer an inmate when released on parole, probation, supervised release, or otherwise is no longer in lawful custody.

 

78.   At the July 13, 2009 hearing, the respondents provided testimony explaining the provisions of 45 C.F.R 164.512(k)5 and contended that the in camera records that contain medical information, specifically the workers’ compensation records, fall within the category of health information protected by HIPAA. 

 

79.   It is found that HIPAA was enacted to safeguard medical information and “to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the health care system by facilitating the electronic exchange of information with respect to financial and administrative transactions carried out by health plans, health care clearinghouse, health care providers.”  See Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 67 Fed. Reg. 14776 (Mar. 27, 2002).

 

80.   It is found that HIPAA applies to any entity that is: a health care provider that conducts certain transactions in electronic form; a health care clearinghouse; or a health plan.  It is found that an entity that is one or more of these types of entities is referred to as a "covered entity" in the Administrative Simplification regulations that govern HIPAA and are required to comply with those regulations.

 

81.   It is found that the respondents failed to prove that they are a health care clearinghouse, a health plan, or a health care provider and are, therefore, “covered entities” required to comply with the HIPAA regulations.  The respondents further failed to prove the records described in paragraph 70, above, constitute “protected health information” within the meaning of the HIPAA regulations.

 

82.   Moreover, it is found, that even if the respondents were “covered entities” for purposes of HIPAA, 45 C.F.R. 164.512(a)(1) provides in relevant part that:

 

(a) Standard: Uses and disclosures required by law.

(1) A covered entity may use or disclose protected health information to the extent that such use or disclosure is required by law and the use or disclosure complies with and is limited to the relevant requirements of such law.

 

83.   45 C.F.R. §164.103 defines “required by law” as:

 

a mandate contained in law that compels an entity to make a use or disclosure of protected health information and that is enforceable in a court of law [which includes]…, but is not limited to … an administrative body authorized to require the production of information … and statutes or regulations that require the production of information….

 

84.   It is concluded that the FOI Act requires by law the disclosure of non-exempt requested records, within the meaning of 45 C.F.R. §164.103. See State of Nebraska ex re. Adams County Historical Society v. Kinyoun, 277 Neb. 749 (2009), Abbott v. Texas Department of Mental Health, 212 S.W.3rd 648 (Tex. 2006); State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Daniels, 108 Ohio St.3d 518, 2006 (state public records laws which require disclosure of records are not in conflict with HIPAA privacy rule exceptions, even for covered entities).

 

85.   It is found, therefore, that HIPAA alone does not bar disclosure of the medical information contained in the in camera records, specifically those records identified as in camera record #s 2008-507-013, 014, 103 and 146 through 159 where state law does not exempt those records from disclosure.

 

86.   The respondents contend on brief that the in camera records contain the residential addresses of certain employees of the respondent department which addresses are exempt from disclosure pursuant to §1-217(a)(3), G.S.

 

87.   Section 1-217(a)(3), G.S., provides in relevant part that  “[n]o public agency may disclose, under the Freedom of Information Act, the residential address of . . . [an] employee of the Department of Correction. . . .”

 

88.   It is found that the in camera records contain residential addresses of employees of the respondent department.

 

89.   It is concluded that the residential addresses of employees of the respondent department contained in the in camera records, wherever found, are exempt from mandatory disclosure by virtue of §1-217(a)(3), G.S.  It is further concluded that the respondents did not violate the FOI Act by denying the complainant a copy of such residential addresses.

 

90.   It is concluded therefore that the respondents violated the disclosure provisions of §§1-210(a) and 1-212(a), G.S., by redacting the responsive records  identified as in camera record #s 2008-507-001 through 159 with the exception of the redactions  described in paragraphs 26, 47, 49, 66, 69, 75, and 89, above. 

 

91.   Prior to the hearing in this matter, the respondents moved to have sanctions imposed against the complainant alleging that the complainant had taken this appeal for the sole purpose of harassing the respondents.

 

92.   Section 1-206(b)(2), G.S., provides in relevant part that: 

 

[i]f the commission finds that a person has taken an appeal under this subsection frivolously, without reasonable grounds and solely for the purpose of harassing the agency from which the appeal has been taken, after such person has been given an opportunity to be heard at a hearing conducted in accordance with sections 4-176e to 4-184, inclusive, the commission may, in its discretion, impose against that person a civil penalty of not less than twenty dollars nor more than one thousand dollars. 

 

93.   It is found that the complainant legitimately questioned the validity of the respondents’ redactions which have been found, in this case, not to have been made entirely within confines of the law.  

 

94.   It is found that the complainant has not taken this appeal frivolously, without reasonable grounds and solely for the purpose of harassing the respondents.

 

95.   The Commission, therefore, denies the respondents’ request for sanctions against the complainant.

 

96.   The Commission declines to consider the complainant’s request for the imposition of civil penalties.

 

The following order by the Commission is hereby recommended on the basis of the record concerning the above-captioned complaint:

 

1.      Forthwith, the respondents shall provide the complainant with an un-redacted copy of the in camera records described in paragraphs 14 and 15 of the findings, above, free of charge.

 

2.      In complying with the order described in paragraph 1, above, the respondents may redact the “Medical Incident Report” described as in camera record #s 2008-507-013, 014, and 103, in paragraph 23 through 26 of the findings, above; those portions of the in camera records, including in camera record #s 2008-507-001, 2, 6, 104 through 108, 110 through 112, and 146 through 159, that disclose an individual’s injuries, medical or mental conditions, or the treatment thereof, as described in paragraphs 44 through 47 of the findings, above; the names and numbers of inmates where ever found in the in camera records, as described in paragraphs 48 and 49; any information contained in the in camera records that discloses information regarding the location or re-location of inmates and staff as described in paragraphs 62 through 66, of the findings above, and the names, and/or identification numbers, of assault victims, wherever found in the in camera records, as described in paragraphs 67 through 69; answers reflected in lines 14, 15, and 21 through 23 of in camera record #2008-507-151 and lines 14, 15, 21 and 22 of in camera record #2008-507-153, as described in paragraph 75, of the findings, above.  

