FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
In the Matter of a Complaint by Final Decision
Henry E. Buermeyer,
Complainant
against Docket #FIC 92-355
Groton Board of Education and Groton Superintendent of Public Schools,
Respondents August 11, 1993
The above-captioned matter was heard as a contested case on May 14, 1993, at which time the complainant and the respondents appeared, stipulated to certain facts and presented testimony, exhibits and argument on the complaint.
After consideration of the entire record, the following facts are found and conclusions of law are reached:
1. The respondents are public agencies within the meaning of 1-18a(a), G.S.
2. By letter of complaint dated and postmarked November 20, 1992, the complainant alleged that during the course of its special meeting held on October 22, 1992 (hereinafter "October meeting"), the respondent board violated 1-21, G.S.
3. First, the complainant alleged that at the October meeting an executive session was convened to discuss "student personnel matters" and the minutes for the executive session did not sufficiently identify all persons in attendance. Specifically, the complainant alleged that although three parents of two high school students attended the executive session at the October meeting, the minutes for the meeting did not list the names of the Groton public school students' parents who attended the executive session, in violation of 1-21g(a), G.S.
4. The complainant further alleged that although the respondent board's notice of special meeting and agenda for the October meeting indicated that the board would also discuss a "student disciplinary matter," the respondent board subsequently took two formal votes during the meeting, in violation of 1-21(a), G.S.
Docket #FIC 92-355 Page 2
5. It is found that the respondent board convened in executive session during the special meeting in question to discuss the "student's problems" and performances as Groton public school students.
6. It is found that the minutes for the respondent board's October meeting stated that the parents of the students in question attended the executive session.
7. It is found that each of the students and their parents have the same surname, therefore, to disclose the identities of the parents would identify the students.
8. It is concluded, therefore, that because the discussion of a public school student is a permissible subject of an executive session under 1-18a(e)(5), G.S., and the identity of a public school student is exempt from disclosure under 1-19(b)(11), G.S., the respondent board's merely describing, without identifying, the parents of the student in question in the minutes of its October 22, 1992 executive session is sufficient, under the facts of this case, for compliance with the minutes requirements of 1-21(a) and 1-21g(a), G.S.
9. The complainant also alleged that although the respondent board's notice of special meeting and agenda for the October meeting indicated that the board would also discuss a "student disciplinary matter," the respondent board subsequently took two formal votes during that portion of the meeting, in violation of 1-21(a), G.S.
10. Section 1-21(a), G.S., states in relevant part that the notice of special meeting shall specify the "business to be transacted [and] [n]o other business shall be considered at such meetings. . . . "
11. It is found that the notice of special meeting item regarding the student disciplinary matter was sufficiently specific to put an interested member of the community on notice that the respondent board of education would consider the disciplinary matter.
12. It is concluded that under the facts of this case that an interested member of the community would understand that the respondent board might also take some action on the student disciplinary matter as a result of the board's discussion, whether or not the words "action" or "vote" were contained in the notice of special meeting.
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13. It is therefore concluded that under the circumstances of this case the disputed notice of special meeting item relating to the student disciplinary matter sufficiently described the business to be transacted at the October meeting.
14. It is further concluded that the respondent board of education did not violate 1-21(a), G.S., by using the language contained in its notice of special meeting item.
15. The Commission notes, however, that while it finds that the notice of special meeting item was technically adequate, the respondent board, as a matter of good public policy, should consider using language in its meeting notices and agendas that specifically communicates whether action will be taken or might be considered with respect to particular agenda items.
The following order by the Commission is hereby recommended on the basis of the record concerning the above-captioned complaint:
1. The complaint is hereby dismissed.
Approved by Order of the Freedom of Information Commission at its regular meeting of August 11, 1993.
Debra L. Rembowski
Acting Clerk of the Commission
Docket #FIC 92-355 Page 4
PURSUANT TO SECTION 4-180(c), G.S. THE FOLLOWING ARE THE NAMES OF EACH PARTY AND THE MOST RECENT MAILING ADDRESS, PROVIDED TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION, OF THE PARTIES OR THEIR AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE.
THE PARTIES TO THIS CONTESTED CASE ARE:
Henry E. Buermeyer
40 Spicer Avenue
Groton, CT 06340
Groton Board of Education and Groton Superintendent of Public Schools
c/o Atty. Loren Lettick
Sullivan, Lettick & Schoen
646 Prospect Avenue
Hartford, CT 06105-4286
Debra L. Rembowski
Acting Clerk of the Commission