FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT

In the Matter of a Complaint by FINAL DECISION

Stephanie Reitz and

The Associated Press,

  
  Complainants  
  against   Docket #FIC 2006-343

Commissioner,

State of Connecticut,

Department of Correction,

  
  Respondent  June 27, 2007
       

 

            The above-captioned matter was heard as a contested case on October 12, 2006, at which time the complainants, the respondent, and the intervenors appeared, stipulated to certain facts and presented testimony, exhibits and argument on the complaint.  The subject of the requested records, James Calvin Tillman, was granted permission to intervene as a party, pursuant to §1-206(b)(1), G.S.  The State of Connecticut Office of the Chief Public Defender was granted permission to intervene for the purpose of presenting limited evidence and argument, pursuant to Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies §1-21j-31.

 

            After consideration of the entire record, the following facts are found and conclusions of law are reached:

 

1.  The respondent is a public agency within the meaning of §1-200(1), G.S.

 

2.  By letter of complaint filed July 9, 2006, the complainants appealed to the Commission, alleging that the respondent violated the Freedom of Information (“FOI”) Act by failing to comply with their July 6, 2006 request for public records.

 

            3.  It is found that the complainants, following up on a telephone conversation that day with the respondent, made a written request on July 6, 2006 to the respondent for the correctional history and discipline information for James Calvin Tillman. 

 

4.  It is found that the respondent contacted counsel for Mr. Tillman, who registered a number of objections to the disclosure of the requested records, including that disclosure would constitute a violation of Mr. Tillman’s privacy.

 

5.  It is found that the respondent then denied the complainants’ request.

6.  Section 1-200(5), G.S., provides:

 

    “Public records or files” means any recorded data or information relating to the conduct of the public's business prepared, owned, used, received or retained by a public agency, or to which a public agency is entitled to receive a copy by law or contract under section 1-218, whether such data or information be handwritten, typed, tape-recorded, printed, photostated, photographed or recorded by any other method.

 

7.  Section 1-210(a), G.S., provides in relevant part:

 

Except as otherwise provided by any federal law or state statute, all records maintained or kept on file by any public agency, whether or not such records are required by any law or by any rule or regulation, shall be public records and every person shall have the right to (1) inspect such records promptly during regular office or business hours, (2) copy such records in accordance with subsection (g) of section 1-212, or (3) receive a copy of such records in accordance with section 1-212.

 

8.  Section 1-212(a)(1), G.S., provides in relevant part: “Any person applying in writing shall receive, promptly upon request, a plain or certified copy of any public record.”

 

9.  At the hearing, the complainants limited their request to records that would reflect the dates that Mr. Tillman was incarcerated at which correctional facilities, his movement between facilities, and his disciplinary record while incarcerated, as indicated by the record of his disciplinary “tickets.”

 

            10.  Following the hearing, the respondent submitted for in camera inspection the records in its possession that are responsive to the complainants’ request.  The records are designated as 2006-343-1 through 2006-343-10. 

 

11.  It is found that the requested records are public records within the meaning of §§1-200(5), 1-210(a) and 1-212(a), G.S.

 

12.  The respondent contends that the requested records are exempt from disclosure because Mr. Tillman’s police and court records are subject to erasure under §54-142a(a), G.S.        

 

13.  The Commission takes administrative notice of the extensive publicity concerning Mr. Tillman’s release from prison, the dismissal of the charges against him, and the compensation offered to him by the State of Connecticut for his wrongful conviction and lengthy incarceration.  Briefly, as recently reported by the Associated Press:

 

   Gov. M. Jodi Rell on Monday signed legislation giving an East Hartford man $5 million in compensation for serving a prison term of more than 18 years for a rape that DNA evidence determined he did not commit.

   Rell told James C. Tillman and his mother, Catherine Martin Tillman, that she realized the bill-signing ceremony marked "a mixed blessing."  But she said it was "well-deserved and long overdue."

   Tillman, who was 26 when he was arrested, was sentenced to 45 years in prison after being convicted of raping and beating a woman in downtown Hartford in 1988. The victim identified him, but Tillman was exonerated last summer when DNA tests showed he could not have been the attacker.

 

14.  Section 54-142a(a), G.S., provides in relevant part that, when a person is found not guilty of a criminal offense or the charge is dismissed, “all police and court records and records of any state’s attorney pertaining to such charge shall be erased ….” 

 

15.  It is found that the charges against Mr. Tillman were dismissed on July 11, 2006.

 

16.  However, it is also found that the requested records are not police records, court records, or records of any state’s attorney, within the meaning of §54-142a(a), G.S.

 

17.  The Commission also observes that our Supreme Court has expressly held  that the term “court records” in §54-142a(a), G.S., does not encompass prison records maintained by the Department of Correction (“DOC”) after a defendant has been pardoned and his police, court, and state’s attorney records are subject to erasure.  Doe v. Manson, 183 Conn. 183, 188 (1981).

 

18.  Consequently, it is concluded that the requested records are not subject to erasure under §54-142a(a), G.S.

 

19.  The respondent nonetheless contends that the statutory erasure provisions become meaningless if the complainant can do an “end run around the court, and around the prosecutor, and obtain the same records from the DOC.”  Respondent’s Post Hearing Brief at 7.

 

20.  It is found, however, that the complainants are not seeking the same records from DOC as are maintained by the court and prosecutor.  Specifically, it is found that the records sought by the complainant are maintained exclusively by the DOC.

 

21.  It is therefore concluded that the provisions of §54-142a(a), G.S., do not affect the disclosability of the requested records.

 

22.  The respondent and the intervenors also contend that the requested records are exempt from disclosure as “nonconviction information” under §§54-142g, G.S., et seq., because at the time of the complainants’ request on July 6, 2006 there was an extremely strong likelihood that all charges would be dismissed on July 11, 2006, and that therefore all the information concerning Mr. Tillman would, they argue, then be subject to nondisclosure as “nonconviction information” under §54-142n, G.S.

 

23.  However, while “nonconviction information” is exempt from disclosure, an examination of the relevant statutory provisions makes clear that the requested records, while they pertain to a criminal charge ultimately dismissed, do not fall within the definition of “nonconviction information.”