 

3.      In complying with the order described in paragraph 1, above, the respondents may redact the social security numbers of any staff member or inmate that may be contained in the in camera records.  The respondents also may redact any code color referenced in the in camera records.

 

4.      In complying with the order in paragraph 1, above, the respondents may redact the residential addresses of employees of the respondent department wherever found in the in camera records.

 

 

 

Approved by Order of the Freedom of Information Commission at its regular meeting of July 22, 2009.

 

____________________________

S. Wilson

Acting Clerk of the Commission

 

 

 

 

 

 

PURSUANT TO SECTION 4-180(c), G.S., THE FOLLOWING ARE THE NAMES OF EACH PARTY AND THE MOST RECENT MAILING ADDRESS, PROVIDED TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION, OF THE PARTIES OR THEIR AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE.

 

THE PARTIES TO THIS CONTESTED CASE ARE:

 

Robin Elliott #24941

Northern Correctional Institution

287 Bilton Road

P.O. Box 665

Somers, CT 06071

 

Commissioner, State of Connecticut,

Department of Correction; Warden,

State of Connecticut, Department of

Correction, Corrigan-Radgowski

Correctional Institution; and State of

Connecticut, Department of Correction

C/o Sandra A. Sharr, Esq.

Director of Legal Affairs

Department of Correction

24 Wolcott Hill Road

Wethersfield, CT 06109

 

 

 

____________________________

S. Wilson

Acting Clerk of the Commission

 

 

FIC/2008-507FD/sw/7/24/2009

 

 

 

1.  ENDNOTES

 

Court cases

 

Payne v. City of Danbury, 267 Conn. 669 (2004); Director, Retirement & Benefits Services Div. v. FOIC, 256 Conn. 764 (2001); Rocque v. FOIC, 255 Conn. 651 (2001); Dept. of Public Safety v FOIC, 242 Conn. 79 (1997); Conn. Alcohol & Drug Abuse Commission v. FOIC, 233 Conn.28 (1995); Kurecza v. FOIC, 228 Conn. 271 (1994); First Selectman v. FOIC, 60 Conn. App. 64 (2000); Dept. of Children & Families v. FOIC, 48 Conn. App. 467 (1998); Almeida v. FOIC, 39 Conn. App. 154 (1995); Town of Enfield v. Freedom of Information Commission,  Super Ct JD NB CV 06 4012219 S (Cohn, J. 2007); Chairman, Board of Ethics, Town of Greenwich and Board of Ethics, Town of Greenwich v. Freedom of Information Commission and Michael Aurelia, Super Ct JD NB CV 05 400 7004 S (Owens, J. 2006); Dept. of Transportation v. FOIC, Super Ct JD NB CV 01-0508810 (Schuman, J. 2001); City Treasurer, City of Hartford v. FOIC, Super Ct JD NB CV 99 0496222 (Cohn, J. 2000); Rocque, Commissioner of Environmental Protection v. FOIC, Super Ct JD NB CV 98 0492734 (Hartmere, J. 1999); Director, Retirement & Benefits Services Div. v. FOIC, Super Ct JD NB CV 98 0492692 (Hartmere, J. 1999); First Selectman, Town of Ridgefield v. FOIC, Super Ct JD NB CV 99‑0493041 (McWeeny, J. 1999); Chairman, Bd. of Education Town of Darien v. FOIC, Super Ct JD Htfd NB CV 97 0575674 (McWeeny, J. 1998); Waters, Commissioner of State of Conn. Dept. of Administrative Services v. FOIC, Super Ct JD Htfd/NB CV 96 0565853 (McWeeny, J. 1997); Armstrong, Commissioner of State of Conn. Dept. Of Correction v. FOIC, Super Ct JD Htfd/NB CV 96 0563608 (McWeeny, J. 1997); Dept. of Children & Families v. FOIC, Super Ct JD Htfd NB CV 96 0562546 (McWeeny, J. 1997); State of Conn. Office of Protection and Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities v. FOIC, Super Ct JD Htfd/NB CV 95 0554467 (McWeeny, J. 1997); Youngquist v. FOIC, Super Ct JD Htfd/NB, CV 95 0554601 (McWeeny, J. 1996 and 1997); Cracco v. FOIC, Super Ct JD Htfd/NB, CV 94 0705371 (Dunnell, J. 1995); Cracco v. FOIC, Super Ct JD Htfd NB, CV 93 0705370, (Dunnell, J. 1995); Cracco v. FOIC, Super Ct JD Htfd NB, CV 94 0705369, (Dunnell, J. 1995); Simonds v. FOIC, Super Ct JD Htfd/NB, CV 93 070 41 39 (Maloney, J. 1994); Gallagher v. FOIC, Super Ct JD Htfd/NB, CV 93 0531514 (Maloney, J. 1994).

 

 

FOIC Decisions

 

Docket #FIC 2007-580; Town of Putnam and Putnam Board of Education v. Commissioner, State of Connecticut, Department of Public Safety; and

State of Connecticut, Department of Public Safety (May 28, 2008); Docket #FIC 2007-447; Daniel Mathena v. Chief, Police Department, Town of Simsbury (April 23, 2008);

Docket #FIC 2007-560; Kenneth D. Goldberg v. Executive Director, Greater Hartford

