FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT

The above-captioned matter was heard as a contested case on September 4, 2003, at which time the complainant and the respondent appeared, stipulated to certain facts and presented testimony, exhibits and argument on the complaint.

 

            After consideration of the entire record, the following facts are found and conclusions of law are reached:

 

            1.  The respondent is a public agency only with respect to its administrative functions, within the meaning of §1-200(1), G.S.

 

2.  By letter received and filed January 24, 2003, the complainant appealed to the Commission, alleging that the respondent denied his request for portions of records pertaining to sealed files in the custody of the respondent.

 

3.  It is found that the complainant on January 6, 2003 requested, in addition to records no longer at issue, access to data that would identify which family relations case files had been sealed by order of a Connecticut judge since November 2, 2002. 

 

4.  Specifically, it is found that the complainant sought records that would disclose the judge that entered the sealing order, the date of the order, the judicial district in which the order was issued, and the date of expiration of the order.

 

5.  It is found that by letter dated January 7, 2003, the complainant clarified his request, adding he was seeking the information described in paragraph 4 of the findings, above, as it pertained to any active or current case file sealed under a “Level 1” sealing order, and additionally requesting any number or code that referenced those cases.

 

6.  It is found that the respondent provided certain requested information to the complainant, including the number of “Level 1” family and civil cases broken down by judicial district, but did not provide the remaining information described in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the findings, above, because, it asserted, that information was contained within sealed files that could not be disclosed.

 

7.  It is found that most of the data sought by the complainant is maintained in the respondent’s computer system, although only sealing orders that are the result of written motions are maintained in the computer system, and some information, such as the date of the order, might be difficult to extract from the system.

 

8.  Section 1-200(5) defines “public records or files” to mean:

 

… any recorded data or information relating to the conduct of the public's business prepared, owned, used, received or retained by a public agency, or to which a public agency is entitled to receive a copy by law or contract under section 1-218, whether such data or information be handwritten, typed, tape-recorded, printed, photostated, photographed or recorded by any other method.

 

9.  With respect to computer-stored records, §1-211(a), G.S. provides in relevant part:

 

    Any public agency which maintains public records in a computer storage system shall provide, to any person making a request pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act, a copy of any nonexempt data contained in such records, properly identified, on paper, disk, tape or any other electronic storage device or medium requested by the person, if the agency can reasonably make such copy or have such copy made.  Except as otherwise provided by state statute, the cost for providing a copy of such data shall be in accordance with the provisions of section 1-212.

 

10.  The respondent maintains that the requested records are not public records within the meaning of §§1-200(5) and 1-211(a), G.S., because they are involved in the adjudication of cases and therefore are not “administrative” within the meaning of §1-200(1), G.S.

 

11.  In Rules Committee of the Superior Court v. FOIC, 192 Conn. 234, 243 (1984), the Supreme Court construed the term “administrative functions” in §1-200(1), G.S., to exclude matters involved in the adjudication of cases, and to refer only to “matters relating to the internal management of the internal institutional machinery of the court system.”

12.  In construing the 1977 amendment that brought the constitutional courts within the scope of §1-200(1), G.S., the Supreme Court commented that matters involved with the management of the court’s internal institutional machinery included docketing information similar to that requested in this case:

 

     The limited scope of the [FOI] act’s intended application to the judiciary is evidenced by the remarks of the FOIC’s representative, who testified before the Judiciary Committee in support of the 1977 amendment that, in the one case presented to the FOIC in its first two years of operation involving the Judicial Department, the FOIC had ordered the release of jury dockets listing the names of litigants and counsel, the judge to whom each case was assigned and the time and place each case was to be called.  The FOIC representative further testified, “I think that’s a good example of what an administer of [sic administrative] records [sic] of the court is.”  Judiciary Committee proc., Pt. 2, 1977 Sess., p. 548.

 

Rules Committee, supra, n. 10.

 

13.  In Ron E. Cretaro et al. v. Court of Common Pleas for G.A. #14, Docket #FIC 76-8 (which appears to be the case referenced in Rules Committee, supra, n. 10), the Commission concluded that the Court of Common Pleas was exercising an administrative function in maintaining records in pending criminal cases that disclosed the name and address of the defendant, the name of the attorney of record, the date of arrest, the date of arraignment, the date of the next court appearance, the date of the last court appearance, the present status of the case, whether the defendant was incarcerated, the amount of bond, the person who posted surety, the date of disposition, and the disposition excluding dismissal, nolle or a finding of not guilty.

 

14.  In Attorney Russell Collins LLC v. Clerk, G.A. #7, docket #FIC 2002-076 (appeal pending, Docket No. CV 03-0518871-S, Superior Court, J.D. of New Britain), the Commission concluded that the Superior Court was exercising an administrative function in maintaining, in its computer system, docketing information similar to the information that was at issue in Cretaro v. Court of Common Pleas, above.

 

15.  It is found that the requested records are, like the docketing information described in paragraphs 12-14 of the findings, above, used by the respondent to manage case flow, not to adjudicate cases.

 

16.  It is concluded that the respondent is exercising an administrative function in maintaining, in its computer system, data that records the judge that issued a sealing order, the date of the sealing, the judicial district in which the order was entered, and the date of expiration of the sealing.