 

24.  With respect to disclosure of “nonconviction information, §54-142n, G.S., provides:

 

Nonconviction information other than erased information may be disclosed only to: (1) Criminal justice agencies in this and other states and the federal government; (2) agencies and persons which require such information to implement a statute or executive order that expressly refers to criminal conduct; (3) agencies or persons authorized by a court order, statute or decisional law to receive criminal history record information. Whenever a person or agency receiving a request for nonconviction information is in doubt about the authority of the requesting agency to receive such information, the request shall be referred to the State Police Bureau of Investigation.

 

25.  Section 54-142g(e), G.S., defines “nonconviction information” as follows:

 

"Nonconviction information" means (1) criminal history record information that has been "erased" pursuant to section 54-142a; (2) information relating to persons granted youthful offender status; (3) continuances which are more than thirteen months old. Nonconviction information does not mean conviction information or current offender information. [Emphasis added.]

 

26.  Section 54-142g(a), G.S., defines criminal history record information as follows:

 

"Criminal history record information" means court records and information compiled by criminal justice agencies for purposes of identifying criminal offenders and of maintaining as to each such offender notations of arrests, releases, detentions, indictments, informations, or other formal criminal charges or any events and outcomes arising from those arrests, releases, detentions, including pleas, trials, sentences, appeals, incarcerations, correctional supervision, paroles and releases; but does not include intelligence, presentence investigation, investigative information or any information which may be disclosed pursuant to subsection (f) of section 54-63d. [Emphasis added.]

 

27.  Finally, § 54-142g(a), G.S., defines “criminal justice agency” to include the DOC.

 

28.  It is found that the requested records were compiled by the DOC for the purpose of maintaining notations of Mr. Tillman’s incarceration.

 

29.  Consequently, it is concluded that the requested records are criminal history record information within the meaning of §54-142g(a), G.S.

 

30.  However, it is also concluded that, since the requested records are not subject to erasure under §52-142a, G.S., as found in paragraph 18, above, the requested records are therefore not “nonconviction information” within the meaning of §54-142g(e), G.S.

 

31.  Therefore, it is concluded that the requested records are not subject to the disclosure limitations under §54-142n, G.S.

 

32.  The respondent and the intervenors contend that the records should not be disclosed because Mr. Tillman has a constitutional right of privacy.

 

33.  It is concluded, however, that the respondent and intervenors failed to prove any constitutional privacy claims.

 

34.  The respondent and the intervenors also contend that the records are exempt from disclosure under §1-210(b)(2), G.S.

 

35.  Section 1-210(b)(2), G.S., provides that disclosure is not required of “[p]ersonnel or medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute an invasion of personal privacy ….”

 

36.  The Supreme Court set forth the test for the exemption contained in §1-210(b)(2), G.S., in Perkins v. Freedom of Information Commission, 228 Conn. 158, 175 (1993).   The claimant must first establish that the files in question are personnel, medical or similar files.  Second, the claimant must show that disclosure of the records would constitute an invasion of personal privacy.  In determining whether disclosure would constitute an invasion of personal privacy, the claimant must establish both of two elements: first, that the information sought does not pertain to legitimate matters of public concern, and second, that the disclosure of such information is highly offensive to a reasonable person.  The Commission takes administrative notice of the multitude of court rulings, commission final decisions1, and instances of advice given by the Commission staff members2, which have relied upon the Perkins test, since its release in 1993.

 

37.  It is found that the requested records are in the nature of personnel or similar files within the meaning of §1-210(b)(2), G.S.  See Board of Pardons v. FOIC, 19 Conn. App. 539 (1989).

 

38.  With respect to whether the information sought pertains to legitimate matters of public concern, the Commission again takes administrative notice of the extensive publicity concerning Mr. Tillman’s release from prison, the dismissal of the charges against him, and the compensation offered to him by the State of Connecticut for his wrongful conviction and lengthy incarceration.

 

39.  It is found that Mr. Tillman is, at the very least, a limited purpose public figure.  See, e.g., Jones v. New Haven Register, Inc., 46 Conn. Supp. 634, 643 (2000) (limited purpose public figure is “an individual that, ‘voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into a particular public controversy and thereby becomes a public figure for a limited range of issues’”); 3 Restatement (Second) of Torts (1977) §642D, comment F (“Those who commit crime or are accused of it may not only seek publicity but may make every possible effort to avoid it, but they are nevertheless persons of public interest, concerning whom the public is entitled to be informed.”)

 

40.  It is also found that the requested records bear a logical relationship to the newsworthy story of Mr. Tillman’s release from prison.  See, e.g., Shulman et al. v. Group W. Productions, Inc., et al., 18 Cal. 4th 200, 223-224, 955 P.2d 469, 485 (1998) (“[R]ecent decisions have generally tested newsworthiness with regard to limited public figures by assessing the logical relationship or nexus, or the lack thereof, between the events or activities that brought the person into the public eye and the particular facts disclosed.”)

 

41.  It is concluded that there is a legitimate public interest in the requested records.

 

42.  It is therefore concluded that the requested records are not exempt from disclosure pursuant to §1-210(b)(2), G.S.

 

43.  The respondent and the intervenors also contend that the Commissioner of Correction has reasonable grounds to believe that disclosure may result in harm to Mr. Tillman, and thus that the requested records are exempt under §1-210(b)(18), G.S. 

 

44.  Section 1-210(b)(18), G.S., provides that disclosure is not required of:

     Records, the disclosure of which the Commissioner of Correction, or as it applies to Whiting Forensic Division facilities of the Connecticut Valley Hospital, the Commissioner of Mental Health and Addiction Services, has reasonable grounds to believe may result in a safety risk, including the risk of harm to any person or the risk of an escape from, or a disorder in, a correctional institution or facility under the supervision of the Department of Correction or Whiting Forensic Division facilities. Such records shall include, but are not limited to:

      (A) Security manuals, including emergency plans contained or referred to in such security manuals;

      (B) Engineering and architectural drawings of correctional institutions or facilities or Whiting Forensic Division facilities;

      (C) Operational specifications of security systems utilized by the Department of Correction at any correctional institution or facility or Whiting Forensic Division facilities, except that a general description of any such security system and the cost and quality of such system may be disclosed;

      (D) Training manuals prepared for correctional institutions and facilities or Whiting Forensic Division facilities that describe, in any manner, security procedures, emergency plans or security equipment;

      (E) Internal security audits of correctional institutions and facilities or Whiting Forensic Division facilities;

      (F) Minutes or recordings of staff meetings of the Department of Correction or Whiting Forensic Division facilities, or portions of such minutes or recordings, that contain or reveal information relating to security or other records otherwise exempt from disclosure under this subdivision;

      (G) Logs or other documents that contain information on the movement or assignment of inmates or staff at correctional institutions or facilities; and

      (H) Records that contain information on contacts between inmates, as defined in section 18-84, and law enforcement officers;

45.  The respondent and the intervenors all contend that release of the records may re-traumatize Mr. Tillman by bringing up his correctional history after he has been released; that the records are subject to misinterpretation by the general public because events for which an inmate is disciplined, such as fighting, are perceived negatively by the general public but are a necessary means of survival while incarcerated; and because revisiting any of Mr. Tillman’s correctional history will make his re-entry into society more difficult.  Generally, the respondent and the intervenors contend that release of the requested records may have a negative impact upon Mr. Tillman’s mental health and the difficulties associated with his wrongful conviction, and that such a psychological impact constitutes “risk of harm to any person” within the meaning of §1-210(b)(18), G.S.