Transit District; and Greater Hartford Transit District (April 9, 2008); Docket #FIC 2007-513; Elizabeth Benton and the New Haven Register v. Chairman, Board of Commissioners, Housing Authority, Town of Derby (April 9, 2008); Docket #FIC 2007-317; James Baker v. Warden, State of Connecticut, Department of Correction, Osborn Correctional Institution (April 9, 2008); Docket #FIC 2007-221; Jon Lender and The Hartford Courant v. Executive Director, State of Connecticut, Office of State Ethics; General Counsel, State of Connecticut Office of State Ethics; Citizen’s Ethics Advisory Board, State of Connecticut, Office of State Ethics; and State of Connecticut, Office of State Ethics (March 26, 2008); Docket #FIC 2007-469; Lawrence C. Sherman v. Board of Education, West Hartford Public Schools (March 12, 2008); Docket #FIC 2007-315; Dawne Westbrook v. Commissioner, State of Connecticut, Department of Correction (January 23, 2008); Docket #FIC 2007-298; Josh Kovner and the Hartford Courant v. Chief, Police Department, City of Middletown (November 14, 2007); Docket #FIC 2007-416; Junta for Progressive Action, Inc.; Unidad Latina en Accion; and The Jerome N. Frank Legal Services Organization v. John A. Danaher III, Commissioner, State of Connecticut, Department of Public Safety (November 8, 2007); Docket #FIC 2006-502; David P. Taylor v. Commissioner, State of Connecticut, Department of Correction (September 12, 2007); Docket #FIC 2007-123; Jessica Crowley and Isabella O’Malley v. Commissioner, State of Connecticut, Department of Public Health (August 8, 2007);

Docket #FIC 2006-467; Charlie Santiago Zapata v. Commissioner, State of Connecticut, Department of Correction (August 8, 2007); Docket #FIC 2006-374; Burton Weinstein v. Commissioner, State of Connecticut, Department of Public Safety (July 11, 2007); Docket # 2006-343; Stephanie Reitz and the Associated Press v. Commissioner, State of Connecticut, Department of Correction (June 27, 2007); Docket #FIC 2006-098; Louis J. Russo v. Director, State of Connecticut, University of Connecticut Health Center, Office of Health Affairs Policy Planning; and Dr. Jacob Zamstein (February 28, 2007); Docket #FIC 2006-258; John Orr v. First Selectman, Town of Essex (January 24, 2007); Docket #FIC 2006-242; Ismael Hernandez III v. Director of Labor Relations, Labor Relations Office, City of Bridgeport (January 24, 2007); Docket #FIC 2006-292; Mary Ellen Fillo and The Hartford Courant v. Chief, Volunteer Fire Department, Town of Newington (January 10, 2007); Docket #FIC 2006-121; John Bolton v. Personnel Director, Civil Service Commission, City of Bridgeport; and Civil Service Commission, City of Bridgeport (December 13, 2006); Docket #FIC 2005-571; Alexander Wood and the Manchester Journal Inquirer v. Director, Human Resources Department, Town of Windsor (October 25, 2006); Docket #FIC 2005-535; Alexander Wood and The Manchester Journal-Inquirer v. Director of Human Resources, Town of Windsor (October 25, 2006); Docket #FIC 2005-511; Don Stacom and the Hartford Courant v. John Divenere, Chief, Police Department, City of Bristol (October 11, 2006); Docket #FIC 2005-508; Connecticut State Conference of NAACP Branches v. Chief, Police Department, City of Bristol (October 11, 2006); Docket #FIC 2005-478; Doreen Guarino and the Manchester Journal-Inquirer v. Chief, Police Department, Town of Enfield (September 13, 2006); Docket #FIC 2005-473; Alexander Wood, Heather Nann Collins, and the Manchester; Journal-Inquirer v. Executive Director, State of Connecticut, Board of Education; and Services for the Blind (September 13, 2006); Docket #FIC 2005-448; Susan Raff and WFSB TV v. Mayor, City of Middletown (September 13, 2006); Docket #FIC 2005-615; James E. Simpson v. Chief, Police Department, Town of Seymour (August 23, 2006); Docket #FIC 2005-436; Suzanne Risley and the Waterbury Republican-American v. Chief, Police Department, City of Torrington (August 23, 2006); Docket #FIC 2005-242; Michelle Tuccitto and The New Haven Register v. Chief, Police Department, City of New Haven (May 10, 2006); Docket #FIC 2005-096; Richard Fontana, Jr. v. Board of Fire Commissioners, West Shore Fire District (February 8, 2006); Docket #FIC 2005-058; Glenn C. Morron and William Hertler, Jr. v. J. Edward Brymer, Chief, Police Department, City of Middletown; Phillip Pessina, Deputy Chief, Police Department, City of Middletown; and Lyn Baldoni, Deputy Chief, Police Department, City of Middletown (January 25, 2006);  Docket #FIC 2005-081; Megan Bard and the New London Day v. Superintendent of Schools, Canterbury Public Schools; and Board of Education, Canterbury Public Schools (October 26, 2005); Docket #FIC 2004-289; Lisa A. Coleman v. Chief, Police Department, Town of New Milford (June 22, 2005); Docket #FIC 2004-408; Michael Aurelia v. Chairman, Board of Ethics, Town of Greenwich; and Board of Ethics, Town of Greenwich (May 11, 2005); Docket #FIC 2004-197; Maria McKeon v. Town Manager, Town of Hebron (March 23, 2005); Docket #FIC 2004-159; Jason L. McCoy v. Town Manager, Town of Rocky Hill (March 23, 2005); Docket #FIC 2004-119; Dawne Westbrook v. Chief, Police Department, Town of Rocky Hill; and Robert Catania (February 9, 2005); Docket #FIC 2004-092; Dan Levine v. Public Information Officer, Police Department, City of Hartford (February 9, 2005);

