FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF
CONNECTICUT
In the Matter of
a Complaint by FINAL DECISION
Steven A.
Anderson, Karen Armour, Edward P. Daniels, Jr., Lynn Hamlen and Charles
Raymond,
Complainants
against Docket #FIC 86-180
Darien Board of
Ethics,
Respondent October 8, 1986
The above captioned matter was heard
as a contested case on July 29, 1986, at which time the complainants and the
respondent appeared and presented testimony, exhibits and argument on the
complaint.
After consideration of the entire
record the following facts are found:
1.
The respondent is a public agency within the meaning of 1-18a(a),
G.S.
2.
By letter of complaint filed with the Commission on June 19, 1986 the
complainants alleged that the respondent convened improperly in executive
session during its May 14, 1986 and May 21, 1986 meetings. The second portion of the complainants'
appeal requests that the Commission review the respondent's rules and regulations
for compliance with the Freedom of Information Act.
3.
With respect to the complainants' request that the Commission review the
respondent's rules and regulations, it is found that a contested case is not
the proper forum to make such a determination and will therefore not be treated
here.
4.
It is found that the respondent convened in executive session during its
May 14, 1986 meeting for the stated purpose of reviewing correspondence sent by
one Charles Raymond to determine if his question fell within its jurisdiction.
Docket #FIC
86-180
Page 2
5.
The respondent claims this was a permissible purpose within the meaning
of 1-18a(e)(1), G.S.
6.
It is further found that while convened in executive session, the
respondent did not discuss Mr. Raymond's request, but instead discussed and
voted to send a letter to Mr. DeSelding in response to questions posed by him
to the respondent.
7.
It is found that the respondent failed to convene in executive session
for a permissible purpose within the meaning of 1-18a(e)(1), G.S.
8.
It is further found that the respondent voted while convened in
executive session in violation of 1-21, G.S.
9.
It is concluded that the respondent violated 1-21, G.S., when it
convened in executive session during its May 14, 1986 meeting for an improper
purpose and voted in executive session regarding the improper matter.
10.
It is found that the respondent conducted a special meeting on May 21,
1986.
11.
It is found that the respondent convened in executive sesssion at its
May 21, 1986 meeting for the stated purpose of deliberating over a letter sent
to it by one Charles Raymond.
12.
It is further found that while convened in executive session the
respondent discussed and voted to send a letter to Charles Raymond regarding
various questions posed by him to the respondent.
13.
It is found that the respondent failed to convene in executive session
at its May 21, 1986 meeting for a permissible purpose within the meaning of
1-18a(e)(1), G.S.
14.
It is found that the respondent voted while convened in executive
session in violation of 1-21, G.S.
15.
It is concluded that the respondent violated 1-21, G.S., when it
convened in executive session during it May 21, 1986 special meeting for an
improper purpose and voted in executive session regarding the improper matter.
16.
The Commission finds unpersuasive the respondent's argument that it was
proper to convene in executive session because of the attendance of the press
which allegedly takes many things out of context.
Docket #FIC
86-180
Page 3
17.
It is found that the presence of the press does not justify the
respondent's closed meetings or excuse it from complying with the open meetings
requirements of 1-21, G.S.
18.
The Commission notes that under the facts of this case, it would serve
no useful purpose to declare actions taken at either the May 14, 1986 or May
21, 1986 meetings null and void.
19.
The Commission also notes, however, that the respondent violated
numerous provisions of the Freedom of Information Act which indicates a clear
lack of knowledge on its part concerning the requirements of the Act.
20.
As a public agency, the respondent has a responsibility and obligation
to become knowledgeable with the requirements of the Freedom of Information
Act.
The following order by the
Commission is hereby recommended on the basis of the record concerning the
above-captioned complaint:
1.
The respondent shall henceforth act in strict compliance with 1-21,
G.S.
2.
The respondent shall forthwith provide the complainants with a copy of
the letters identified in paragraghs 6 and 12 of the findings, above.
3.
Each member of the respondent shall, within two weeks of the final
decision in this matter, read and study the terms of the Freedom of Information
Act, 1-15, 1-18a, 1-19 to 1-19c, inclusive and 1-20 to
1-21k, inclusive, G.S., and shall, at the end of such two weeks, provide the
Commission with an affidavit stating that the member is familiar with the
requirements of the Freedom of Information Act.
4.
The respondent shall provide a copy of this report to the town clerk for
posting in the same manner as a notice of special meeting is posted pursuant to
1-21(a), G.S. Such report shall
remain posted for a period of three weeks.
Approved by order of the Freedom of
Information Commission at its regular meeting of October 8, 1986.
ÿ
Catherine I.
Hostetter
Acting Clerk of the Commission