 

46.  However, it is not readily apparent that the risk of harm asserted by the respondent and intervenors—that is, harm to Mr. Tillman’s mental health and impairment of his ability to reintegrate into society—is the type of harm contemplated by §1-210(b)(18), G.S.

 

47.  The Commission is also somewhat troubled by the DOC’s concession that it routinely discloses the very same records that were requested concerning Mr. Tillman for any other inmate that is incarcerated, and thus that the DOC’s concern for the harms caused by the release of such records seems to be limited to Mr. Tillman alone.

 

48.  Nonetheless, the respondent’s and the intervenors’ claim regarding whether the language “risk of harm to any person” encompasses possible psychological harm raises an issue of first impression for the Commission, and merits a close reading of the statute, guided by the principles set forth below.

 

49.  First, the FOI Act does not define “risk of harm to any person.”

 

50.  Second, Webster’s Third New International Dictionary Unabridged (1993) defines “harm” to include either physical or mental damage.

 

51.  Third, §1-1(a), G.S., provides:

 

In the construction of the statutes, words and phrases shall be construed according to the commonly approved usage of the language; and technical words and phrases, and such as have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law, shall be construed and understood accordingly.

52.  Fourth, §1-2z, G.S., provides:

 

The meaning of a statute shall, in the first instance, be ascertained from the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered.

 

53.  An examination of the first paragraph of the text of §1-210(b)(18), G.S., indicates that the general term “safety risk” expressly includes “the risk of harm to any person” or “the risk of escape from, or a disorder in, a correctional institution or facility.”  It is found that the context strongly implies that “safety risk” means physical harm.  It is also found that the context does not imply that “safety risk” includes the type of psychological harm asserted by the respondent and intervenors.

 

54.  An examination of the remainder of the text of §1-210(b)(18), G.S., reveals the enumeration of eight categories of records in subsections (A) through (H).  It is found that the first seven of these categories of records, subsections (A) through (G), refer to physical security concerns.  It is found that the last of these categories of records, subsection (H), refers to information on contacts between inmates and law enforcement officers, which is not defined, but appears to refer to risks of physical harm to law enforcement officers from inmates.

 

55.  The doctrine of ejusdem generis is a rule of statutory construction that directs that the general term "risk of harm to any person" in §1-210(b)(18), G.S., is to be construed to embrace things of the same general kind or character as the more specific terms enumerated in subsections (A) through (H) of  the statute. See, e.g., State v. Russell, 218 Conn. 273, 278 (1991); 2A J. Sutherland, Statutory Construction (4th Ed. Sands 1984) § 47.17, p. 166.  The doctrine applies when:

 

… (1) the [clause] contains an enumeration by specific words; (2) the members of the enumeration suggest a specific class; (3) the class is not exhausted by the enumeration; (4) a general reference [supplements] the enumeration . . . and (5) there is [no] clearly manifested intent that the general term be given a broader meaning than the doctrine requires. . . . It rests on particular insights about everyday language usage. When people list a number of particulars and add a general reference like 'and so forth' they mean to include by use of the general reference not everything else but only others of like kind. [Emphasis added; citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.]  

 

Fairfax Properties, Inc. v. Lyons, 72 Conn. App. 426, 439-440 (2002). 

56.  It is found that each of the five prongs of the test for application of the doctrine of ejusdem generis, cited in Fairfax Properties, above, is satisfied by the language of §1-210(b)(18), G.S.

 

57.  It is therefore concluded that the enumeration in subsections (A) through (H) of specific types of records confined to risks of security breaches or physical harm means that the general references to “safety risk” and “harm to any person” are not to be construed to include risks that are unrelated to security or physical safety.

 

58.  It is also concluded that this interpretation is consistent with the policy of our Supreme Court to narrowly construe exceptions to the Freedom of Information Act. Board of Police Commissioners v. Freedom of Information Commission, 192 Conn. 183, 188 (1984).

 

59.  Although the Commission does not believe that the meaning of §1-210(b)(18), G.S., is so unclear as to require evidence outside the text of the statute, it also notes that its interpretation is consistent with the extensive legislative history surrounding the enactment of P.A. 99-156, now codified as §1-210(b)(18), G.S.  The debate on the floor of the House of Representatives on May 25, 1999, and on the floor of the Senate on June 2, 1999, as well as the testimony and colloquy at the public hearing before the Governmental Administration and Elections Committee on March 15, 1999, are replete with statements indicating the concern of legislators, and of then Commissioner Armstrong of the DOC, that inmates not have access to records such as topographic maps of the prison that could be used to escape, or home addresses of witnesses and correction officers that could be used to endanger them, or information in reports that could be used to threaten other inmates.   Many expressed the concern that inmates would use the FOI Act to obtain information, particularly “security materials,” to pose a security or safety threat to others.  Commissioner Armstrong testified that the purpose of P.A. 99-156 was to protect the public, protect the staff that works inside correctional facilities, and keep offenders safe from each other.  Nowhere does the legislative history even suggest that P.A. 99-156 was intended to keep the type of records requested in this case away from the press or the general public.

 

60.  Moreover, it is found that the very real harm experienced by Mr. Tillman was caused by his wrongful incarceration, not by the release of records indicating that he was in fact incarcerated.

 

61.  It is concluded that the phrase “risk of harm” in §1-210(b)(18), G.S., does not encompass the type of potential mental or psychological impact on Mr. Tillman asserted by the respondent and the intervenors.

 

62.  It is therefore found that the Commissioner of Correction did not have reasonable grounds to believe that the release of the requested records would result in a safety risk to any person, specifically to Mr. Tillman.

