FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF
CONNECTICUT
In the Matter of
a Complaint by Final
Decision
John P. Ambrogio
and Lewis Perry,
Complainants
against Docket #FIC 91-346
Hamden Board of
Police Commissioners,
Respondent November 4, 1992
The above-captioned matter was
heard as a contested case on May 18, 1992, at which time the complainants and
the respondent appeared, stipulated to certain facts and presented testimony,
exhibits and argument on the complaint.
At the hearing, the hearing officer denied the requests of the
complainants and respondent for a second continuance of this matter, the case
having originally been scheduled for a hearing on April 20, 1992. Also at the hearing, the hearing officer
granted the motion of Charles Watts to be made an intervenor in this
matter. After the hearing, the
Commission received from the complainant Ambrogio a certified transcript of the
October 9, 1991 disciplinary hearing described in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the
findings, below, which transcript the Commission on its own motion makes a full
exhibit in this case.
After consideration of the
entire record, the following facts are found and conclusions of law are
reached:
1. The respondent is a public agency within the meaning of
1-18a(a), G.S.
2. By letter of complaint filed November 6, 1991, the
complainants appealed to the Commission, alleging that the respondent violated
the Freedom of Information Act at its October 9, 1991 meeting.
3. Specifically, the complainants alleged that the
respondent:
a. permitted a stenographer to be
present during its executive session at its October 9, 1991 meeting;
b. solicited information regarding a
disciplinary charge, but did not solicit sworn testimony;
Docket #FIC
91-346 Page
2
c. discussed matters that were not the
proper subjects for an executive session, including the policy and procedure of
the respondent in conducting disciplinary hearings; and
d. failed to include in its agenda for
the October 9, 1991 meeting a notice that an executive session would be held or
the name of the officers who would be the subject of disciplinary charges.
4. It is found that the respondents held a meeting on
October 9, 1991, at which time disciplinary charges were scheduled to be
presented and heard against a police officer.
5. It is found that the respondents conducted most of their
consideration of the disciplinary charges in public session, and conducted two
portions of their deliberations in executive session.
6. With respect to the allegation described in paragraph
3.a, above, it is found that a stenographer attended and recorded at least one
portion of the deliberations in executive session.
7. It is found that the purpose of the stenographer's
presence was to create a stenographic record of the proceedings, not to present
testimony or opinion.
8. It is concluded that the stenographer's presence in the
executive session was technically a violation of of 1-21g, G.S.
9. With respect to the allegation described in paragraph
3.b., above, it is concluded that the complainants failed to allege a violation
of the Freedom of Information ("FOI") Act.
10. With respect to the allegation described in paragraph
3.c., above, it is found that the respondent discussed with the individuals
present in open session whether it was permissible under the FOI Act to present
the charges against the officer while in executive session.
11. It is found that the respondent also discussed in open
session whether the charges were timely under the collective bargaining
agreement between the repondent and the officer's union.
12. It is found that the charges against the police officer
were also formally presented, and his plea entered, in open session.
13. It is found that the respondent convened in executive
session to discuss the actual disciplinary charges brought against the police
officer, and whether there existed significant cause to proceed with a
disciplinary hearing.
Docket #91-346 Page
3
14. With respect to the allegation described in paragraph 3.d,
above, it is concluded that the FOI Act does not require that individuals whose
performance is discussed in executive session be named in the agenda, and does
not require that an intention to convene in executive session be set forth in
the agenda.
15. It is concluded that the respondent did not violate
1-21(a), G.S. with respect to the allegation described in paragraph 3.d,
above.
The following order by the
Commission is hereby recommended on the basis of the record concerning the
above-captioned complaint:
1. With respect to the allegations described in paragraphs
3.b., 3.c. and 3.d of the findings, above, the complaint is dismissed.
2. With respect to the allegation described in paragraph
3.a. of the findings, above, henceforth the respondent shall strictly comply
with the requirements of 1-21g, G.S.
Approved by
Order of the Freedom of Information Commission at its special meeting of
November 4, 1992.
Debra
L. Rembowski
Acting
Clerk of the Commission
Docket #FIC
91-346
Page 4
PURSUANT TO
SECTION 4-180(c), G.S. THE FOLLOWING ARE THE NAMES OF EACH PARTY AND THE MOST
RECENT MAILING ADDRESS, PROVIDED TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION, OF
THE PARTIES OR THEIR AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE.
THE PARTIES TO
THIS CONTESTED CASE ARE:
John Ambrogio
Hamden
Department of Police Services
2900 Dixwell
Avenue
Hamden, CT 06518
Hamden Board of
Police Commissioners
c/o Carl A.
Secola
Assistant Town
Attorney
2372 Whitney
Avenue
Hamden, CT 06518
Debra
L. Rembowski
Acting
Clerk of the Commission