Docket #FIC 2004-005; Ralph W. Williams Jr. and The Manchester Journal Inquirer v. State Connecticut, Office of the Governor (Oct. 13, 2004); Docket #FIC 2003-456; Thomas O’Brien v. Chief, Police Department, Town of Waterford (Oct. 13, 2004); Docket #FIC 2003-454; Michael C. Bingham and Business New Haven v. Commissioner, State of Connecticut, Department of Banking (Sept. 22, 2004); Docket #FIC 2003-382; Michael J. McMullen v. Town Administrator, Town of Vernon (Sep. 22, 2004); Docket #FIC 2004-100; Jerry Romaniello and the Greenwich Firefighters Association v. First Selectman, Town of Greenwich (Sept. 8, 2004); Docket #FIC 2003-348; Alexander Wood and the Journal Inquirer, v. Town Manager, Town of South Windsor (Sep. 8, 2004); Docket #FIC 2003-386; Mathew L. Brown and the Willimantic Chronicle, v. President and Chief Executive Officer, Windham Mills Development Corp. (Aug. 11, 2004); Docket #FIC 2003-285; Frank C. Violissi, Jr. v. First Selectman, Town of Chester (May 26, 2004); Docket #FIC 2003-074; Heather M. Henderson v. State of Connecticut, Department of Public Safety, Legal Affairs Department (Dec. 10, 2003); Docket #FIC 2003-020; Hugh Curran v. Mayor, City of Waterbury (Sept. 10, 2003); Docket #FIC 2002-580; Ken Byron and The Hartford Courant v. First Selectman, Town of Westbrook (Sept. 10, 2003); Docket #FIC 2003-038 Chris Dehnel and The Journal Inquirer v.  First Selectman, Town of Ellington (Aug. 27, 2003); Docket #FIC 2002-531Chris Dehnel and Journal Inquirer First Selectman, Town of Ellington (Aug. 27, 2003); Docket #FIC 2003-055; Robert Mack v. Director, State of Connecticut, Department of Correction, Labor Relations (July 23, 2003); Docket #FIC 2002-345; Josh Kovner, Chris Keating, and The Hartford Courant v. Chief, Police Department, City of Middletown (July 23, 2003); Docket #FIC 2002-338; Amy L. Zitka and The Middletown Press v. Chief, Police Department, City of Middletown; and Professional Standards Unit Supervisor, Police Department, City of Middletown (July 23, 2003); Docket #FIC 2002-465; Fred Radford v. Chairman, Police Commission, Town of Trumbull; and Chief, Police Department, Town of Trumbull (July 9, 2003); Docket #FIC 2002-118; Kimberly W. Moy and the Hartford Courant v. Superintendent of Schools, Southington Public Schools (Feb. 26, 2003); Docket #FIC 2002-020; Maurice Timothy Reidy and The Hartford Courant v. Chief, Police Department, Town of Newington and Brendan Fitzgerald (Oct. 23, 2002); Docket #FIC 2001-489 Jonathan Kellogg, Trip Jennings and Waterbury Republican-American Chief, Police Department, Borough of Naugatuck and Rick Smolicz (Sept. 25, 2002); Docket #FIC 2002-173; Carrie J. Campion v. Director, Department of Human Resources, Town of Fairfield (Aug. 28, 2002); Docket #FIC 2001-425 Joseph Mincewicz, Commissioner, State of Connecticut, Department of Public Safety, Division of State Police; and State of Connecticut, Department of Public Safety, Division of State Police (Aug. 28, 2002); Docket #FIC 2001-421 Jean M. Morningstar and University Health Professionals Local 3837, AFT-CFEPE, AFL-CIO v. Executive Vice President for Health Affairs, State of Connecticut, University of Connecticut Health Center; and State of Connecticut, University of Connecticut Health Center; and Justin Radolf, M.D., Director, Center for Microbial Pathogenesis, School of Medicine, University of Connecticut Health Center (Aug. 28, 2002); Docket #FIC 2002-093 Sean P. Turpin v. Director, Department of Human Resources, Town of Greenwich and Steve Demetri (July 24, 2002); Docket #FIC 2002-034; MariAn Gail Brown, Michael P. Mayko and Connecticut Post Michael Lupkas, Comptroller, City of Bridgeport; Christopher Duby, Chief of Staff, City of Bridgeport; Mark Anastasi, City Attorney, City of Bridgeport; and Gregory Conte, Deputy Chief of Staff, City of Bridgeport (June 26, 2002); Docket #FIC 2001-364; Karen Guzman and The Hartford Courant v. City of New Britain Docket (June 26, 2002); Docket #FIC 2001-180 James H. Smith and The Record Journal Publishing Company v. Commissioner, State of Connecticut, Department of Public Safety, Division of State Police; and State of Connecticut, Department of Public Safety, Division of State Police (Feb. 13, 2002); Docket #FIC 2001-129; Kimberly W. Moy and The Hartford Courant v. Police Commission, Town of Southington (Feb. 13, 2002); Docket #FIC 2001-251 Fred Radford v. Chief, Police Department, Town of Trumbull (Jan. 23, 2002); Docket #FIC 2000-624; Eric Gustavson v. Board of Education, Brookfield Public Schools (June 13, 2001); Docket #FIC 2000-557; Wendy John v. Richard Blumenthal, Attorney General, State of Connecticut, Office of the Attorney General; Wil Gundling, William McCullough, Phillip Schulz, Margaret Chapple, Assistant Attorneys General, State of Connecticut, Office of the Attorney General; and State of Connecticut, Office of the Attorney General (June 13, 2001); Docket #FIC 2000-268; Michael Costanza and The Day v. Director of Utilities, Utilities Department, City of Groton; and Mayor, City of Groton (April 25, 2001); Docket #FIC 2000-198; William J. Stone v. Personnel Administrator, State of Connecticut, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Finance and Administration; and State of Connecticut, Department of Transportation (April 20, 2001); Docket #FIC 2000-537; James Leonard, Jr. v. Chief, Police Department, City of New Britain (March 28, 2001); Docket #FIC 2000-348; Bradshaw Smith v. Office of the Vice Chancellor for Information Services, State of Connecticut, University of Connecticut; and State of Connecticut, University of Connecticut (February 28, 2001); Docket #FIC 2000-474; Robert H. Boone and Journal Inquirer v. Chief, Police Department, Town of Windsor Locks (Jan. 24, 2001); Docket #FIC 2000-265; Lisa Goldberg and The Hartford Courant v. Superintendent of Schools, Vernon Public Schools (Jan. 24, 2001); Docket #FIC 2000-569; Mary Hyde v. Chief, Police Department, Town of Seymour (Dec. 13, 2000); Docket #FIC 2000-049; Nicholas B. Wynnick v. Board of Directors, Ansonia Public Library, Town of Ansonia (Dec. 13, 