 

63.  It is therefore concluded that the respondent violated §§1-210(a) and 1-212(a), G.S., by failing to provide a copy of the requested records to the complainant.

 

64.  The Commission is sensitive to the fact that Mr. Tillman suffered, in a manner most of us cannot even imagine, for a crime he did not commit, and that, with great dignity, he wishes to put the events of the past behind him.  But many records deal with events that individuals would like to put behind them, and the discomfort or pain caused by public revelation or discussion has never previously been found by the Commission to be sufficient to bar disclosure of otherwise public records.  Nor does the Commission believe it should be in the business of deciding what newsworthy information may or may not be published because of the possible anguish of victims.  The Commission leaves it to the good discretion of the complainants Reitz and the Associated Press, and other news media, to make those judgments.  In the event that publication invades Mr. Tillman’s privacy, adequate legal remedies are available to him.  (Contrary to the respondent’s assertion, the DOC itself is, for a variety of reasons, not liable for disclosures made under the FOI Act.  See Pane v. Danbury, 267 Conn. 669 (2004).)

 

65.  The intervenors maintain that, notwithstanding the otherwise public nature of the requested records, that the Commission has equitable powers to prevent disclosure of the requested records in order to protect Mr. Tillman’s privacy.

 

66.  Section 1-206(b)(2), G.S., provides in relevant part:

 

In any appeal to the Freedom of Information Commission under subdivision (1) of this subsection or subsection (c) of this section, the commission may confirm the action of the agency or order the agency to provide relief that the commission, in its discretion, believes appropriate to rectify the denial of any right conferred by the Freedom of Information Act. 

 

67.  While the Commission has, under §1-206(b)(2), G.S., the discretion to fashion a remedy that it believes appropriate, the Commission does not, for the reasons described above, believe it appropriate to withhold records in an attempt to limit publicity about newsworthy events.

 

68.  Finally, the Commission notes that the intervenors obtained on July 11, 2006, an order from the Superior Court that the requested records “be sealed, may not be made public, pending further order of the FOI Commission or a judge of the Superior Court.”  See Docket No. CR880339665S, State v. Tillman, Superior Court, J.D. of Hartford (Miano, J.).  Although the respondent and the intervenors did not raise this sealing order as a defense to disclosure under the FOI Act, the Commission wishes to make clear that the court’s order, by its express terms, expires, and therefore does not conflict, with the issuance of the Commission’s order of disclosure in this case.

 

 

The following order by the Commission is hereby recommended on the basis of the record concerning the above-captioned complaint:

 

            1.  The respondent shall forthwith provide the requested records to the complainants.

 

 

Approved by Order of the Freedom of Information Commission at its regular meeting of June 27, 2007.

 

________________________________

Petrea A. Jones

Acting Clerk of the Commission

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

PURSUANT TO SECTION 4-180(c), G.S., THE FOLLOWING ARE THE NAMES OF EACH PARTY AND THE MOST RECENT MAILING ADDRESS, PROVIDED TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION, OF THE PARTIES OR THEIR AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE.

 

THE PARTIES TO THIS CONTESTED CASE ARE:

 

Stephanie Reitz and

The Associated Press

c/o Daniel J. Klau, Esq.

Pepe & Hazard LLP

225 Asylum Street

Hartford, CT 06103

 

Commissioner,

State of Connecticut,

Department of Correction

c/o Henri Alexandre, Esq.

Assistant Attorney General and

Steven R. Strom, Esq.

Assistant Attorney General

110 Sherman Street

Hartford, CT 06105

 

James Calvin Tillman

c/o Karen A. Goodrow, Esq.

Connecticut Innocence Project

Office of the Chief Public Defender

30 Trinity Street

Hartford, CT 06106

 

State of Connecticut, Office of

the Chief Public Defender

c/o Deborah Del Prete Sullivan, Esq.

Executive Assistant Public Defender

Office of the Chief Public Defender

30 Trinity Street

Hartford, CT 06106

 

___________________________________

Petrea A. Jones

Acting Clerk of the Commission

 

 

FIC/2006-343FD/paj/6/28/2007

 

 

ENDNOTES

 

1. A. Court cases

 

Director, Retirement & Benefits Services Div. v. FOIC, 256 Conn. 764 (2001); Rocque v. FOIC, 255 Conn. 651 (2001); Dept. of Public Safety v FOIC, 242 Conn. 79 (1997) Conn. Alcohol & Drug Abuse Commission v. FOIC, 233 Conn.28 (1995) Kurecza v. FOIC, 228 Conn. 271 (1994); First Selectman v. FOIC, 60 Conn. App. 64 (2000); Dept. of Children & Families v. FOIC, 48 Conn. App. 467 (1998); Almeida v. FOIC, 39 Conn. App. 154 (1995); Dept. of Transportation v. FOIC, Super Ct JD NB CV 01-0508810 (Schuman, J. 2001); City Treasurer, City of Hartford v. FOIC, Super Ct JD NB CV 99 0496222 (Cohn, J. 2000); Rocque, Commissioner of Environmental Protection v. FOIC, Super Ct JD NB CV 98 0492734 (Hartmere, J. 1999); Director, Retirement & Benefits Services Div. v. FOIC, Super Ct JD NB CV 98 0492692 (Hartmere, J. 1999); First Selectman, Town of Ridgefield v. FOIC, Super Ct JD NB CV 99‑0493041 (McWeeny, J. 1999); Chairman, Bd. of Education Town of Darien v. FOIC, Super Ct JD Htfd NB CV 97 0575674 (McWeeny, J. 1998); Waters, Commissioner of State of Conn. Dept. of Administrative Services v. FOIC, Super Ct JD Htfd/NB CV 96 0565853 (McWeeny, J. 1997); Armstrong, Commissioner of State of Conn. Dept. Of Correction v. FOIC, Super Ct JD Htfd/NB CV 96 0563608 (McWeeny, J. 1997); Dept. of Children & Families v. FOIC, Super Ct JD Htfd NB CV 96 0562546 (McWeeny, J. 1997); State of Conn. Office of Protection and Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities v. FOIC, Super Ct JD Htfd/NB CV 95 0554467 (McWeeny, J. 1997); Youngquist v. FOIC, Super Ct JD Htfd/NB, CV 95 0554601 (McWeeny, J. 1996 and 1997); Cracco v. FOIC, Super Ct JD Htfd/NB, CV 94 0705371 (Dunnell, J. 1995); Cracco v. FOIC, Super Ct JD Htfd NB, CV 93 0705370, (Dunnell, J. 1995); Cracco v. FOIC, Super Ct JD Htfd NB, CV 94 0705369, (Dunnell, J. 1995); Simonds v. FOIC, Super Ct JD Htfd/NB, CV 93 070 41 39 (Maloney, J. 1994); Gallagher v. FOIC, Super Ct JD Htfd/NB, CV 93 0531514 (Maloney, J. 1994).

