FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
In the Matter of a Complaint
by FINAL DECISION
Lisa Wlodarski, Macklin Reid
and The Ridgefield Press,
Complainants
against Docket
#FIC 94-201
Ridgefield Board of Police
Commissioners,
Respondent March 22, 1995
The above-captioned matter was heard as a contested
case on January 13, 1995 at which time the complainants and the respondent
appeared, stipulated to certain facts and presented testimony, exhibits and
argument on the complaint. At the
hearing, and pursuant to the provisions of 1-21j-28, G.S., the Ridgefield
Independent Party was granted intervenor status limited to addressing the
issues raised in this appeal.
After consideration of the entire record, the
following facts are found and conclusions of law are reached:
1. The
respondent is a public agency within the meaning of 1-18a(a), G.S.
2. By letter
of complaint dated and filed with the Freedom of Information ("FOI")
Commission on June 17, 1994, the complainants appealed to the Commission
alleging that the respondent violated the FOI Act by:
a.
convening an executive session on June 6, 1994 for an improper purpose;
b.
convening an executive session on June 6, 1994 at a special meeting
without prior notice to the public;
c.
failing to specify in its notice the place where the June 6, 1994
special meeting would be held;
d.
failing to notify the public that a vote would be taken at the June 6,
1994 special meeting to select a new member of the respondent; and
Docket #FIC 94-201 Page 2
e.
failing to disclose questions asked of candidates interviewed during the
June 6, 1994 executive session.
3. It is
found that the respondent held a special meeting on June 6, 1994 at which it
convened in executive session and interviewed candidates to fill a vacant
position on its Board.
4. With
respect to the allegation described in paragraph 2a., above, it is found that
the respondent's June 6, 1994 special meeting minutes state that the respondent
went into executive session for security purposes.
5. At the
hearing in this matter, the respondent testified that the June 6 executive
session was convened for two purposes: the appointment of a member to serve on
its Board and security strategy.
6. Section
1-18a(e), G.S., allows a public agency to convene in executive session for
certain purposes, including discussions concerning the appointment or
employment of a public officer or employee, and matters concerning security
strategy.
7. It is
concluded that the respondent's purpose for convening the May 6, 1994 executive
session, to interview candidates for a vacancy on its Board, was not an
improper purpose within the meaning of 1-18a(e), G.S.
8. With
respect to the allegations described in paragraphs 2b., 2c. and 2d., above, it
is found that the respondent's June 6, 1994 special meeting notice states in
relevant part: "The Police Commission will hold a special meeting, to
interview candidates for the position of Police Commissioner at 7:00 PM, June
6, 1994."
9. Section
1-21(a), G.S., requires that the notice of each special meeting of a public
agency specify the time, place and the business to be transacted. In addition, 1-21(a), G.S., states in
pertinent part "no other business shall be considered at such meetings by
such public agency."
10. It is
found that the notice fails to specify the place where the respondent's June 6,
1994 special meeting would be held and therefore violates 1-21(a), G.S.
11. It is
found that pursuant to the provisions of 1-21(a), G.S, the respondent was
not precluded from convening in executive session at its June 6, 1994 special
meeting.
Docket #FIC 94-210 Page 3
12. It is
found that the stated purpose on the June 6, 1994 special meeting notice, to
"interview" candidates, was not so restrictive so as to preclude the
respondent from voting to select one of the candidates for the vacant position.
13. It is
also found that the respondent's vote, referred to in paragraph 12, above, was
undertaken during the open portion of the May 6, 1994 special meeting.
14. With
respect to the allegation described in paragraph 2e., above, it is concluded
that under the provisions of the FOI Act the respondent was not required to
disclose the questions asked of interviewees.
15. It is
therefore concluded that the respondent violated the complainants' rights with
respect to the allegation described in paragraph 2c., above, but did not
violate the complainants' rights with respect to the allegations described in
paragraphs 2a., 2b., 2d. and 2e., above.
The following order by the Commission is hereby
recommended on the basis of the record concerning the above-captioned
complaint:
1. With
respect to the allegation described in paragraph 2c. of the findings, above,
the respondent shall henceforth strictly comply with the requirements of
1-21(a), G.S.
2. With
respect to the allegations described in paragraphs 2a., 2b., 2d. and 2e. of the
findings, above, the complaint is hereby dismissed.
Approved by Order of the
Freedom of Information Commission at its regular meeting of March 22, 1995.
Debra L. Rembowski
Clerk of the
Commission
Docket #FIC 94-201 Page 4
PURSUANT TO SECTION 4-180(c),
G.S. THE FOLLOWING ARE THE NAMES OF EACH PARTY AND THE MOST RECENT MAILING
ADDRESS, PROVIDED TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION, OF THE PARTIES OR
THEIR AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE.
THE PARTIES TO THIS CONTESTED
CASE ARE:
LISA WLODARSKI, MACKLIN REID
AND THE RIDGEFIELD PRESS
P.O. Box 1019
Ridgefield, CT 06877
RIDGEFIELD BOARD OF POLICE
COMMISSIONERS
c/o J. Allen Kerr, Jr., Esq.
24 Bailey Avenue
Ridgefield, CT 06877
RIDGEFIELD INDEPENDENT PARTY
c/o William I. Allen
20 Fairview Avenue
Ridgefield, CT 06877
Debra L. Rembowski
Clerk of the Commission