2000); Docket #FIC 2000-136; Thomas E. Lee v. Board of Education, Trumbull Public Schools; and Superintendent of Schools, Trumbull Public Schools (Nov. 29, 2000); Docket #FIC 2000-135; Thomas E. Lee v. Board of Education, Trumbull Public Schools; and Superintendent of Schools, Trumbull Public Schools (Nov. 29, 2000); Docket #FIC2000-086; Mitchell D. Poudrier v. Superintendent of Schools, Killingly Public Schools (Sept. 13, 2000); Docket #FIC 2000-173; Robert H. Boone and the Journal Inquirer v. Anthony Milano, District Manager, Metropolitan District Commission; and Metropolitan District Commission (Aug. 23, 2000); Docket #FIC 2000-094; James D. Goodwin v. Communications Specialist, State of Connecticut, Department of Social Services, Public and Government Relations Unit (Aug. 9, 2000); Docket #FIC 2000-022; Thedress Campbell v. City Treasurer, City of Hartford (Aug. 9, 2000); Docket #FIC 2000-137; Robert H. Boone and Journal Inquirer v. Metropolitan District Commission (July 12, 2000); Docket #FIC 1999-560; Leo F. Smith v. Robert H. Skinner, First Selectman, Town of Suffield; and Selectmen’s Office, Town of Suffield (July 12, 2000); Docket #FIC 1999-556; Delores Annicelli v. Director, New Haven Housing Authority, City of New Haven; and New Haven Housing Authority, City of New Haven (July 12, 2000); Docket #FIC 1999-548; Leo F. Smith v. John P. Lange, Human Resources Director, Town of Suffield; and Department of Human Resources, Town of Suffield (July 12, 2000); Docket #FIC 1999-547; Leo F. Smith v. John P. Lange, Human Resources Director, Town of Suffield; and Department of Human Resources, Town of Suffield (July 12, 2000); Docket #FIC 1999-525; Leo F. Smith v. John P. Lange, Human Resources Director, Town of Suffield; and Department of Human Resources, Town of Suffield (July 12, 2000); Docket #FIC 2000-118; Elizabeth Ganga and Connecticut Post v. Police Department, Town of Stratford (June 28, 2000); Docket #FIC 2000-095; Ron Robillard and the Chronicle v. Chairman, Board of Education, Eastford Public Schools; and Board of Education, Eastford Public Schools (June 28, 2000); Docket #FIC 2000-093; Megan J. Bard and The Norwich Bulletin v. Chairman, Board of Education, Eastford Public Schools; and Board of Education, Eastford Public Schools (June 28, 2000); Docket #FIC 1999-575; Bruce Kaz v. Robert Skinner, First Selectman, Town of Suffield; and Ted Flanders, Building Inspector, Town of Suffield (June 28, 2000); Docket #FIC 1999-519; Robert J. Fortier v. Personnel Director, Town of East Hartford; and Mayor, Town of East Hartford (June 14, 2000); Docket #FIC1999-550; James and Susanne Milewski v. Deputy Chief, Police Department, Town of Clinton; and Police Department, Town of Clinton (May 24, 2000); Docket #FIC 2000-005; Fred B. Feins v. President and Chief Executive Officer, Granby Ambulance Association, Inc., Town of Granby (May 10, 2000); Docket #FIC1999-606; Robert L. Corraro and IBEW Local 90 v. Town Attorney, Town of Hamden; and Electrical Contractors, Inc. (May 10, 2000); Docket #FIC 1999-533; Donald J. Lanouette, Jr. v. Chief, Police Department, Town of Madison; and Police Department, Town of Madison (April 26, 2000); Docket #FIC 1999-502; Christopher Hoffman and New Haven Register v. Director of Personnel, State of Connecticut, Southern Connecticut State University; and Personnel Office, State of Connecticut, Southern Connecticut State University (April 26, 2000); Docket #FIC1999-440; Anne Hamilton and The Hartford Courant James Martino, Chief, Police Department, Town of Avon; Peter A. Agnesi, Lieutenant, Police Department, Town of Avon; and Police Department, Town of Avon (March 8, 2000); Docket #FIC1999-333; Lynn Fredricksen and New Haven Register v. Chief, Police Department, Town of Madison; and Police Department, Town of Madison (March 8, 2000); Docket #FIC 1999-289; Thomas Moran v. Director, Human Resources, Town of Simsbury; and Department of Human Resources, Town of Simsbury (Feb. 9, 2000); Docket #FIC 1999-328; Victor Zigmund v. Director, State of Connecticut, Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services, Human Resources Operations, Connecticut Valley Hospital, Whiting Forensic Division (Jan. 26, 2000); Docket #FIC 1999-100; Janice D’Arcy and The Hartford Courant v. Chief, Police Department, Town of Cheshire; Police Department, Town of Cheshire; Town Manager, Town of Cheshire; and Town of Cheshire (Jan. 26, 2000); Docket #FIC 1999-355; Wayne Mercier v. Patricia C. Washington, Director of Personnel, City of Hartford; and Department of Personnel, City of Hartford (Nov. 10, 1999); Docket #FIC 1998-391; Jonathan F. Kellogg and The Republican American v. Department of Education, City of Waterbury (Oct. 13, 1999); Docket #FIC 1999-161; Michael W. Cahill v. Chief, Police Department, Town of Hamden; and Police Department, Town of Hamden (Sept. 22, 1999); Docket #FIC 1998-294; Robert J. Bourne v. Department of Public Utilities, City of Norwich, and City of Norwich (Sept. 22, 1999); Docket #FIC 1998-293; Joseph J. Cassidy v. Department of Public Utilities, City of Norwich, and City of Norwich (Sept. 22, 1999); Docket #FIC 1999-040; Judith F. Machuga and State of Connecticut, Division of Public Defender Services, Superior Court, G.A. 13 v. Chief, Police Department, Town of East Windsor; and Police Department, Town of East Windsor (Aug. 25, 1999); Docket #FIC 1999-144; Robert H. Boone and Journal Inquirer v. William Gifford, Chief, Police Department, Town of Windsor Locks; Police Department, Town of Windsor Locks; and Windsor Locks Police Commission (July 28, 1999); Docket #FIC 1999-096; Paul Marks and The Hartford Courant v. Chief, Police Department, Town of Windsor Locks; and Police Department, Town of Windsor Locks (July 28, 1999); Docket #FIC 1999-064; Joan Coe v. First Selectman, Town of Simsbury; Director, Human Resources Department, Town of Simsbury; and Town of Simsbury (July 28, 1999); Docket #FIC 1999-150; Andrew Nargi v. Office of Corporation Counsel, City of Torrington; and City of Torrington (July 14, 1999); Docket #FIC 1999-135; Warren Woodberry, Jr. and The