FREEDOM
OF INFORMATION COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
In the Matter of a Complaint by |
FINAL DECISION |
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Norman B. Seney, |
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Complainant |
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against |
Docket #FIC 2002-357 | |
Mayor,
Town of Putnam; Deputy Mayor,
Town of Putnam; and Board
of Selectmen, Town of Putnam, |
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Respondents |
July 9, 2003 | |
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The above-captioned
matter was heard as a contested case on October 29, 2002, at which time the
complainant and the respondents appeared and presented testimony, exhibits and
argument on the complaint. For purposes of hearing, the above-captioned matter was
consolidated with Docket #FIC 2002-315; Norman B. Seney v. Daniel S. Rovero,
Mayor, Town of Putnam; Douglas Cutler, Town Administrator, Town of Putnam; and
Board of Selectmen, Town of Putnam.
After consideration of the entire record, the
following facts are found and conclusions of law are reached:
1.
The
respondents are public agencies within the meaning of §1-200(1),
G.S.
2.
By
letter dated August 2, 2002 and filed on August 6, 2002, the complainant
appealed to this Commission alleging that the respondent violated the Freedom
of Information (“FOI”) Act by convening in executive session on July 15,
2002, for an impermissible purpose. The
complainant requested the imposition of civil penalties against the
respondents.
3.
It is
found that the respondent board was scheduled to hold a regular meeting on
July 15, 2002 during which it planned to discuss the pistol permit application
of a Mr. Glenwood S. Curtis, Jr.
4.
It is
found that, prior to the July 15, 2002 meeting, the town attorney informed the
respondent mayor, in a June 26, 2002 letter, that there was information in Mr.
Curtis’ application regarding a “non-disclosable nolle” of a criminal
case that was filed against him.
5.
It is
found that in an effort to avoid violating any confidentiality rights Mr.
Curtis may have had regarding the case and/or the nolle, the respondent board
convened in executive session to discuss his application.
6.
With
respect to the executive session, the respondents
argued in their brief that under §1-200(6)(e), G.S., “any matter which
would result in a disclosure of information described in subsection (b) of
§1-210 is confidential” and that “§1-210 indicates that preliminary
drafts and notes are exempt as are personnel or medical files or similar
files, the disclosure of which would constitute an invasion of privacy, and
law enforcement records.” The
respondents also argued that pursuant to §52-142a, G.S., the records are
exempt from disclosure under §1-210(b)(12), G.S., as records obtained by
illegal means. The respondents
argued that the respondent board was concerned with protecting the
confidentiality to which Mr. Curtis was entitled under §§1-200, 1-210, and
54-142a, G.S., while discharging its statutory duty, and that if it had
discussed the application in an open session, it may well have violated the
rights of Mr. Curtis.
7.
Section
1-225(a), G.S., provides in relevant part that “[t]he meetings of all public
agencies, except executive sessions, as defined in subdivision (6) of section
1-200, shall be open to the public . . . .”
8.
Section
1-200(6), G.S., provides that in relevant part that:
“Executive
sessions” means a meeting of a public agency at which the public is excluded
for . . .(E) discussion of any matter which would result in the disclosure of
public records or the information contained therein described in subsection
(b) of section 1-210.
9.
Section
1-210(b), G.S., provides in relevant part that nothing in the FOI Act shall be
construed to require the disclosure of:
(1) Preliminary drafts or notes provided the public agency has determined that the public interest in withholding such documents clearly outweighs the public interest in disclosure . . .;
(2) Personnel or medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute an invasion of personal privacy . . .;
(3)
Records of law enforcement agencies not otherwise available to the public
which records were compiled in connection with the detection or investigation
of crime, if the disclosure of said records would not be in the public
interest because it would result in the disclosure of (A) the identity of
informants not otherwise known or the identity of witnesses not otherwise
known whose safety would be endangered or who would be subject to threat or
intimidation if their identity was made known, (B) signed statements of
witnesses, (C) information to be used in a prospective law enforcement action
if prejudicial to such action, (D) investigatory techniques not otherwise
known to the general public, (E) arrest records of a juvenile, which shall
also include any investigatory files, concerning the arrest of such juvenile,
compiled for law enforcement purposes, (F) the name and address of the victim
of a sexual assault under section 53a-70, 53a-70a, 53a-71, 53a-72a, 53a-72b or
53a-73a, or injury or risk of injury, or impairing of morals under section
53-21, or of an attempt thereof, or (G) uncorroborated allegations subject to
destruction pursuant to section 1-216 . . .;
and
(12) Any information obtained by the use of illegal means . . . .