 

 

1. B. FOIC Decisions

 

Docket #FIC 2000-624; Eric Gustavson v. Board of Education, Brookfield Public Schools (June 13, 2001); Docket #FIC 2000-557; Wendy John v. Richard Blumenthal, Attorney General, State of Connecticut, Office of the Attorney General; Wil Gundling, William McCullough, Phillip Schulz, Margaret Chapple, Assistant Attorneys General, State of Connecticut, Office of the Attorney General; and State of Connecticut, Office of the Attorney General (June 13, 2001); Docket #FIC 2000-268; Michael Costanza and The Day v. Director of Utilities, Utilities Department, City of Groton; and Mayor, City of Groton (April 25, 2001); Docket #FIC 2000-198; William J. Stone v. Personnel Administrator, State of Connecticut, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Finance and Administration; and State of Connecticut, Department of Transportation (April 20, 2001); Docket #FIC 2000-537; James Leonard, Jr. v. Chief, Police Department, City of New Britain (March 28, 2001); Docket #FIC 2000-348; Bradshaw Smith v. Office of the Vice Chancellor for Information Services, State of Connecticut, University of Connecticut; and State of Connecticut, University of Connecticut (February 28, 2001); Docket #FIC 2000-474; Robert H. Boone and Journal Inquirer v. Chief, Police Department, Town of Windsor Locks (Jan. 24, 2001); Docket #FIC 2000-265; Lisa Goldberg and The Hartford Courant v. Superintendent of Schools, Vernon Public Schools (Jan. 24, 2001); Docket #FIC 2000-569; Mary Hyde v. Chief, Police Department, Town of Seymour (Dec. 13, 2000); Docket #FIC 2000-049; Nicholas B. Wynnick v. Board of Directors, Ansonia Public Library, Town of Ansonia (Dec. 13, 2000); Docket #FIC 2000-136; Thomas E. Lee v. Board of Education, Trumbull Public Schools; and Superintendent of Schools, Trumbull Public Schools (Nov. 29, 2000); Docket #FIC 2000-135; Thomas E. Lee v. Board of Education, Trumbull Public Schools; and Superintendent of Schools, Trumbull Public Schools (Nov. 29, 2000); Docket #FIC2000-086; Mitchell D. Poudrier v. Superintendent of Schools, Killingly Public Schools (Sept. 13, 2000); Docket #FIC 2000-173; Robert H. Boone and the Journal Inquirer v. Anthony Milano, District Manager, Metropolitan District Commission; and Metropolitan District Commission (Aug. 23, 2000); Docket #FIC 2000-094; James D. Goodwin v. Communications Specialist, State of Connecticut, Department of Social Services, Public and Government Relations Unit (Aug. 9, 2000); Docket #FIC 2000-022; Thedress Campbell v. City Treasurer, City of Hartford (Aug. 9, 2000); Docket #FIC 2000-137; Robert H. Boone and Journal Inquirer v. Metropolitan District Commission (July 12, 2000); Docket #FIC 1999-560; Leo F. Smith v. Robert H. Skinner, First Selectman, Town of Suffield; and Selectmen’s Office, Town of Suffield (July 12, 2000); Docket #FIC 1999-556; Delores Annicelli v. Director, New Haven Housing Authority, City of New Haven; and New Haven Housing Authority, City of New Haven (July 12, 2000); Docket #FIC 1999-548; Leo F. Smith v. John P. Lange, Human Resources Director, Town of Suffield; and Department of Human Resources, Town of Suffield (July 12, 2000); Docket #FIC 1999-547; Leo F. Smith v. John P. Lange, Human Resources Director, Town of Suffield; and Department of Human Resources, Town of Suffield (July 12, 2000); Docket #FIC 1999-525; Leo F. Smith v. John P. Lange, Human Resources Director, Town of Suffield; and Department of Human Resources, Town of Suffield (July 12, 2000); Docket #FIC 2000-118; Elizabeth Ganga and Connecticut Post v. Police Department, Town of Stratford (June 28, 2000); Docket #FIC 2000-095; Ron Robillard and the Chronicle v. Chairman, Board of Education, Eastford Public Schools; and Board of Education, Eastford Public Schools (June 28, 2000); Docket #FIC 2000-093; Megan J. Bard and The Norwich Bulletin v. Chairman, Board of Education, Eastford Public Schools; and Board of Education, Eastford Public Schools (June 28, 2000); Docket #FIC 1999-575; Bruce Kaz v. Robert Skinner, First Selectman, Town of Suffield; and Ted Flanders, Building Inspector, Town of Suffield (June 28, 2000); Docket #FIC 1999-519; Robert J. Fortier v. Personnel Director, Town of East Hartford; and Mayor, Town of East Hartford (June 14, 2000); Docket #FIC1999-550; James and Susanne Milewski v. Deputy Chief, Police Department, Town of Clinton; and Police Department, Town of Clinton (May 24, 2000); Docket #FIC 2000-005; Fred B. Feins v. President and Chief Executive Officer, Granby Ambulance Association, Inc., Town of Granby (May 10, 2000); Docket #FIC1999-606; Robert L. Corraro and IBEW Local 90 v. Town Attorney, Town of Hamden; and Electrical Contractors, Inc. (May 10, 2000); Docket #FIC 1999-533; Donald J. Lanouette, Jr. v. Chief, Police Department, Town of Madison; and Police Department, Town of Madison (April 26, 2000); Docket #FIC 1999-502; Christopher Hoffman and New Haven Register v. Director of Personnel, State of Connecticut, Southern Connecticut State University; and Personnel Office, State of Connecticut, Southern Connecticut State University (April 26, 2000); Docket #FIC1999-440; Anne Hamilton and The Hartford Courant James Martino, Chief, Police Department, Town of Avon; Peter A. Agnesi, Lieutenant, Police Department, Town of Avon; and Police Department, Town of Avon (March 8, 2000); Docket #FIC1999-333; Lynn Fredricksen and New Haven Register v. Chief, Police Department, Town of Madison; and Police Department, Town of Madison (March 8, 2000); Docket #FIC 1999-289; Thomas Moran v. Director, Human Resources, Town of Simsbury; and Department of Human Resources, Town of Simsbury (Feb. 9, 2000); Docket #FIC 1999-328; Victor Zigmund v. Director, State of Connecticut, Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services, Human Resources Operations, Connecticut Valley Hospital, Whiting Forensic Division (Jan. 26, 2000); Docket #FIC 1999-100; Janice D’Arcy and The Hartford Courant v. Chief, Police Department, Town of Cheshire; Police Department, Town of Cheshire; Town Manager, Town of Cheshire; and Town of Cheshire (Jan. 26, 2000); Docket #FIC 1999-355; Wayne Mercier v. Patricia C. Washington, Director of Personnel, City of Hartford; and Department of Personnel, City of Hartford (Nov. 10, 1999); Docket #FIC 1998-391; Jonathan F. Kellogg and The Republican American v. Department of Education, City of Waterbury (Oct. 13, 1999); Docket #FIC 1999-161; Michael W. Cahill v. Chief, Police Department, Town of Hamden; and Police Department, Town of Hamden (Sept. 22, 1999); Docket #FIC 1998-294; Robert J. Bourne v. Department of Public Utilities, City of Norwich, and City of Norwich (Sept. 22, 1999); Docket #FIC 1998-293; Joseph J. Cassidy v. Department of Public Utilities, City of Norwich, and City of Norwich (Sept. 22, 1999); Docket #FIC 1999-040; Judith F. Machuga and State of Connecticut, Division of Public Defender Services, Superior Court, G.A. 13 v. Chief, Police Department, Town of East Windsor; and Police Department, Town of East Windsor (Aug. 25, 1999); Docket #FIC 1999-144; Robert H. Boone and Journal Inquirer v. William Gifford, Chief, Police Department, Town of Windsor Locks; Police Department, Town of Windsor Locks; and Windsor Locks Police Commission (July 28, 1999); Docket #FIC 1999-096; Paul Marks and The Hartford Courant v. Chief, Police Department, Town of Windsor Locks; and Police Department, Town of Windsor Locks (July 28, 1999); Docket #FIC 1999-064; Joan Coe v. First Selectman, Town of Simsbury; Director, Human Resources Department, Town of Simsbury; and Town of Simsbury (July 28, 1999); Docket #FIC 1999-150; Andrew Nargi v. Office of Corporation Counsel, City of Torrington; and City of Torrington (July 14, 1999); Docket #FIC 1999-135; Warren Woodberry, Jr. and The Hartford Courant v. Acting Town Manager, Town of Rocky Hill and Town of Rocky Hill (July 14, 1999); Docket #FIC 1999-015; Richard Manuel Rivera v. Superintendent of Schools, Torrington Public Schools; and Board of Education, Torrington Public Schools (June 9, 1999); Docket #FIC 1998-372; William C. Kaempffer and New Haven Register v. Police Department, City of New Haven; City of New Haven; and James Sorrentino (June 9, 1999); Docket #FIC 1997-361; Dominick L. Santarsiero v. Director, Human Resources, City of Stamford (June 10, 1998); Docket #FIC 1999-019; David K. Jaffe v. State of Connecticut, Connecticut Lottery Corporation, Human Resources; State of Connecticut, Connecticut Lottery Corporation, Security Division; and State of Connecticut, Connecticut Lottery Corporation (April 28, 1999); Docket #FIC1998-325; Virginia Groark and The Day v. Freedom of Information Officer, State of Connecticut, Department of Public Health, Office of Special Services, Communications Division; and Agency Personnel Administrator, State of Connecticut, Department of Public Health, Human Resources Division (April 28, 1999); Docket #FIC 1998-208; Thedress Campbell v. City Treasurer, City of Hartford; and City of Hartford (April 14, 1999); Docket #FIC 1998-265; Benjamin M. Wenograd and Service Employees International Union Local 760 v. John Roughan, Executive Director, East Hartford Housing Authority; and East Hartford Housing Authority, Town of East Hartford (March 24, 1999); Docket #FIC 1997-363; Diana R. Raczkowski v. Mayor, Town of Naugatuck (March 11, 1998); Docket #FIC 1997-307; Krystin Bratina v. Chief, Hartford Fire Department, City of Hartford (March 11, 1998); Docket #FIC 1998-288; Christian Miller and the New Haven Register v. Superintendent, Branford Public Schools; and Board of Education, Branford Public Schools (Feb. 24, 1999); Docket #FIC 1998-255; Joan O’Rourke v. Chief, Police Department, City of Torrington; and Police Department, City of Torrington (Jan. 27, 1999); Docket #FIC 1998-251; John Ward v. Beverly L. Durante, Personnel Administrator, Housatonic Area Regional Transit; and Housatonic Area Regional Transit (Jan. 27, 1999); Docket #FIC 1998-163; Lawrence A. Butts v. Director, State of Connecticut, Department of Environmental Protection, Human Resources Division; and State of Connecticut, Department of Environmental Protection, Human Resources Division (Dec. 9, 1998); Docket #FIC 1998-162; Lawrence A. Butts Chairperson, State of Connecticut, Department of Environmental Protection, Human Resources Division; and State of Connecticut, Department of Environmental Protection, Human Resources Division (Dec. 9, 1998); Docket #FIC 1998-232; Scott Clark, Amy Kertesz, Michael Gates and the Ridgefield Police Union v. First Selectman, Town of Ridgefield; and Town of Ridgefield (Nov. 18, 1998); Docket #FIC 1998-193; Daniel P. Jones and The Hartford Courant v. Commissioner, State of Connecticut, Department of Environmental Protection; and State of Connecticut, Department of Environmental Protection (Nov. 18, 1998); Docket #FIC 1998-121; Ernie Cantwell and International Association of Firefighters, Local No. 1073 v. Director, Personnel Department, City of Middletown and Personnel Department, City of Middletown (Oct. 14, 1998); Docket #FIC 1998-120; Ernie Cantwell and International Association of Firefighters, Local No. 1073 v. Director, Personnel Department, City of Middletown (        Oct. 14, 1998); Docket #FIC 1998‑094; Janice D'Arcy and The Hartford Courant v. Chief, Meriden Police Department, City of Meriden and Meriden Police Department (Oct. 14, 1998); Docket #FIC 1997-422; Joseph A. Johnson, Jr. and Greenwich Time v. Chief, Greenwich Police Department, Town of Greenwich; and Greenwich Police Department, Town of Greenwich (Sept. 9, 1998); Docket #FIC 1998-023; Deborah Maynard v. Superintendent, Voluntown School District; and Principal, Voluntown Elementary School, Voluntown School District (Aug. 12, 1998); Docket #FIC 1997-298; Allan Drury and The New Haven Register v. Chief, East Haven Police Department, Town of East Haven; and Town of East Haven (June 10, 1998); Jonathan Lucas and Greenwich Times v. Director, Department of Human Resources, Town of Greenwich; and Town of Greenwich (May 27, 1998); John C. Rettman v. Meriden Police Department, Internal Affairs Division; and Paul Rowen (May 13, 1998); Docket #FIC 1997-318; Dennis Carnot v. Chief, Meriden Police Department, City of Meriden; Internal Affairs Division, Meriden Police Department, City of Meriden; Meriden Police Department, City of Meriden; and Paul Rowen (May 13, 1998); Docket #FIC 1997-175; Matthew Brown, Ken Byron and The Hartford Courant v. Superintendent of Schools, Plymouth Public Schools; and Board of Education, Town of Plymouth (February 18, 1998); Docket #FIC 1997-123; John Christoffersen and The Advocate v. Superintendent of Schools, Stamford Public Schools and Director of Personnel, Stamford Public Schools (Feb. 11, 1998); Docket #FIC 1997-088; John B. Harkins v. Acting Town Manager, Town of Tolland (Jan. 28, 1998); Docket #FIC 1997-085; Joe Johnson and Greenwich Time v. Chief of Police, Greenwich Police Department (Jan. 28, 1998); Docket #FIC 1997-142; Laura Amon v. Program Manager, Affirmative Action Division, State of Connecticut, Department of Transportation (Dec. 3, 1997); Docket #FIC 1996-572; Ken Byron and The Hartford Courant v. Chief of Police, Town of Wethersfield (Nov. 12, 1997); Docket #FIC 1997-238; Kimberley A. Thomsen and the Republican-American v. Acting