Hartford Courant v. Acting Town Manager, Town of Rocky Hill and Town of Rocky Hill (July 14, 1999); Docket #FIC 1999-015; Richard Manuel Rivera v. Superintendent of Schools, Torrington Public Schools; and Board of Education, Torrington Public Schools (June 9, 1999); Docket #FIC 1998-372; William C. Kaempffer and New Haven Register v. Police Department, City of New Haven; City of New Haven; and James Sorrentino (June 9, 1999); Docket #FIC 1997-361; Docket #FIC 1999-019; David K. Jaffe v. State of Connecticut, Connecticut Lottery Corporation, Human Resources; State of Connecticut, Connecticut Lottery Corporation, Security Division; and State of Connecticut, Connecticut Lottery Corporation (April 28, 1999); Docket #FIC1998-325; Virginia Groark and The Day v. Freedom of Information Officer, State of Connecticut, Department of Public Health, Office of Special Services, Communications Division; and Agency Personnel Administrator, State of Connecticut, Department of Public Health, Human Resources Division (April 28, 1999); Docket #FIC 1998-208; Thedress Campbell v. City Treasurer, City of Hartford; and City of Hartford (April 14, 1999); Docket #FIC 1998-265; Benjamin M. Wenograd and Service Employees International Union Local 760 v. John Roughan, Executive Director, East Hartford Housing Authority; and East Hartford Housing Authority, Town of East Hartford (March 24, 1999); Docket #FIC 1997-361; Dominick L. Santarsiero v. Director, Human Resources, City of Stamford (June 10, 1998); Docket #FIC 1997-363; Diana R. Raczkowski v. Mayor, Town of Naugatuck (March 11, 1998); Docket #FIC 1997-307; Krystin Bratina v. Chief, Hartford Fire Department, City of Hartford (March 11, 1998); Docket #FIC 1998-288; Christian Miller and the New Haven Register v. Superintendent, Branford Public Schools; and Board of Education, Branford Public Schools (Feb. 24, 1999); Docket #FIC 1998-255; Joan O’Rourke v. Chief, Police Department, City of Torrington; and Police Department, City of Torrington (Jan. 27, 1999); Docket #FIC 1998-251; John Ward v. Beverly L. Durante, Personnel Administrator, Housatonic Area Regional Transit; and Housatonic Area Regional Transit (Jan. 27, 1999); Docket #FIC 1998-163; Lawrence A. Butts v. Director, State of Connecticut, Department of Environmental Protection, Human Resources Division; and State of Connecticut, Department of Environmental Protection, Human Resources Division (Dec. 9, 1998); Docket #FIC 1998-162; Lawrence A. Butts Chairperson, State of Connecticut, Department of Environmental Protection, Human Resources Division; and State of Connecticut, Department of Environmental Protection, Human Resources Division (Dec. 9, 1998); Docket #FIC 1998-232; Scott Clark, Amy Kertesz, Michael Gates and the Ridgefield Police Union v. First Selectman, Town of Ridgefield; and Town of Ridgefield (Nov. 18, 1998); Docket #FIC 1998-193; Daniel P. Jones and The Hartford Courant v. Commissioner, State of Connecticut, Department of Environmental Protection; and State of Connecticut, Department of Environmental Protection (Nov. 18, 1998); Docket #FIC 1998-121; Ernie Cantwell and International Association of Firefighters, Local No. 1073 v. Director, Personnel Department, City of Middletown and Personnel Department, City of Middletown (Oct. 14, 1998); Docket #FIC 1998-120; Ernie Cantwell and International Association of Firefighters, Local No. 1073 v. Director, Personnel Department, City of Middletown (Oct. 14, 1998); Docket #FIC 1998‑094; Janice D'Arcy and The Hartford Courant v. Chief, Meriden Police Department, City of Meriden and Meriden Police Department (Oct. 14, 1998); Docket #FIC 1997-422; Joseph A. Johnson, Jr. and Greenwich Time v. Chief, Greenwich Police Department, Town of Greenwich; and Greenwich Police Department, Town of Greenwich (Sept. 9, 1998); Docket #FIC 1998-023; Deborah Maynard v. Superintendent, Voluntown School District; and Principal, Voluntown Elementary School, Voluntown School District (Aug. 12, 1998); Docket #FIC 1997-298; Allan Drury and The New Haven Register v. Chief, East Haven Police Department, Town of East Haven; and Town of East Haven (June 10, 1998); Jonathan Lucas and Greenwich Times v. Director, Department of Human Resources, Town of Greenwich; and Town of Greenwich (May 27, 1998); John C. Rettman v. Meriden Police Department, Internal Affairs Division; and Paul Rowen (May 13, 1998); Docket #FIC 1997-318; Dennis Carnot v. Chief, Meriden Police Department, City of Meriden; Internal Affairs Division, Meriden Police Department, City of Meriden; Meriden Police Department, City of Meriden; and Paul Rowen (May 13, 1998); Docket #FIC 1997-175; Matthew Brown, Ken Byron and The Hartford Courant v. Superintendent of Schools, Plymouth Public Schools; and Board of Education, Town of Plymouth (February 18, 1998); Docket #FIC 1997-123; John Christoffersen and The Advocate v. Superintendent of Schools, Stamford Public Schools and Director of Personnel, Stamford Public Schools (Feb. 11, 1998); Docket #FIC 1997-088; John B. Harkins v. Acting Town Manager, Town of Tolland (Jan. 28, 1998); Docket #FIC 1997-085; Joe Johnson and Greenwich Time v. Chief of Police, Greenwich Police Department (Jan. 28, 1998); Docket #FIC 1997-142; Laura Amon v. Program Manager, Affirmative Action Division, State of Connecticut, Department of Transportation (Dec. 3, 1997); Docket #FIC 1996-572; Ken Byron and The Hartford Courant v. Chief of Police, Town of Wethersfield (Nov. 12, 1997); Docket #FIC 1997-238; Kimberley A. Thomsen and the Republican-American v. Acting Superintendent, Waterbury Police Department (Oct. 29, 1997); Docket #FIC 1997-089; Steven Edelman v. Commissioner, State of Connecticut, Department of Mental Retardation; and State of Connecticut, Department of Mental Retardation (Oct. 22, 1997); Docket #FIC 1996-551; Judith A. Amato v. Executive Director, New Britain Housing Authority; and New Britain Housing Authority (Aug. 27, 1997); Docket # FIC 1996-539; Ann Marie Derwin v. Legal Advisor, State of Connecticut, Department of Public Safety; and State of Connecticut, Department of Public Safety (Aug. 27, 1997); Docket #FIC 1996-592; Francine Karp v. Mayor, City of Bristol; Director of Personnel, City of Bristol; and Dennis Daigneault (July 23, 1997); Docket #FIC 1996-243; Joanne C. Tashjian v. Personnel Officer, State of Connecticut, Workers’ Compensation Commission; and State of Connecticut, Workers’ Compensation Commission (June 4, 1997); Docket #FIC 1996-322;Carolyn Moreau and The Hartford Courant v. Chief of Police, Southington Police Department; and Susan Williams (May 28, 1997); Docket #FIC 1996-465; John Gauger, Jr., Joseph Cadrain and Richard Westervelt v. Kenneth H. Kirschner, Commissioner, State of Connecticut, Department of Public Safety; Dawn Carnese, Legal Advisor, State of Connecticut, Department of Public Safety; and Lt. David Werner, Commanding Officer, Troop "B", State of Connecticut, Department of Public Safety, Division of State Police (April 9, 1997); Docket #FIC 1996-315; David W. Cummings v. Christopher Burnham, Treasurer, State of Connecticut (April 9, 1997); Docket #FIC 1996-521; Carol Butterworth v. Town Council, Town of Tolland (March 26, 1997); Docket #FIC 1996-421; John B. Harkins v. Chairman, Tolland Town Council (March 26, 1997); Docket #FIC 1996-314; David W. Cummings v. Christopher Burnham, Treasurer, State of Connecticut (April 9, 1997); Docket #FIC 1996-119; David W. Cummings v. Jesse M. Frankl, Chairman, State of Connecticut, Workers’ Compensation Commission (March 26, 1997); Docket #FIC 1996-215; Alice M. Gray v. Chief of Police, Manchester Police Department, and Assistant Town Attorney, Town of Manchester (Feb. 26, 1997); Docket #FIC 1996-159; Carolyn Moreau and The Hartford Courant v. Police Chief, Southington Police Department (Jan. 22, 1997); Docket #FIC 1996-124; Donald H. Schiller, Michael Kelley and The Record-Journal Publishing Company v. Police Chief, Town of Southington Police Department, and Town of Southington Police Department (Jan. 22, 1997); Docket #FIC 1996-134; Betty Halibozek v. Superintendent of Schools, Middletown Public Schools; and Supervisor of Maintenance and Transportation, Board of Education, City of Middletown (Dec. 11, 1996); Docket #FIC1996-006; Joseph Cadrain and Richard Westervelt v. Gerald Gore, Legal Affairs Unit, State of Connecticut, Department of Public Safety; and State of Connecticut, Department of Public Safety, Division of State Police (Dec. 11, 1996); Docket #FIC 1996-153; Tracey Thomas and The Hartford Courant v. Legal Affairs Unit, State of Connecticut, Department of Public Safety (Nov. 20, 1996); Docket #FIC1995-419; Robie Irizarry v. Warden, Willard Correctional Institution, State of Connecticut, Department of Correction (Oct. 23, 1996); Docket #FIC 1995-368; Thomas Lally v. Executive Director, State of Connecticut Board of Education and Services for the Blind, and Special Projects Coordinator, State of Connecticut, Board of Education and Services for the Blind (Oct. 9, 1996); Docket #FIC 1995-403; Jesse C. Leavenworth and The Hartford Courant v. Superintendent of Schools, Regional School District #7 (Sept. 25, 1996); Docket #FIC 1995-361; Christopher Hoffman and the New Haven Register v. James J. McGrath, Chief of Police, Ansonia Police Department and Eugene K. Baron, Brian Phipps, and Howard Tinney as members of the Ansonia Board of Police Commissioners (Sept. 25, 1996); Docket #FIC1995-358; Lyn Bixby and The Hartford Courant v. State of Connecticut, Department of Administrative Services (Sept. 25, 1996); Docket #FIC 1996-056; Francine Cimino v. Chief of Police, Glastonbury Police Department; Town Manager, Town of Glastonbury; and Town of Glastonbury (Sept. 25, 1996); Docket #FIC 1995-343; John J. Woodcock, III v. Town Manager, Town of South Windsor (July 24, 1996); Docket #FIC 1995-324; John J. Woodcock, III and Kathryn A. Hale v. Dana Whitman, Jr., Acting Town Manager, Town of South Windsor (July 24, 1996); Docket #FIC 95-251; Lyn Bixby & The Hartford Courant v. Commissioner, State of Connecticut, Department of Correction (July 10, 1996); Docket #FIC 1995-252; Valerie Finholm and The Hartford Courant v. Commissioner, State of Connecticut, Department of Children and Families (May 22, 1996); Docket #FIC 1995-193; Terence P. Sexton v. Chief of Police, Hartford Police Department (May 8, 1996); Docket #FIC 1995-125; Chris Powell and Journal Inquirer v. Commissioner, State of Connecticut, Department of Social Services (March 13, 1996); Docket #FIC 1995-081; Bruce Bellm, Kendres Lally, Philip Cater, Peter Hughes, Carol Northrop, Brad Pellissier, Todd Higgins and Bruce Garrison v. State of Connecticut, Office of Protection and Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities, Sharon Story and Marlene Fein (March 13, 1996); Docket #FIC 1995-074; Jeffrey C. Cole and WFSB/TV 3 v. James Strillacci, Chief of Police, West Hartford Police Department (Jan. 24, 1996); Docket #FIC 1995-026; Curtis R. Wood v. Director of Affirmative Action, State of Connecticut, Department of Correction (Jan. 24, 1996); Docket #FIC 1995-132; Michael A. Ingrassia v. Warden, Walker Special Management Unit, State of Connecticut Department of Correction (Dec. 27, 1995); Docket #FIC 1995-048; Jane Holfelder v. Canton Police Department (June 14, 1995); Docket #FIC 1994-351; Edward A. Peruta v. O. Paul Shew, Rocky Hill Town Manager and Director of Public Safety; Donald Unwin, Mayor of Rocky Hill, William Pacelia, Deputy Mayor of Rocky Hill; and Curt Roggi, Rocky Hill Town Attorney (May 28, 1995); Docket #FIC 1994-160; John Springer and The Bristol Press v. Chief of Police, Bristol Police Department (April 5, 1995); Docket #FIC 1994-077; Kathryn Kranhold and The Hartford Courant v. Director, New Haven Health Department (Feb. 8, 1995); Docket #FIC 1994-099; Frank Faraci, Jr. v. Middletown Police Department, Mayor of Middletown, and Middletown City Attorney (Feb. 2, 1995); Docket #FIC 1994-011; Robert Grabar, Edward Frede and The News-Times v. Superintendent of Schools, Brookfield Public Schools and Brookfield Board of Education (Aug. 24, 1994); Docket #FIC 1993-279; Jay Lewin v. New Milford Director of Finance (March 23, 1994).