 

17.  It is therefore concluded that the requested data is a public record within the meaning of §§1-200(5) and 1-210(a), G.S.

 

18.  The respondent additionally maintains that the requested data is exempt from disclosure by virtue of the “otherwise provided” language contained in §1-210(a), G.S.  Specifically, the respondent points out that §46b-11, G.S., permits a judge of the Superior Court to seal any records in a family relations matter, and that permitting access to any sealed records pursuant to the FOI Act would circumvent the judge’s order.

 

19.  Section 1-210(a), G.S., provides in relevant part:

 

    Except as otherwise provided by any federal law or state statute, all records maintained or kept on file by any public agency, whether or not such records are required by any law or by any rule or regulation, shall be public records and every person shall have the right to (1) inspect such records promptly during regular office or business hours, (2) copy such records in accordance with subsection (g) of section 1-212, or (3) receive a copy of such records in accordance with section 1-212….

 

20.  Section 46b-11, G.S., provides:

 

    Any case which is a family relations matter may be heard in chambers or, if a jury case, in a courtroom from which the public and press have been excluded, if the judge hearing the case determines that the welfare of any children involved or the nature of the case so requires. The records and other papers in any family relations matter may be ordered by the court to be kept confidential and not to be open to inspection except upon order of the court or judge thereof for cause shown.

 

21.  The complainant maintains that unless a sealing order specifically provides for the sealing of the name of the judge entering the order, the date of the order, the judicial district in which the order was entered, and the date of expiration of the order, then that data is not in fact sealed and is subject to disclosure.

 

22.  The respondent contends that it maintains strict guidelines as to what information is sealed, and that the information described in paragraph 4 of the findings, above, is encompassed by orders sealing “Level 1” and “Level 2” files.  Specifically, it is found that a sealing order authorized under §46b-11, G.S., that is designated “Level 1” means that the entire case is sealed, and that all information, including even the case caption and the docket number, is classified as confidential. It is found that a “Level 2” sealing means that all records in the file are sealed, and disclosure is allowed only of the case caption and docket number.  It is found that “Level 3” sealing means that only a specific document such as a motion or pleading is sealed, and all other information from the file is disclosable.

 

23.  It is found that an order sealing a “Level 1” file contemplates that no information will be disclosed, and that an order sealing a “Level 2” file contemplates that only the docket number and the case caption may be disclosed.  Consequently, it is concluded that the information described in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the findings, above, is sealed by an order sealing a “Level 1” or a “Level 2” case file.

 

24.  The complainant argues that permitting “Level 1” and “Level 2” sealing orders to hide even the barest fact of what order was entered when and by what judge is the equivalent of permitting “star chamber” proceedings.

 

25.  While the Commission is, as a matter of policy, sympathetic to the complainant’s arguments, it is concluded that §46b-11, G.S., clearly permits the sealing of any records in a family relations matter, that the scope of the sealing orders are clear for the three levels of sealing, and that it is not for the Commission to second-guess the appropriate scope of a sealing order issued by a judicial authority.

 

26.  It is therefore concluded that the respondent did not violate §1-210(a), G.S.

 

27.  While the sealing of individual documents in “Level 3” cases does not appear to preclude disclosing the information described in paragraph 4 of the findings, above, since the sealing order containing that information would not ordinarily by part of the sealed file, the complainant’s clarifying letter of January 7, 2003 referred only to “Level 1” cases, and his January 6, 2003 letter requested information about cases that had been sealed, implicitly referring to “Level 1” and “Level 2” case files, not to individual documents that had been sealed at “Level 3” within otherwise public case files.  It is therefore concluded that the complainant’s request did not extend to “Level 3” cases, particularly since he did not pursue this line of argument or evidence during the hearing on this matter.

 

28.  In light of the conclusion in paragraph 26 of the findings, above, it is unnecessary to address the respondent’s additional contention that the requested information is also exempt from disclosure pursuant to §1-210(b)(4), G.S., as records pertaining to strategy and negotiations with respect to pending claims or pending litigation.

 

 

The following order by the Commission is hereby recommended on the basis of the record concerning the above-captioned complaint:

 

            1.  The complaint is dismissed.

 

 

 

Approved by Order of the Freedom of Information Commission at its regular meeting of September 24, 2003.

 

 

___________________________________

Ann B. Gimmartino

Acting Clerk of the Commission

 

PURSUANT TO SECTION 4-180(c), G.S., THE FOLLOWING ARE THE NAMES OF EACH PARTY AND THE MOST RECENT MAILING ADDRESS, PROVIDED TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION, OF THE PARTIES OR THEIR AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE.

 

THE PARTIES TO THIS CONTESTED CASE ARE:

 

Edward A. Peruta

38 Parish Road

Rocky Hill, CT  06067

 

Chief Court Administrator,

State of Connecticut, Judicial Department

c/o Martin R. Libbin, Esq.

Legal Services, Judicial Branch

Court Operations Division

100 Washington Street, 3^rd floor

P.O. Box 150474

Hartford, CT  06115-0474

 

 

 

___________________________________

Ann B. Gimmartino

Acting Clerk of the Commission

 

 

FIC/2003-035FD/mes/09/25/2003