FREEDOM
OF INFORMATION COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
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In the Matter of a Complaint by |
FINAL DECISION |
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Robert Fromer, |
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Complainant |
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against |
Docket #FIC 1999-570 |
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Claire Gaudiani,
President, Executive |
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Respondents |
July 12, 2000 |
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The above-captioned matter was heard as a contested case on March 28, 2000, at which time the complainant and the respondents appeared, stipulated to certain facts and presented testimony, exhibits and argument on the complaint.
After consideration of the entire record, the following facts are found and conclusions of law are reached:
1. The respondents are public agencies within the meaning of §1-200(1), G.S. [formerly §1-18a(1), G.S.].
2.
By letter dated December 3, 1999 and filed on December 6, 1999, and
amended by letter dated March 23, 2000 and filed on March 24, 1999, the
complainant appealed to the Commission alleging that the respondents violated
the Freedom of Information (“FOI”) Act with respect to a December 2, 1999
meeting when they:
a. improperly referenced
§1-18a, G.S.,
now
§1-200, G.S., in the notice of meeting;
b. held the meeting at a
facility not owned or leased by the
respondents;
c. failed to provide
meaningful notice of the
subject
matter of the executive sessions;
d. failed to show that
publicity concerning the real estate
matters
discussed during the executive session would
cause a
likelihood of increased price pursuant to §1-
200(6)(D),
G.S.;
e. failed to indicate on the
notice that the change in the
location
of the meeting was posted within the required
statutory
time for notice of a meeting.
The complainant requested that the Commission impose the maximum fine and declare null and void any actions of the respondents taken at the meeting.
3. It is found that the respondent corporation held a regular meeting on December 2, 1999 (hereinafter “meeting”).
4. With respect to the allegation described in paragraph 2a, above, the complainant contends that the notice to the public of the meeting was not meaningful because such notice makes reference to §1-18a, G.S., now §1-200, G.S., effective October, 1999.
5. The complainant concedes however, and the Commission concludes, that there is no requirement that a statutory citation be included in the notice of meeting. It is further concluded that the reference to §1-18a, G.S., by the respondents did not violate the notice provisions of the FOI Act as alleged in the complaint.
6. With respect to the allegation described in paragraph 2b, above, it is concluded that the FOI Act does not require that the respondents hold meetings in a facility owned or leased by the respondents. Consequently, it is concluded that the respondents did not violate the FOI Act when they held the meeting in a facility not owned or leased by the respondents.
7. With respect to the allegation
described in paragraph 2c, above, §1-225(a), G.S. [formerly §1-21(a), G.S.],
provides, in relevant part: “[A] public agency may hold an executive session
as defined in subdivision (6) of section 1-200, upon an affirmative vote of
two-thirds of the members of such body present and voting, taken at a public
meeting and stating the reasons for such executive session, as defined in said
section.”
8. Section §1-200(6), G.S.
[formerly §1-18a(6), G.S.], provides, in relevant part:
"Executive sessions" means a meeting of a public agency at which the public is excluded for one or more of the following purposes: (A) Discussion concerning the appointment, employment, performance, evaluation, health or dismissal of a public officer or employee, provided that such individual may require that discussion be held at an open meeting … (D) discussion of the selection of a site or the lease, sale or purchase of real estate by a political subdivision of the state when publicity regarding such site, lease, sale, purchase or construction would cause a likelihood of increased price until such time as all of the property has been acquired or all proceedings or transactions concerning same have been terminated or abandoned….
9. In keeping with long standing
Commission precedent, it is concluded that the purpose of the executive
session as stated in the notice of the meeting: “Executive Session-Real
Estate Matters” and “Executive Session-Personnel Matters” does not
provide the public with adequate and meaningful notice regarding the real
estate matters and personnel matters to be discussed in the executive
sessions.
10. It is therefore, concluded that the respondents violated §1-225(a), G.S., [formerly §1-21(a), G.S.], when they convened in executive session without adequately stating the purpose for such executive sessions.
11. With respect to the allegation described in paragraph 2d, above, it is found that the respondents are in negotiations with property owners, concerning the acquisition of real estate (within the Fort Trumbull area) from such property owners. It is also found that during the meeting the respondents discussed the acquisition of real estate in the Fort Trumbull area in executive session. It is further found that publicity regarding such acquisition would cause a likelihood of increased price within the meaning of §1-200(6)(D), [formerly §1-18a(6)(D], G.S). It is further found that the respondents did not discuss any personnel matters during the executive session.
12. It is concluded that the executive session discussion concerning the acquisition of real estate in the Fort Trumbull area was appropriate and consequently, the respondents did not violate the FOI Act as alleged in the complaint.
13. With respect to the
allegation described in paragraph 2e, above, it is found that the
complainant has not alleged any conduct on the part of the respondents which
constitutes a violation of the FOI Act. It
is also found that the record does not support a finding that the change made
on the notice of the meeting to the location of such meeting violated any of
the complainant’s or the public’s rights to proper notice of the meeting.
14. Accordingly, it is concluded that the respondents did not violate the FOI Act as alleged in the complaint.
15. The Commission does not find that civil penalties or a null and void remedy are appropriate in this matter.
The following order by the Commission is hereby recommended on the basis of
the record concerning the above-captioned complaint:
1. Henceforth, the respondents shall state the purpose of its executive sessions with more specificity so that the public may have some indication of the topic or subject matter to be addressed in such sessions.
Approved by Order of the Freedom of Information Commission at its regular meeting of
July 12, 2000.
_________________________
Melanie R. Balfour
Acting Clerk of the Commission
PURSUANT TO SECTION 4-180(c), G.S., THE FOLLOWING ARE THE NAMES OF EACH PARTY AND THE MOST RECENT MAILING ADDRESS, PROVIDED TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION, OF THE PARTIES OR THEIR AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE.
THE PARTIES TO THIS CONTESTED CASE ARE:
Robert Fromer
PO Box 697
New London, CT 06320
Claire Gaudiani, President, Executive Committee, New London Development
Corporation; David Goebel, Chief Executive Operating Officer, Executive Committee, New London Development Corporation; and Executive Committee, New London Development Corporation
c/o Atty. David L. Metzger
Metzger & Richters LLP
25 Capitol Avenue
Hartford, CT 06106
__________________________
Melanie R. Balfour
Acting Clerk of the Commission
FIC1999-570FD/mrb/07/13/00