FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT

           

The above-captioned matter was heard as a contested case on July 20, 2005, at which time the complainants and the respondent appeared, stipulated to certain facts and presented testimony, exhibits and argument on the complaint.   For purposes of hearing, this case was consolidated with Docket #FIC 2005-156; Ken Byron and The Hartford Courant v. Consolidation Committee, Enfield Fire Chiefs Association and Docket #FIC 2005-199; Ken Byron and The Hartford Courant v. Enfield Fire Chiefs Association.

 

            After consideration of the entire record, the following facts are found and conclusions of law are reached:

 

            1.  It is found that the town of Enfield has within it five separate fire districts [hereinafter “the districts”], which are independently run by five boards of elected fire commissioners [hereinafter “the boards”].  It is further found that during 2005, the issue of perhaps consolidating the districts arose in Enfield.

 

            2.  It is found that the Enfield Fire Chiefs Association [hereinafter “the association”] is a voluntary organization consisting of district chiefs, assistant chiefs, deputy chiefs and battalion chiefs from all five districts.  It is found that, at the direction of the president of the association, the respondent was formed, consisting of one chief officer from each district. 

 

3.  It is found that the respondent conducted one meeting, on April 5, 2005 [hereinafter “the meeting”], and discussed the pros and cons of consolidating the five fire districts in Enfield, so as to come up with an association position and recommendation on the consolidation issue to present to the boards.   It is further found that the boards are not obliged to accept the association’s position or recommendation. 

 

4.   By letter dated April 13, 2005, and filed with the Commission on April 15, 2005, the complainants alleged that the respondent violated the Freedom of Information  [hereinafter “FOI”] Act by not providing notice of the meeting, and by barring Sarah Netter, a reporter for the complainant newspaper, from attending the meeting.

 

            5.  Section 1-225(a), G.S., provides in relevant part that: “[t]he meetings of all public agencies… shall be open to the public….”

 

6.  Section 1-225(d), G.S., provides in relevant part that “[n]otice of each special meeting of every public agency… shall be given not less than twenty-four hours prior to the time of such meeting by filing a notice of the time and place thereof…in the office of the [town] clerk….”

 

7.  It is found that the respondent did not give notice of the meeting within the meaning of §1-225(d), G.S.  It is further found that the respondent barred Sarah Netter from attending the meeting. 

 

8.  The respondent contends that it is not a “public agency” within the meaning of the FOI Act, and that therefore the meeting is not governed by §1-225, G.S.

 

9.  Section 1-200(2), G.S., defines “meeting” to mean:

 

“any hearing or other proceeding of a public agency, any convening or assembly of a quorum of a multimember public agency, and any communication by or to a quorum of a multimember public agency, whether in person or by means of electronic equipment, to discuss or act upon a matter over which the public agency has supervision, control, jurisdiction or advisory power….” 

 

10.  Section 1-200(1), G.S., defines “public agency” to mean:

 

“…(A) [a]ny executive, administrative or legislative office of the state or any political subdivision of the state and any state or town agency, any department, institution, bureau, board, commission, authority or official of the state or of any city, town, borough, municipal corporation, school district, regional district or other district or other political subdivision of the state, including any committee of, or created by, any such office, subdivision, agency, department, institution, bureau, board, commission, authority or official, and also includes any judicial office, official, or body or committee thereof but only with respect to its or their administrative functions; (B) Any person to the extent such person is deemed to be the functional equivalent of a public agency pursuant to law; or (C) Any “implementing agency,” as defined in section 32-222.”

 

11.  With respect to §1-200(1)(A), G.S., it is found that the association is not an executive, administrative or legislative office of Enfield, nor is it an Enfield agency, department, institution, bureau, board, commission, authority or official.  Accordingly, it is concluded that the respondent is not a committee within the meaning of §1-200(1)(A), G.S.  

 

12.   With respect to §1-200(1)(C), G.S., §32-222, G.S., defines “implementing agency to mean “…(1) [a]n economic development commission, redevelopment agency; sewer authority or sewer commission; public works commission; water authority or water commission; port authority or port commission or harbor authority or harbor commission; parking authority or parking commission; (2) a nonprofit development corporation; or (3) any other agency designated and authorized by a municipality to undertake a project.…”

 

13.  It is concluded that the respondent is not an “implementing agency”, within the meaning of §1-200(1)(C), G.S.  

 

14.  With respect to whether the respondent is deemed to be the “functional equivalent” of a public agency within the meaning of §1-200(1)(B), G.S., the Supreme Court has adopted a “functional equivalent” test to determine whether an entity is a public agency.   Board of Trustees of Woodstock Academy v. FOI Commission, 181 Conn. 544, 554 (1980) (“Woodstock”).  Such test consists of the following four criteria: (1) whether the entity performs a governmental function; (2) the level of government funding; (3) the extent of government involvement or regulation; and (4) whether the entity was created by government.

