FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT

In the Matter of a Complaint by

FINAL DECISION

Thomas R. Carozza and Waterbury
Police Union, Local 1237,

 

Complainant

 

 

against

Docket #FIC 1999-553

Joseph Carlson, Chairman, Budget
Advisory Council, State of Connecticut;
and Budget Advisory Council, State of
Connecticut,

 

 

Respondents

June 28, 2000

 

 

 

 

            The above-captioned matter was heard as a contested case on February 16, 2000 at which time the complainants and the respondents appeared, stipulated to certain facts and presented testimony, exhibits and argument on the complaint.  At the hearing, with the agreement of all parties, the case caption was changed to reflect that the respondents are agencies of the State of Connecticut and not the City of Waterbury.  The respondents further indicated to the Commission that they were waiving any rights with respect to issues of notice of the hearing in this matter.

 

            After consideration of the entire record, the following facts are found and conclusions of law are reached:

 

            1.  The respondents are public agencies within the meaning of §1-200(1), G.S. [formerly §1-18a(1), G.S.].

 

2.  By letter of complaint dated November 22, 1999, and filed with the Commission on November 23, 1999, the complainants appealed to the Commission alleging that the respondents violated the Freedom of Information (“FOI”) Act by discussing matters not appropriate for executive session, during such a session convened by the respondents on November 16, 1999.  The complainants requested that respondents’ actions at the November 16, 1999 meeting be declared null and void and further, that civil penalties be imposed upon the respondents.

 

3.  It is found that the respondent council held a regular meeting on November 16, 1999 (“meeting”), during which it convened in executive session (“executive session”) and discussed pending contract negotiations concerning the possible sale or lease of a city asset, and the possible execution of contracts with respect to such sale or lease.  The ramifications to certain groups of employees were also discussed during the executive session. 

 

4.  It is found that the executive session is listed on the meeting agenda under item 4 and described as “Executive Session”.  It is concluded that such a description does not give notice to the public of the purpose of the executive session.

 

5.  It is found that prior to going into the executive session, the respondent chairman indicated, in response to being asked what the purpose of the executive session was, that such purpose was to discuss personnel matters.

 

6.  At the hearing on this matter, the respondent chairman indicated that after reviewing the FOI Act, upon the receipt of the complaint, he is now of the opinion that the executive session purpose should not have been characterized as “personnel” but rather discussion concerning the possible sale or lease of a city asset.

 

            7.  Section 1-200(6), G.S. [formerly 1-18a(6), G.S.] provides, in relevant part, that an executive session may be held for:

 

“(D) discussion of … the lease, sale or purchase of real estate by a political subdivision of the state when publicity regarding such … lease, sale, purchase … would cause a likelihood of increased price until such time as all of the property has been acquired or all proceedings or transactions concerning same have been terminated or abandoned.” [Emphasis added.]

 

              8.  It is unclear from the record  whether the “city asset” discussed constitutes “real estate”, within the meaning of  §1-200(6)(D), G.S. [formerly 1-18a(6)(D), G.S.], however, assuming that it does, the respondents failed to prove that the discussion, if held during the open meeting “would cause a likelihood of increased price until such time as all of the property has been acquired or all proceedings or transactions concerning same have been terminated or abandoned”, within the meaning of §1-200(6)(D), G.S. [formerly 1-18a(6)(D), G.S.].

 

                9.  Consequently, it is concluded that the discussion was not appropriate for executive session, and therefore, the respondents violated the open meeting provisions of §1-225(a) G.S. [formerly §1-21(a), G.S.], when they closed the discussions to the public.

 

                10.  The Commission in its discretion declines to impose civil penalties or make null and void any actions taken by the respondents at the meeting. 

 

 

 

 

 

            The following order by the Commission is hereby recommended on the basis of the record concerning the above-captioned complaint:

 

1.  Henceforth, the respondents shall strictly comply with the executive session and open meeting provisions of the FOI Act.

 

 

 

Approved by Order of the Freedom of Information Commission at its regular meeting of

June 28, 2000.

 

 

 

 

_________________________

Melanie R. Balfour

Acting Clerk of the Commission

 


PURSUANT TO SECTION 4-180(c), G.S., THE FOLLOWING ARE THE NAMES OF EACH PARTY AND THE MOST RECENT MAILING ADDRESS, PROVIDED TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION, OF THE PARTIES OR THEIR AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE.

 

THE PARTIES TO THIS CONTESTED CASE ARE:

 

 

Thomas R. Carozza and Waterbury Police Union, Local 1237

PO Box 2096

Waterbury, CT  06722-2096

 

 

Joseph Carlson

Chairman, Budget Advisory Council

State of Connecticut

536 Hillside Avenue

Naugatuck, CT  06770

 

and

 

Budget Advisory Council

State of Connecticut

c/o City Clerk

236 Grand Street

Waterbury, CT  06702

 

 

 

 

 

 

__________________________

Melanie R. Balfour

Acting Clerk of the Commission

 

FIC1999-553FD/mrb/06/30/00