The above-captioned matter was heard as a contested case on February 20, 1998,
at which time the complainants and the respondents appeared, stipulated to certain facts
and presented testimony, exhibits and argument on the complaint. For purposes of
hearing, this case was consolidated with Docket # FIC1997-401; John Gauger, Jr., Joseph
Cadrain, and Richard Westervelt against Manager, State of Connecticut, Office of Labor
Relations; and State of Connecticut, Office of Labor Relations. The Connecticut State
Police Union requested and was granted party status at the hearing on this matter.

     After consideration of the entire record, the following facts are found and
conclusions of law are reached:

     1. It is found that a grievance arbitration hearing related to Trooper John R.
Bement (hereinafter “the hearing”) was conducted on October 14, 1997 by arbitrator Joel
M. Weisblatt (hereinafter “the arbitrator”), and that the parties to such hearing were the
State of Connecticut, which was represented by the respondent office, and the
Connecticut State Police Union (hereinafter “the union”).

     2. It is found that the complainants in this matter were present at the time the
hearing was convened, but were asked by the arbitrator to leave after the union and a
representative of the respondents objected to their presence.

     3. By letter dated November 10, 1997, and filed with the Commission on
November 12, 1997, the complainants alleged that the respondents violated the Freedom
of Information Act (“FOI”) Act by denying them the right to attend portions of the
hearing. As remedies, the complainants requested access to the public portions of the
hearing, an order declaring null and void any decisions made at the hearing, and access to
all notes, records, and minutes of the hearing.

     4. The respondents contend that the hearing was not a meeting of the respondents
but, rather, a meeting of the arbitrator, and, consequently, that the respondents cannot be
held accountable for any FOI Act violations which may have occurred at such hearing.

     5. The complainants contend that the arbitrator is a public agency for purposes of
the FOI Act and, consequently, that the hearing should have been held pursuant to that
act.

     6. Section 1-18a(1), G.S., in relevant part defines “public agency” as:

…any executive, administrative or legislative office of the
state or any political subdivision of the state and any state
or town agency, any department, institution, bureau, board,
commission, authority or official of the state or of any city,
town, borough, municipal corporation, school district,
regional district or other district or other political
subdivision of the state, including any committee of, or
created by, any such office, subdivision, agency,
department, institution, bureau, board, commission,
authority or official, and also includes any judicial office,
official or body or committee thereof but only in respect to
its or their administrative functions.

     7. Section 1-18a(2), G.S., in relevant part defines “meeting” to include:

…any hearing or other proceeding of a public agency, any
convening or assembly of a quorum of a multimember
public agency, and any communication by or to a quorum
of a multimember public agency, whether in person or by
means of electronic equipment, to discuss or act upon a
matter over which the public agency has supervision,
control, jurisdiction or advisory power….

     8. It is found that the hearing was conducted at the offices of the respondents. It
is also found that the arbitrator’s fee was paid in equal parts by the respondents and the
union, pursuant to contract. It is further found that the arbitrator was selected from a list
of available arbitrators agreed upon by the union and the respondents, pursuant to
contract.

     9. However, it is also found that the arbitrator cannot be deemed an agent of the
respondents.

     10. It is further found that the arbitrator, and not the respondents, conducted the
hearing.

     11. Since the arbitrator was not named as a respondent in the complaint, as
described in paragraph 3, above, administrative restraint dictates that it is inappropriate to
determine whether the arbitrator is a public agency subject to the FOI Act.

     The following order by the Commission is hereby recommended on the basis of
the record concerning the above-captioned complaint:

     1. The complaint is hereby dismissed.



     Approved by Order of the Freedom of Information Commission at its regular meeting of
October 14, 1998.

_________________________
Melanie R. Balfour
Acting Clerk of the Commission

PURSUANT TO SECTION 4-180(c), G.S., THE FOLLOWING ARE THE NAMES OF
EACH PARTY AND THE MOST RECENT MAILING ADDRESS, PROVIDED TO
THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION, OF THE PARTIES OR THEIR
AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE.

THE PARTIES TO THIS CONTESTED CASE ARE:

John Gauger, Jr., Joseph Cadrain
and Richard Westervelt
c/o Atty. Barry J. Boodman
P.O.Box 8158
Stamford, CT 06905-8158
and
c/o Atty. Charlene LaVoie
P.O. Box 1044
Winsted, CT 06098

Manager, State of Connecticut,
Office of Labor Relations; and
State of Connecticut, Office of
Labor Relations,
c/o Atty. Laurie Adler
Assistant Attorney General
55 Elm Street
P.O. Box 120
Hartford, CT 06141-0120

Connecticut State Police Union
c/o Atty. Robert J. Krzys
1010 Wethersfield Avenue
Suite 205
Hartford, CT 06114

__________________________
Melanie R. Balfour
Acting Clerk of the Commission

FIC1997-362FD/mrb10151998