10.
Section
54-142a, G.S., provides in relevant part that:
(c) Whenever any charge in a criminal case has been
nolled in the Superior Court, or in the Court of Common Pleas, if at least
thirteen months have elapsed since such nolle, all police and court records
and records of the state’s or prosecuting attorney or the prosecuting grand
juror pertaining to such charge shall be erased . . .;
and
(e)
The clerk of the court or any person charged with retention and control of
such records in the records center of the Judicial Department or any law
enforcement agency having information contained in such erased records shall
not disclose to anyone, except the subject of the record . . . .
11.
It is found that although Mr. Curtis’ application contained
information relative to a nolle more than thirteen months old at the time of
the July 13, 2002 meeting of the respondent board, no evidence was presented
at the hearing in this matter that such information had been erased pursuant
to the provisions of §54-142a(c), G.S.
12.
It is found that §54-142a(e), G.S., provides that court clerks,
judicial department employees and law enforcement officials shall not disclose
records or information contained in records which fall within the meaning of
§54-142a(c), G.S.
13.
It is found that the respondents are not court clerks, judicial
department employees and law enforcement officials, within the meaning of
§54-142a(e), G.S., and that therefore, under the facts and circumstances of
this case, such provision does not provide an exemption from mandatory
disclosure.
13.
It is also found that, while the respondents may have received the
information described in paragraph 11, above, in contravention of procedures
set forth in the erasure statutes, there is no evidence in the record to show
that such information was
obtained by the use of illegal means, within the meaning of §1-210(b)(12),
G.S.
14.
It is found that the respondents failed to prove that the records in
Mr. Curtis’ application regarding the nolle described in paragraph 11,
above, are exempt records within the meaning §§1-210(b)(1), (2), (3), and
(12), G.S.
15.
It is therefore found that the July 15, 2002, executive session
discussion at issue herein was not for a permitted purpose under §1-200(6),
G.S.
16.
It is concluded, therefore, that the respondent mayor and the
respondent board violated §1-225(a), G.S., by convening in executive session
for an impermissible purpose.
17.
Notwithstanding the conclusion in paragraph 16, above, the Commission
declines to consider the imposition of civil penalties in this matter.
The following order
by the Commission is hereby recommended on the basis of the record concerning
the above-captioned complaint.
1. Henceforth the respondent mayor and the respondent board shall strictly comply with the executive session and the open meetings provisions of §§1-200(6) and 1-225(a), G.S.
2. The complaint against the respondent deputy mayor is dismissed, since there is no showing that such official is a member of the respondent board.
Approved by Order of the Freedom of Information Commission at its regular meeting of
July 9, 2003.
___________________________________
Ann B. Gimmartino
Acting Clerk of the Commission
PURSUANT TO SECTION 4-180(c), G.S., THE FOLLOWING ARE THE NAMES OF EACH PARTY AND THE MOST RECENT MAILING ADDRESS, PROVIDED TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION, OF THE PARTIES OR THEIR AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE.
THE PARTIES TO THIS CONTESTED CASE ARE:
Norman B. Seney
171 Elmwood Hill Road
Thompson, CT 06277
Mayor, Town of Putnam; Deputy Mayor,
Town of Putnam; and Board of Selectmen,
Town of Putnam
c/o William St. Onge, Esq.
Boland, St. Onge & Brouillard
PO Box
550
Putnam, CT 06260-0550
___________________________________
Ann B. Gimmartino
Acting Clerk of the Commission
FIC/2002-357FD/abg/07/11/2003