 

            15.  Subsequently, in Connecticut Humane Society v. FOI Commission, 281 Conn. 757, 761 (1991), the Supreme Court elaborated that all four factors set forth in Woodstock are not necessary for a finding of functional equivalence, but rather that “all relevant factors are to be considered cumulatively, with no single factor being essential or conclusive.”

 

            16.  With respect to the first criterion, it is found that the purpose of the association is to promote, administer, and educate the public within the town of Enfield in all phases of fire emergency service operations.  It is further found that there is no requirement for the association to provide such services to Enfield.  It is also found that the association has a fraternal aspect in that its members engage in social gatherings.    It is found that the association does not provide fire response services to the town of Enfield; rather, the districts provide such services.   It is concluded that the association does not presently perform a governmental function.

 

17.  With respect to the second criterion, it is found that the association derives its revenues from fees for educational services provided to, and paid for by, the districts, in addition to grants and charitable contributions.  It is also found that the Internal Revenue Service has deemed the association a 501(c)(3) organization.   It is concluded that the association receives a majority of its funds from government. 

 

18.  With respect to the third criterion, it is found that neither the districts nor the boards regulate the association or are involved in the association.  It is concluded that the third criterion is not met. 

 

19.  With respect to the fourth criterion, it is found that the association was voluntarily created in 1964  by chief officers of the districts and that it is organized by constitution dated October 4, 1964.   It is concluded that the association was not created by government. 

 

20.  The complainants contend that the association and its committee, the respondent, are public agencies under Yantic Volunteer Fire Co. v. FOI Commission, 44 Conn. Sup. 230 (1995), affirmed 42 Conn. App. 519 (1996); see also §7-314(b), G.S., (exempting from the FOI Act the records and meetings of volunteer fire and ambulance companies related to fraternal matters). 

 

21.  However, the Commission notes that the Yantic case and its progeny, as well as §7-314(b), G.S., deal with volunteer fire and ambulance companies which provide fire and emergency services to municipalities.   As described in paragraph 16, above, the association does not provide such services.  Rather, it is found that the association is much more akin to the Connecticut Conference of Municipalities (“CCM”), in that it is a voluntary unincorporated association offering educational services to a municipality, for a fee.   The Commission concluded that CCM is not the functional equivalent of a public agency.  Docket #FIC1994-121, American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees, Connecticut Council 4, AFL-CIO v. Connecticut Conference of Municipalities (Dec.  29, 1994). 

 

                22.  It is concluded that, based on the totality of relevant criteria, the association is not the functional equivalent of a public agency within the meaning of §1-200(1)(B), G.S.  Likewise, it is also concluded that the respondent, as a committee of the association, is not the functional equivalent of a public agency within the meaning of §1-200(1)(B), G.S.  Accordingly, it is concluded that the respondent is not subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission. 

 

            The following order by the Commission is hereby recommended on the basis of the record concerning the above-captioned complaint:

 

            1.  The complaint is hereby dismissed.

 

Approved by Order of the Freedom of Information Commission at its regular meeting of January 25, 2006.

 

________________________________

Petrea A. Jones

Acting Clerk of the Commission

PURSUANT TO SECTION 4-180(c), G.S., THE FOLLOWING ARE THE NAMES OF EACH PARTY AND THE MOST RECENT MAILING ADDRESS, PROVIDED TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION, OF THE PARTIES OR THEIR AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE.

 

THE PARTIES TO THIS CONTESTED CASE ARE:

 

Ralph Williams and the

Manchester Journal Inquirer

306 Progress Drive

PO Box 510

Manchester, CT 06045-0510

 

Consolidation Committee,

Enfield Fire Chiefs Association

c/o Carl T. Landolina, Esq.

487 Spring Street, Suite 2

Windsor Locks, CT 06096

 

 

 

___________________________________

Petrea A. Jones

Acting Clerk of the Commission

 

 

 

FIC/2005-164FD/paj/1/31/2006