FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT

In the Matter of a Complaint by

FINAL DECISION

Michele Graham,

 

 

Complainants

 

 

against

 

Docket #FIC 1999-353

Police Department, City of Stratford,

 

 

Respondents

February 23, 2000

 

 

 

 

The above-captioned matter was heard as a contested case on September 22, 1999, at which time the complainant and the respondent appeared, stipulated to certain facts and presented testimony, exhibits and argument on the complaint.

After consideration of the entire record, the following facts are found and conclusions of law are reached:

1.     The respondent is a public agency within the meaning of §1-200(1), G.S. [formerly §1-18a(1), G.S.].

 

2.     It is found that on November 27, 1992 the complainant was sexually assaulted in the Town of Stratford and a criminal investigation was conducted, which resulted in the arrest of one individual for sexual assault and three other individuals for making false statements.

 

3.     It is found, however, that a State’s Attorney’s office nolled the sexual assault charges against the one individual and the other three arrestees availed themselves of the youthful offender program pursuant to which the charges against them were either nolled or dismissed.

 

4.     It is found that on December 14, 1993, the complainant filed a civil lawsuit against various individuals allegedly responsible for the sexual assault, which lawsuit is pending.

 

5.      By letter dated July 16, 1999, the complainant submitted a request to the respondent for copies of reports and statements taken during the respondent’s investigation of the sexual assault described in paragraph 2, above.

 

6.     By letter dated July 28, 1999, and filed on July 29, 1999, the complainant appealed to this Commission alleging that the respondent violated the Freedom of Information (“FOI”) Act by failing to respond to her request.

 

7.     Section 1-210(a), G.S. [formerly §1-19(a), G.S.], provides in relevant part that:

 

[e]xcept as otherwise provided by any federal law or state statute, all records maintained or kept on file by any public agency, whether or not such records are required by any law or by any rule or regulation, shall be public records and every person shall have the right . . . to receive a copy of such records in accordance with the provisions of section 1-212.  Any agency rule or regulation, or

part thereof, that conflicts with the provisions of this subsection or diminishes or curtails in any way the rights granted by this subsection shall be void. 

 

8.     Section 1-212(a), G.S. [formerly §1-15(a), G.S.], provides in relevant part that “[a]ny person applying in writing shall receive, promptly upon request, a plain or certified copy of any public record.”

 

9.     It is found that the requested records are public records within the meaning of §1-210(a), G.S. [formerly §1-19(a), G.S.].

 

10. At the hearing on this matter, the respondent argued that the records are not disclosable pursuant to the state’s erasure statutes. 

 

11. By letter dated September 21,1999, the respondent provided a series of arguments for denying the complainant’s request that were not raised at the hearing.  Those arguments are:

 

 

a.       that the requested records are exempt from disclosure pursuant to §1-210(b)(2), G.S., because the records contain medical files or similar files the disclosure of which would constitute an invasion of personal privacy;

 

b.      that the requested records are exempt from disclosure pursuant to §1-210(b)(3)(B), G.S., because the records contain signed statements of witnesses;

 

c.       that the requested records are exempt from disclosure pursuant to §1-210(b)(3)(F) because the records contain the name of a sexual assault victim; and

 

d.      that the records are exempt from disclosure  pursuant to §1-215(a), G.S., as it relates to 54-142a(c). 

12.  Because no evidence was introduced on the record in the hearing in this case to support such arguments, it is found that the respondent failed to prove the applicability of the exemptions set forth in paragraphs 11a, 11b, and 11c, of the findings, above.

 

13. With respect to the respondent’s argument that the records are not disclosable pursuant to the erasure provisions of §54-142a(c), G.S., that section provides in relevant part that:

 

(c)  . . . [w]henever any charge in a criminal case has been nolled in the Superior Court, or in Court of Common Pleas, if at least thirteen months have elapsed since such nolle, all police and court records and records of the state’s or prosecuting attorney or the prosecuting grand juror pertaining to such charge shall be erased. 

 

14. Section 54-142c, G.S., provides in relevant part that:

 

 

(a)    [t]he clerk of the court or any person in charge with retention and control of erased records . . . or any criminal justice agency having information contained in such erased records shall not disclose to anyone the existence of such record or information pertaining to any charge erased under any provision of part I of this chapter, except as otherwise provided in this chapter.

 

(b)   [n]otwithstanding any other provisions of this chapter, within one year from the date of disposition of any case, the clerk of the court or any person charged with retention and control of erased records . . . or any criminal justice agency having information contained in such erased records may disclose to the victim of a crime the fact that the case was dismissed.  If disclosure contains information from erased records, the identity of the defendant or defendants shall not be released, except that any information contained in such records, including the identity of the person charged may be released to the victim or representative to the court stating that (1) a civil action has been commenced for loss or damage resulting from such action (2) the intent to bring a civil action for loss or damage. (emphasis added)

 

 

15. Section 54-76o, G.S., provides in relevant part that:

 

[w]henever any person has been adjudicated a youthful offender and has subsequently been discharged from the supervision of the court or from the care of any institution or agency to whom he has been committed by the court, all police and court records pertaining to such youthful offender shall be automatically erased when such person attains twenty-one years of age, provided such person has not subsequent to being adjudged a youthful offender been convicted of a felony, as defined in section 53a-25, prior to attaining such age . . .Upon the entry of such erasure order, all references including arrest, complaint, referrals, petitions, reports and orders, shall be removed from all agency, official and institutional files.  The persons in charge of such records shall not disclose to any person, except the subject of the record, upon submission of satisfactory proof of the subject’s identity in accordance with guidelines prescribed by the Chief Court Administrator, information pertaining to the record so erased

 

16.  It is concluded that the erasure provisions of §§54-142a, 54-142c, and 54-74o G.S., supersede the disclosure requirements of the FOI Act and that the requested records are not required to be disclosed.

 

The following order by the Commission is hereby recommended on the basis of the record concerning the above-captioned complaint.

 

            1.  The complaint is hereby dismissed.

 

            2.  The Commission notes that the complainant may have certain rights and that the respondent may have certain responsibilities under Article 1, §8 of the Constitution of the State of Connecticut.   Because the Commission’s statutory jurisdiction is limited to the FOI Act, such rights and responsibilities must be pursued, if at all, in another forum. 

 

 

 

 

Approved by Order of the Freedom of Information Commission at its regular meeting of

February 23, 2000.

 

 

_________________________

Melanie R. Balfour

Acting Clerk of the Commission

 

 

 


PURSUANT TO SECTION 4-180(c), G.S., THE FOLLOWING ARE THE NAMES OF EACH PARTY AND THE MOST RECENT MAILING ADDRESS, PROVIDED TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION, OF THE PARTIES OR THEIR AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE.

 

THE PARTIES TO THIS CONTESTED CASE ARE:

 

 

Michele Graham

c/o Atty. Michael A. D’Onofrio

Law Offices of Frank J. Riccio, LLC

923 East Main Street, PO Box 491

Bridgeport, CT  06601-0491

 

 

Police Department, City of Stratford

c/o Lieutenant Kenneth Bakalar

900 Longbrook Avenue

Stratford, CT  06614

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

__________________________

Melanie R. Balfour

Acting Clerk of the Commission

 

 

FIC1999-353FD/mrb/02/25/00