Superintendent, Waterbury Police Department (Oct. 29, 1997); Docket #FIC 1997-089; Steven Edelman v. Commissioner, State of Connecticut, Department of Mental Retardation; and State of Connecticut, Department of Mental Retardation (Oct. 22, 1997); Docket #FIC 1996-551; Judith A. Amato v. Executive Director, New Britain Housing Authority; and New Britain Housing Authority (Aug. 27, 1997); Docket # FIC 1996-539; Ann Marie Derwin v. Legal Advisor, State of Connecticut, Department of Public Safety; and State of Connecticut, Department of Public Safety (Aug. 27, 1997); Docket #FIC 1996-592; Francine Karp v. Mayor, City of Bristol; Director of Personnel, City of Bristol; and Dennis Daigneault (July 23, 1997); Docket #FIC 1996-243; Joanne C. Tashjian v. Personnel Officer, State of Connecticut, Workers’ Compensation Commission; and State of Connecticut, Workers’ Compensation Commission (June 4, 1997); Docket #FIC 1996-322;Carolyn Moreau and The Hartford Courant v. Chief of Police, Southington Police Department; and Susan Williams (May 28, 1997); Docket #FIC 1996-465; John Gauger, Jr., Joseph Cadrain and Richard Westervelt v. Kenneth H. Kirschner, Commissioner, State of Connecticut, Department of Public Safety; Dawn Carnese, Legal Advisor, State of Connecticut, Department of Public Safety; and Lt. David Werner, Commanding Officer, Troop "B", State of Connecticut, Department of Public Safety, Division of State Police (April 9, 1997); Docket #FIC 1996-315; David W. Cummings v. Christopher Burnham, Treasurer, State of Connecticut (April 9, 1997); Docket #FIC 1996-521; Carol Butterworth v. Town Council, Town of Tolland (March 26, 1997); Docket #FIC 1996-421; John B. Harkins v. Chairman, Tolland Town Council (March 26, 1997); Docket #FIC 1996-314; David W. Cummings v. Christopher Burnham, Treasurer, State of Connecticut (April 9, 1997); Docket #FIC 1996-119; David W. Cummings v. Jesse M. Frankl, Chairman, State of Connecticut, Workers’ Compensation Commission (March 26, 1997); Docket #FIC 1996-215; Alice M. Gray v. Chief of Police, Manchester Police Department, and Assistant Town Attorney, Town of Manchester (Feb. 26, 1997); Docket #FIC 1996-159; Carolyn Moreau and The Hartford Courant v. Police Chief, Southington Police Department (Jan. 22, 1997); Docket #FIC 1996-124; Donald H. Schiller, Michael Kelley and The Record-Journal Publishing Company v. Police Chief, Town of Southington Police Department, and Town of Southington Police Department (Jan. 22, 1997); Docket #FIC 1996-134; Betty Halibozek v. Superintendent of Schools, Middletown Public Schools; and Supervisor of Maintenance and Transportation, Board of Education, City of Middletown (Dec. 11, 1996); Docket #FIC1996-006; Joseph Cadrain and Richard Westervelt v. Gerald Gore, Legal Affairs Unit, State of Connecticut, Department of Public Safety; and State of Connecticut, Department of Public Safety, Division of State Police (Dec. 11, 1996); Docket #FIC 1996-153; Tracey Thomas and The Hartford Courant v. Legal Affairs Unit, State of Connecticut, Department of Public Safety (Nov. 20, 1996); Docket #FIC1995-419; Robie Irizarry v. Warden, Willard Correctional Institution, State of Connecticut, Department of Correction (Oct. 23, 1996); Docket #FIC 1995-368; Thomas Lally v. Executive Director, State of Connecticut Board of Education and Services for the Blind, and Special Projects Coordinator, State of Connecticut, Board of Education and Services for the Blind (Oct. 9, 1996); Docket #FIC 1995-403; Jesse C. Leavenworth and The Hartford Courant v. Superintendent of Schools, Regional School District #7 (Sept. 25, 1996); Docket #FIC 1995-361; Christopher Hoffman and the New Haven Register v. James J. McGrath, Chief of Police, Ansonia Police Department and Eugene K. Baron, Brian Phipps, and Howard Tinney as members of the Ansonia Board of Police Commissioners (Sept. 25, 1996); Docket #FIC1995-358; Lyn Bixby and The Hartford Courant v. State of Connecticut, Department of Administrative Services (Sept. 25, 1996); Docket #FIC 1996-056; Francine Cimino v. Chief of Police, Glastonbury Police Department; Town Manager, Town of Glastonbury; and Town of Glastonbury (Sept. 25, 1996); Docket #FIC 1995-343; John J. Woodcock, III v. Town Manager, Town of South Windsor (July 24, 1996); Docket #FIC 1995-324; John J. Woodcock, III and Kathryn A. Hale v. Dana Whitman, Jr., Acting Town Manager, Town of South Windsor (July 24, 1996); Docket #FIC 95-251; Lyn Bixby & The Hartford Courant v. Commissioner, State of Connecticut, Department of Correction (July 10, 1996); Docket #FIC 1995-252; Valerie Finholm and The Hartford Courant v. Commissioner, State of Connecticut, Department of Children and Families (May 22, 1996); Docket #FIC 1995-193; Terence P. Sexton v. Chief of Police, Hartford Police Department (May 8, 1996); Docket #FIC 1995-125; Chris Powell and Journal Inquirer v. Commissioner, State of Connecticut, Department of Social Services (March 13, 1996); Docket #FIC 1995-081; Bruce Bellm, Kendres Lally, Philip Cater, Peter Hughes, Carol Northrop, Brad Pellissier, Todd Higgins and Bruce Garrison v. State of Connecticut, Office of Protection and Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities, Sharon Story and Marlene Fein (March 13, 1996); Docket #FIC 1995-074; Jeffrey C. Cole and WFSB/TV 3 v. James Strillacci, Chief of Police, West Hartford Police Department (Jan. 24, 1996); Docket #FIC 1995-026; Curtis R. Wood v. Director of Affirmative Action, State of Connecticut, Department of Correction (Jan. 24, 1996); Docket #FIC 1995-132; Michael A. Ingrassia v. Warden, Walker Special Management Unit, State of Connecticut Department of Correction (Dec. 27, 1995); Docket #FIC 1995-048; Jane Holfelder v. Canton Police Department (June 14, 1995); Docket #FIC 1994-351; Edward A. Peruta v. O. Paul Shew, Rocky Hill Town Manager and Director of Public Safety; Donald Unwin, Mayor of Rocky Hill, William Pacelia, Deputy Mayor of Rocky Hill; and Curt Roggi, Rocky Hill Town Attorney (May 28, 1995); Docket #FIC 1994-160; John Springer and The Bristol Press v. Chief of Police, Bristol Police Department (April 5, 1995); Docket #FIC 1994-077; Kathryn Kranhold and The Hartford Courant v. Director, New Haven Health Department (Feb. 8, 1995); Docket #FIC 1994-099; Frank Faraci, Jr. v. Middletown Police Department, Mayor of Middletown, and Middletown City Attorney (Feb. 2, 1995); Docket #FIC 1994-011; Robert Grabar, Edward Frede and The News-Times v. Superintendent of Schools, Brookfield Public Schools and Brookfield Board of Education (Aug. 24, 1994); Docket #FIC 1993-279; Jay Lewin v. New Milford Director of Finance (March 23, 1994)

