FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION

OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT

 

In the Matter of a Complaint by                        FINAL DECISION

 

George F. Kurtyka,

 

                        Complainant

 

            against              Docket #FIC 90-220

 

Derby Board of Police Commissioners,

 

                        Respondent                  May 22, 1991

 

            The above-captioned matter was heard as a contested case on October 1, 1990, at which time the complainant and the respondent appeared, stipulated to certain facts and presented testimony, exhibits and argument on the complaint.

 

            After consideration of the entire record, the following facts are found and conclusions of law are reached:

 

            1.         The respondent is a public agency within the meaning of 1-18a(a), G.S.

 

            2.         By letter of complaint dated June 8, 1990 and filed with the Commission on June 11, 1990, the complainant appealed to the Commission, alleging that the respondent, without notifying him, discussed him at meetings in January 1990 and on May 15, 1990, and that the respondent failed to include certain information in the minutes of one of its meetings.

 

            3.         It is found that the complainant had notice in fact of the alleged January 1990 meeting on or about February 1, 1990.

 

            4.         It is concluded that, pursuant to 1-21i(b), G.S., the Commission lacks jurisdiction over the portion of the complaint concerning the alleged January 1990 meeting.

 

            5.         It is found that the respondent held a regularly scheduled meeting on May 15, 1990.

 

            6.         It is found that the respondent convened in executive session at that meeting and discussed, among other matters, the number of vacation and other hours that, as a matter of general policy, would be credited to officers such as the complainant for periods the officers were not working and receiving workers' compensation benefits.

 

            7.         It is found that the respondent offered no evidence to prove that it took an affirmative vote of two-thirds of its members and stated the reasons for its executive session, as defined in 1-18a(e), G.S.

 

Docket #FIC 90-220                           Page 2

 

            8.         It is concluded therefore that the respondent violated 1-21(a), G.S.

 

            9.         It is found that there is pending litigation in Superior Court and pending claims before the Workers' Compensation Commission and the Board of Labor Relations between the complainant and the respondent.

 

            10.       It is also found that the respondent convened in executive session in part to discuss strategy and negotiations with respect to the pending claims and litigation referenced in paragraph 9, above.

 

            11.       It is concluded that the respondent did not violate 1-21(a), G.S., to the extent that it convened in executive session to discuss strategy and negotiations with respect to the pending claims and litigation referenced in paragraph 9, above.

 

            12.       It is also concluded, however, that the respondent did violate 1-21(a), G.S., to the extent that it convened in executive session to discuss its policy concerning the matters described in paragraph 6, above.

 

            13.       With respect to the complainant's final allegation, it is found that the respondent did not include the discussion of the matters referenced in paragraph 6, above, in the minutes of its May 15, 1990 meeting.

 

            14.       It is concluded, however, that the respondent did not violate 1-19(a), G.S., by failing to include that discussion in its minutes.

 

            The following order by the Commission is hereby recommended on the basis of the record concerning the above-captioned complaint:

 

            1.         Henceforth the respondent shall strictly comply with the requirements of 1-21(a), G.S., concerning the requirements of a two-thirds vote and statement of reasons before convening in executive session.

 

            2.         Henceforth the respondent shall strictly comply with the requirements of 1-18a(e) and 1-21(a), G.S., concerning the purposes for which an executive session is permitted.

 

            3.         The Commission notes that it conducted an educational workshop for the benefit of the respondent in February of 1991, at which time the requirements of 1-18a(e) and 1-21(a), G.S.,

 

Docket #FIC 90-220                           Page 3

 

were discussed generally.  Should the respondent have any remaining questions about those requirements, the Commission staff is available to answer questions during regular office hours.

 

Approved by order of the Freedom of Information Commission at its regular meeting of May 22, 1991.

 

                                                         

                                    Tina C. Frappier

                                    Acting Clerk of the Commission

 

Docket #FIC 90-220                           Page 4

 

PURSUANT TO SECTION 4-180(c), G.S. THE FOLLOWING ARE THE NAMES OF EACH PARTY AND THE MOST RECENT MAILING ADDRESS, PROVIDED TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION, OF THE PARTIES OR THEIR AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE.

 

THE PARTIES TO THIS CONTESTED CASE ARE:

GEORGE F. KURTYKA

46 Mohawk Avenue

Derby, CT 06418

 

DERBY BOARD OF POLICE COMMISSIONERS

c/o Francis A. Teodosio, Esq.

40 Franklin Street

Ansonia, CT 06401

 

                                                         

                                    Tina C. Frappier

                                    Acting Clerk of the Commission