 

2.  ENDNOTES

AFFIDAVIT OF ERIC V. TURNER

 

Eric V. Turner, having been duly sworn, does hereby depose as follows:

 

1.  I am over the age of eighteen (18) years and understand the obligation of an affirmation.

 

2.  I am a member of the Connecticut Bar and am currently employed as Director of Public Education for the Connecticut Freedom of Information Commission, having first been employed by said commission in 1996.

 

3.  I am providing this affidavit in light of the Supreme Court decision in Director, Retirement & Benefits Services Division v. Freedom of Information Commission, 256 Conn. 764 (2001), in which the court apparently invites a reconsideration of Perkins v. Freedom of Information Commission, 228 Conn. 158 (1993).  See, Director, supra at 782, fn 13, 785 (Zarella, J. concurring).

 

4.  As part of my responsibilities as Director of Public Education for said commission, I have developed, organized and scheduled speaking engagements, seminars and programs explaining the duties and rights established under the Connecticut Freedom of Information Act.

 

5.  Since I assumed my current position in 1996, there have been approximately 290 such speaking engagements, seminars and programs in Connecticut and I have personally lectured in approximately 80 such speaking engagements, seminars and programs.

 

6.  As part of the presentation I have prepared for such speaking engagements, seminars and programs, the subject of the Connecticut General Statues Section 1-210(b)(2) exemption for personnel, medical and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute an invasion of personal privacy is stressed because of the great interest in that exemption and the confusion generated by a series of inconsistent and contradictory court decisions prior to Perkins, supra.  See, e.g., Chairman v. Freedom of Information Commission, 217 Conn. 193 (1991) (establishing “reasonable expectation of privacy” test; query whether subjectively or objectively applied) and Board of Education v. Freedom of Information Commission, 210 Conn. 590 (1989) (confirming a “balancing” test), which was overruled by the Chairman case.

 

7.  Since the Supreme Court ruling in Perkins, supra, all Freedom of Information Commission staff members who conduct such speaking engagements, seminars and programs discuss in detail the rulings in that case and its progeny.

 

8.  As part of my responsibilities as Director of Public Education, I also answer telephone and other inquiries from public officials and the public.  Since my employment with said commission, I have answered thousands of such inquiries, including hundreds of inquiries concerning the Connecticut General Statutes Section 1-210(b)(2) exemption.  In responding to such inquiries I discuss in detail the Perkins case and its progeny.

 

9.  Based on the foregoing experiences, it is my opinion that the Perkins decision, and its progeny, have had a beneficial effect on public officials and the public itself because they can rely on a now long-standing and clear test with respect to the Connecticut General Statutes Section 1-210(b)(2) exemption, which helps them determine whether that exemption is applicable to the practical problems they encounter with respect to personnel, medical and similar information.  Indeed, the many court and Freedom of Information Commission decisions applying the Perkins test have given public officials and the public a now consistent body of law concerning that statutory exemption.

 

 

Eric V. Turner

 

 

 

COUNTY OF HARTFORD

                                                            ss:  Hartford

STATE OF CONNECTICUT

 

Subscribed and attested to before me this 9th day of January, 2002.

 

 

 

Mitchell W. Pearlman

Commissioner of the Superior Court