 

 

 

2. Affidavit of Eric Turner, January 9, 2002.

 

AFFIDAVIT OF ERIC V. TURNER

 

Eric V. Turner, having been duly sworn, does hereby depose as follows:

 

1.  I am over the age of eighteen (18) years and understand the obligation of an affirmation.

 

2.  I am a member of the Connecticut Bar and am currently employed as Director of Public Education for the Connecticut Freedom of Information Commission, having first been employed by said commission in 1996.

 

3.  I am providing this affidavit in light of the Supreme Court decision in Director, Retirement & Benefits Services Division v. Freedom of Information Commission, 256 Conn. 764 (2001), in which the court apparently invites a reconsideration of Perkins v. Freedom of Information Commission, 228 Conn. 158 (1993).  See, Director, supra at 782, fn 13, 785 (Zarella, J. concurring).

 

4.  As part of my responsibilities as Director of Public Education for said commission, I have developed, organized and scheduled speaking engagements, seminars and programs explaining the duties and rights established under the Connecticut Freedom of Information Act.

 

5.  Since I assumed my current position in 1996, there have been approximately 290 such speaking engagements, seminars and programs in Connecticut and I have personally lectured in approximately 80 such speaking engagements, seminars and programs.

 

6.  As part of the presentation I have prepared for such speaking engagements, seminars and programs, the subject of the Connecticut General Statues Section 1-210(b)(2) exemption for personnel, medical and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute an invasion of personal privacy is stressed because of the great interest in that exemption and the confusion generated by a series of inconsistent and contradictory court decisions prior to Perkins, supra.  See, e.g., Chairman v. Freedom of Information Commission, 217 Conn. 193 (1991) (establishing “reasonable expectation of privacy” test; query whether subjectively or objectively applied) and Board of Education v. Freedom of Information Commission, 210 Conn. 590 (1989) (confirming a “balancing” test), which was overruled by the Chairman case.

 

7.  Since the Supreme Court ruling in Perkins, supra, all Freedom of Information Commission staff members who conduct such speaking engagements, seminars and programs discuss in detail the rulings in that case and its progeny.

 

8.  As part of my responsibilities as Director of Public Education, I also answer telephone and other inquiries from public officials and the public.  Since my employment with said commission, I have answered thousands of such inquiries, including hundreds of inquiries concerning the Connecticut General Statutes Section 1-210(b)(2) exemption.  In responding to such inquiries I discuss in detail the Perkins case and its progeny.

 

9.  Based on the foregoing experiences, it is my opinion that the Perkins decision, and its progeny, have had a beneficial effect on public officials and the public itself because they can rely on a now long-standing and clear test with respect to the Connecticut General Statutes Section 1-210(b)(2) exemption, which helps them determine whether that exemption is applicable to the practical problems they encounter with respect to personnel, medical and similar information.  Indeed, the many court and Freedom of Information Commission decisions applying the Perkins test have given public officials and the public a now consistent body of law concerning that statutory exemption.

 

 

Eric V. Turner

 

 

 

COUNTY OF HARTFORD

                                                            ss:  Hartford

STATE OF CONNECTICUT

 

Subscribed and attested to before me this 9th day of January, 2002.

 

 

 

Mitchell W. Pearlman

Commissioner of the Superior Court